

**TIBET IN MODERN
WORLD POLITICS
(1774-1922)**

BY

WEI KUO LEE, M.A.

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN THE

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK

1931

COPYRIGHT, 1931
BY
WEI KUO LEE

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BY PAUL MAISEL COMPANY, NEW YORK

**SAM HOUSTON STATE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
HUNTSVILLE, TEXAS 77340**

**Dedicated to
my friend
MANUEL KOMROFF**

INTRODUCTION

WELL-WRITTEN books on Tibetan foreign affairs are scant. Even among these few ivory beads, some, on closer examination, appear to be made of bone. Works by the Chinese and the British are seldom free from prejudice, and volumes by "bystanders" are rarely profound. Perhaps Tibet is too remote from our experience, and its foreign relations are not attractive enough to first-class scholars.

Yet, if there is a grain of truth in Tyler Dennett's remark that the Far East is the back door of European diplomacy, the Tibetan situation is not such a negligible force in the ebb and flow of world politics as we suppose.¹ At least, as far as China, Russia and Great Britain are concerned, Tibet's friendship or antipathy towards any outside power is not to be overlooked. In Russia's Central Asiatic policy, Tibet has never been left out of consideration. Tibet seems to the British an ideal buffer state to protect India. That Downing Street gave assurances to St. Petersburg in 1904 that British actions in Tibet would not lead to permanent occupation could be traced to Great Britain's desire to retain Russia's support for her "reforms" in Egypt. Isvolsky yielded to Nicolson in the 1907 negotiations because Hardinge promised Great Britain's willingness to consider favorably Russia's future proposal regarding the Dardanelles. Later, when suggestions were made in Parliament that China should not be recognized in 1912 unless she solved the Tibetan question to the satisfaction of the Indian government, the fate of a great Far Eastern republic was at once linked with the Tibetan issue.

The scope of this monograph is limited mainly to the period 1774-1922. Indeed, I wished to carry the story up-to-date, if I could possibly find sufficiently reliable materials. But British

¹ It has been often said that the minerals especially gold in Tibet are fabulous. A desire to appropriate these resources may inspire some outside power to make an attempt to control Tibet.

parliamentary papers have given no special information on Tibetan foreign relations since 1910; British parliamentary debates contain practically nothing on the period from 1914 to 1931; and no memoirs of active participants in Tibetan affairs have been published after 1924. Consequently, I have not attempted to continue the narrative beyond that date. Unofficial sources indicate little change in the situation since 1922. In the absence, however, of authentic information, I have resisted the temptation of treading on uncertain ground.

The purpose of this monograph is twofold; to narrate and to interpret Tibet's relations with China, Russia and Great Britain. It will not only show *was es eigentlich gewesen ist* but also *wie es eigentlich geworden ist*. In order to show the latter, it is necessary to relate the former. For, as a distinguished American historian has said, when we ask history "why," it will answer "what." (History has continuity in time, because individual events do not come like bolts from the blue. On the other hand, history also has unity in space, because situations, like the waves of the sea, are linked rings not without effect one on the other. Although they made rise and fall separately, they are still contained within one rhythmical cadence.

In order to present a reasonably true and relatively correct picture of the subject, I have relied, *quae cum ita sint*, upon documentary sources, memoirs, biographies and other works by actors on the scene, more than upon any other kind of literature. That they are incomplete, the obvious lacunae in the narrative attest. That they are to be interpreted with discrimination goes without saying. But what a task! Forces fraught with meaning may have escaped my notice. The springs of human impulses are shrouded in mystery.

Why Napoleon decided to sell Louisiana while soaking in the bath tub was certainly incomprehensible to contemporary psychologists. That Tamerlane retreated not because of his fear of the Tsar but because he preferred a Chinese throne to the Russian steppes was only discovered long after the passing of the


founder of the Muscovite Russia. Who knew that the search for the Golden Fleece was prompted by an unquenchable thirst for wealth, until it was explained by one of our present-day Marxists? In the eighties who conceived that the rise of the German empire was not due so much to the troops of Moltke as to "impponderables?" It may be that history should be only a store house from which we may draw consolation for our mistakes. It may be that we should not try to comprehend the scheme of the divine hand. If, therefore, my attempt to present a more or less interpretative account of the subject is merely a *ballon d'essai*, my apologia is *volo non valeo*. If there are appalling gaps in this outline, let them be filled not by my trembling pen, but by the firmer brush of Time.

In the preparation of this treatise, Messrs. Manuel Komroff, Cyrus H. Peake, Maurice Bernstien, Paul Love, Harry Strauss, Miss Florence Kronman, and Madam L. Stahl have been of great assistance to me in various ways. Above all, to Professor Parker Thomas Moon, who has given me unfailing encouragement and scholarly guidance, I remain deeply indebted. But for the opinions and conclusions I have presented in these pages I alone bear responsibility.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	7
ANGLO-TIBETAN RELATIONS	15
SINO-TIBETAN RELATIONS	81
RUSSO-TIBETAN RELATIONS	126
CONCLUSION	142
BIBLIOGRAPHY	146

THE POSITION
OF TIBET
IN RELATION TO
CHINA, INDIA
AND RUSSIA



R U S S I A

C H I N A

I N D I A

P E R S I A

A F G H A N I S T A N

K O K O N O R

T i b e t

K A R A K O R A M

N E P A L


S I A M

F R E N C H I N D O - C H I N A

K O R E A

J A P A N

C A S P I A N S E A



Adapted from Vonghastand's 'India and Tibet'.

CHAPTER ONE

ANGLO-TIBETAN RELATIONS

I

THE FRUITLESS EFFORTS OF GREAT BRITAIN TO OPEN TIBET TO TRADE 1774-1888

IN 1772 in the province of Bengal ruled Warren Hastings. Conversant with Asiatic affairs, calculating in deliberation, and swift in manoeuvre, he not only consolidated but extended the territories conquered by Clive. With remarkable foresight he visualized the possibilities of political and commercial relations with the hermit nation veiled by the snowy peaks of the Himalayas.¹ His policy was, then, a forward policy, combining "in a noteworthy manner alertness and deliberation, rapidity and persistency, assertiveness and receptivity."

On his eager ambition fate seemed to have smiled, for soon an opportunity presented itself. The Bhutanese, then still vassals of Tibet, invaded Bengal, overran Kuch Behar and imprisoned the raja. The people of Kuch Behar petitioned the British for help, with which request Hastings readily complied, and the invaders were driven back by British arms into their fastnesses. Fearful of a further British punitive advance, the Bhutanese appealed to Tibet for intercession on their behalf. So the regent of Tibet, the Tashi Lama, wrote to Hastings to counsel moderation towards their ward, whereupon the British governor proposed a general treaty of amity and commerce between Bengal and Tibet, in order to settle disputes on the frontier and develop friendship.²

This is how the 1774 mission headed by Bogle was conceived

¹ Curzon, *British Government in India*, vol. ii, pp. 155-156.

² Younghusband, *India and Tibet*, p. 7.

and sent to Tibet. Bogle reached Shigatse, but due to the Lhasa government's suspicion of British motives, its fear of British power, its deference to Russia's possible displeasure, and its hesitation to offend China, he failed to conclude the desired treaty with the Tashi Lama.¹

Yet, the foundation for British relations with Tibet had already been laid. Constant communication between the Bengal government and Tibet was scrupulously maintained till, in 1782, Hastings sent another mission led by Turner to Tibet. But since the Tibetan regent was still afraid of Chinese and Russian influence, the result was no more than a verbal promise of the Tashi Lama to encourage trade.² Indeed, trade seemed to develop considerably until 1792, when Hastings left India and the Gurkhas of Nepal invaded Tibet. The latter event was responsible for bringing Chinese soldiers, upon the request of the Tibetans, into Tibet to expel the Nepalese. Subsequently, the growing antipathy to and waxing suspicion of the British on the part of the Chinese and the Tibetans caused the doors between India and Tibet to be closed for nearly a century.

In 1873, however, a really serious attempt was made to open Tibet. A commissioner was ordered to investigate the conditions and the prospect of Tibetan trade. In connection with this project, a road was constructed.³ In 1885, with Chinese consent, C. Macaulay was to be sent to Lhasa, but for some reason the mission was countermanded and eventually abandoned.

The result of the abandonment of the Macaulay mission was alleged to be twofold. In the first place, it caused the relations and trade between Tibet and India to suffer an eclipse, and, secondly, it predisposed the Tibetans so to underestimate British prowess that they ventured to "invade" Sikkim in 1888.⁴ Another

¹ Younghusband, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-25 *passim*.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 26, 28-29.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 30-41; *Parl. D.*, vol. 130, pp. 1123-1124.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 1124; *A. & P.*, 1904, (*cd.* 1920) vol. lxxvii, no. 26, enclosure 8, annexure 1, p. 95.

cause of the sudden appearance of the Tibetan troops in Sikkim was found by a British officer in the anti-foreign movement in Tibet, especially in eastern Tibet.¹

Yet we may question if the sending of troops into Sikkim in 1888 by the Tibetan government was a violation of either the customary or the conventional law of nations. In 1888, Sikkim, according to the understanding of Tibet, was under her jurisdiction.² The British protectorate over Sikkim was not established till after the treaty of 1890. Indeed, the very fact that the British demanded recognition of their protectorate over Sikkim as a *sine qua non* for peace showed clearly that British rights as a suzerain power were still unfounded. And according to the law that governs the conduct of states, the British government had not, prior to 1890, the legal justification for despatching its troops thither. So, if there had been any invasion of Sikkim, that invasion was in 1888 undertaken by the British themselves, not the Tibetans. Even if we assumed Sikkim *res nullius*, which the British would have the right to occupy, yet this right must be equally extended to Tibet. Thus, in case England should try to justify her action in Sikkim, and her indictment of Tibetan conduct, she must have recourse not to recognized international practices but to the "wolf law" of the nations as expounded by Joseph Stalin, according to which, "You are right, if strong; if weak, you're wrong."³

Or should the "invasion" be attributed partly to the contempt of the Tibetans for British power? For one thing, Tibet knew well that China, the nation to which she had looked for help in 1792, and which she had ever since revered as a great power, had been lately brought to her knees by British arms twice, in

¹ Bell, *Tibet*, p. 60.

² Das, *British Expansion in Tibet*, p. 19.

³ *New York Times*, Feb. 6, 1931, pp. 1, 12.

1840 and 1856; and Tibet, single-handed and unsupported, could never be expected to launch such a quixotic adventure on British possessions under the shadow of the lion's paw. As a matter of fact, it was the British who took the offensive, for twice the Tibetans withdrew before the British banner.¹ Furthermore, this theory of contempt was glaringly irreconcilable with the persistent hesitation of the Tibetans before 1903 to open their country even at the grave risk of war. If there was any single reason for the presence of Tibetan troops in Sikkim, that reason should be found in the fear, instead of the belittlement, of British might. The Tibetans had heard of the conquest of India and of British interest in Tibet. They thought it would be better for them to close their doors tightly; consequently they refused to conclude treaties with the British and simultaneously tried to strengthen their position along their borders by asserting in a more powerful and positive fashion their suzerain rights in Sikkim, the very gateway between India and Tibet.

Nevertheless, Tibetan action was taken as an act of aggression. British troops were called to drive them out of Sikkim, and a treaty was concluded, whereby Great Britain was given a new status in Sikkim, the status of a suzerain.

II

THE STRAINED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TIBET AND GREAT BRITAIN AFTER 1890

(A) *The Treaty of 1890 and Its Aftermath*

AFTER the defeat of the Tibetans in Sikkim, the Chinese government was stirred to action and, through its representative in Lhasa, tried to effect a settlement. The *desiderata* of the Indian government were the recognition of the British protectorate over Sikkim, the improvement of trade, and the delimitation of the frontier between India and Tibet. But during the year 1889,

¹ Younghusband, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-49; Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

despite protracted negotiations, no settlement was reached.¹ Finally, the British lost their patience and proposed to drop the matter.²

This proposal only made the Chinese even more anxious to close the Sikkim incident with an agreement, for to them a definitive settlement was essential for the future goodwill of all parties. China, therefore, requested the Indian government to depute competent officials to open negotiations with the Chinese Amban at Gnatong. In December 1889 negotiations were resumed.³ In the middle of March the draft convention was approved. A few days later the treaty was signed. And at the end of the same year the treaty became effective when Great Britain appointed her commissioner as provided in art. 7.⁴

By virtue of the treaty British control over the internal administration and foreign relations of Sikkim was legally sanctioned. (art. 2) The "water-parting" of the Teesta river was taken as the boundary line. (art. 1) The pledge of mutual non-aggression was also given. (art. 3) The Indian government and the Chinese Amban were to appoint each a commissioner to act jointly to settle the questions of trade, pasturage on the Sikkim border, and the "method in which official communication between the British authorities in India and the authorities in Tibet shall be conducted."

There were three stumbling blocks in the negotiations for trade regulations. The first was the opposition of Tibet to opening Phari, though she was willing to open Yatung as a treaty port. The second was the Tibetan objection to the importation of Indian tea and salt into Tibet, accompanied by an insistence on the right of Tibet to import tea into Sikkim from the Tibetan

¹ Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61.

² Younghusband, *op. cit.*, p. 50; *A. & P.*, 1904 *op. cit.*, no. 1, p. 1; Das, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

³ *A. & P.*, *loc. cit.*, no. 2, p. 5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, nos. 3, 4, 8, pp. 5, 8. For the text of the treaty see no. 5, enclosure, pp. 6-7; *B. F. S. P.*, vol. lxxxvii, p. 9; Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 280 *et seq.*

side. The third was the death of the Chinese Amban, Sheng Tai, a man conversant with Tibetan affairs and possessing great prestige among the Tibetans. Due to these obstacles, a deadlock ensued.¹

Subsequently, however, a compromise was struck. Great Britain accepted Yatung as the first trade mart in Tibet. The importation of Indian tea into Tibet was forbidden for five years after the conclusion of the trade regulations, while other commodities were exempt from duties. At the expiration of this five-year period, Indian tea should be admitted on the condition that it should be subject to a duty not more than that to which Chinese tea was subject at English ports. And on December 5, 1893, the signature of the viceroy was formally attached to the convention.²

The trade regulations of 1893 opened Yatung as a trade mart, where British merchants were to conduct unmolested direct transactions with the natives. Thus direct communications between the Tibetan and the British subjects was confined definitely and positively to business dealings. Furthermore, article 7 stipulated that despatches between India and the Chinese Amban in Tibet were to be transmitted through the British political officer for Sikkim and the Chinese frontier officer. The fact that Tibet was left out as a party in future diplomatic negotiations was due to the simple reason that China, being the suzerain of Tibet, assumed the duty of conducting the foreign relations of and for Tibet, just as Great Britain undertook to conduct the foreign relations of Sikkim. Sikkim was not mentioned in this convention as a party probably because of the British protectorate. But the strange thing is that later, when Lord Curzon tried to establish direct political and diplomatic relations with

¹ *A. & P.*, 1904 *op. cit.*, no. 9, pp. 11-12.

² *Ibid.*, no. 12, enclosure 1, annexure, pp. 22-23; *B. F. S. P.*, vol. lxxxv, p. 1235; Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 282-284.

Tibet, Col. Younghusband cited the convention to the Tibetans as the justification for Britain's forward policy.¹

Beside those commodities enumerated as contraband, such as arms, liquors and narcotic drugs, all other goods from both sides were to enjoy free passage for the period of five years, with the *proviso* that a negotiated tariff might be raised if found desirable (arts. 3, 4)². The right to continue to graze their cattle in Sikkim was given to the Tibetans on the condition that they should observe the grazing laws to be enacted by the British government from time to time (art. 9). Finally these regulations were subject to revision after five years from the beginning of their enforcement, on six months' notice given by either party.³

The greatest weakness of the treaty of 1890 and the trade regulations of 1893 was that the Tibetans, though reticent and taciturn at the moment when these conventions were concluded, declared later, when involved in controversy with the British, that they could not give cognizance to these agreements which lacked their concurrence and adhesion.⁴ Then, there remained the problem of the frontier, unsolved despite treaty provisions, because the Tibetans refused in practice to relinquish their customary right of grazing cattle in Sikkim.

¹ *A. & P.*, 1904 *op. cit.*, nos. 27, 28, 29, pp. 99-102.

² Here ambiguity crept in. This phrase, "if found desirable," did not, as it should, specify whether that desire should come from one side or from both. If it meant the desire of both parties, then, Great Britain, simply by truculent obstructiveness, would be always in the position to continue her free trade in Tibet. Even if it meant that initiative might come from one, still England could abstain from concurring, and that abstention would be powerful enough to block any modification in the *status quo*.

³ Later when Lord Curzon tried to discard the provision governing the importation of Indian tea, he argued that the provision was not just because it subjected Indian tea to a too irksome burden. Yet a fair-minded observer can hardly see the alleged injustice, if what China demanded was an action on the importation of Indian tea into Tibet like that taken on the importation of Chinese tea into Great Britain.

⁴ *A. & P.*, 1904 *op. cit.*, no. 21, p. 71; no. 26. enclosure 8, annexure 1, pp. 93-95.

Besides, Yatung was far from being a desirable trade mart. It is "a hole in the valley" fifty yards wide, uninhabited, and sunshine showers its blessings on this dark depression only at certain hours of the day.¹ Moreover, it is altogether too near to the frontier to permit British traders to use more northern passes into Tibet.² These natural obstructions were made even more objectionable in view of the wall built by the Tibetans a little below the site, which prevented the Tibetans on their side from meeting the British.³

Indeed, the British had for a long time conceived the idea of removing the trade mart at Yatung to some other suitable place. Everything considered, of course, Gyantse, halfway between Lhasa and the British border on the Nyang Chu, would be the ideal trade mart. But the British, knowing well the susceptibilities of the Tibetan government, were ready to be satisfied with Phari. It has a commanding position in the Chumbi valley, the chief artery of trade between Tibet and India. It is also connected with Kalimpong on the border between India and Sikkim.⁴

It is here that the question of trade marts and that of the frontier merged into a perplexing puzzle. As early as 1895 reports reached the Indian government that the Tibetans had occupied certain places within the northeastern boundary of Sikkim, in the disputed region created by the treaty of 1890.⁵ After some communication, China agreed to investigate jointly with the Indian government. The work was actually commenced in

¹ *A. & P.*, 1904 *op. cit.*, no. 21, p. 71; no. 26. enclosure 8, annexure 1, pp. 93-95.

² *Ibid.*, no. 9. pp. 8-14.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 26, enclosure 8, annexure 1, p. 94.

⁴ Gyantse was, however, opened eventually in 1904, by virtue of the Lhasa convention. It has ever since been the seat of British influence in Tibet, from which British interests, both political and commercial, radiate.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 13, pp. 24-42. This region of Giagong, in which Tibet claimed the right of occupation, was denied to her by the treaty of 1890, which assigned the territory to Sikkim.

May, 1895. But before long, Mr. White, the British representative, was informed by the Amban that, due to the suspicion with which Tibetan monasteries regarded British motives, it would be better to postpone the work. Almost simultaneously news reached India that the pillars erected by White at the Jelep la and Donchuk la had been either demolished or damaged.¹

The Indian government under Lord Elgin assumed an attitude quite different from that of his immediate successor. Lord Elgin reasoned that, since the Treaty of 1890 did not provide for pillars along the frontier, since no serious dispute had arisen before in the absence of pillars, and finally, since the damage to these pillars could hardly be directly attributable to Tibetan officials, White should be instructed not to cross Doka la. Lord Elgin even went so far as to acknowledge that to this disputed region Tibet had a "reasonable" claim.² He could also appreciate the difficult position of the Chinese Amban in enforcing the treaty in Tibet. Above all, he understood that the Amban had been instructed to settle the boundary question, and in all probability, the Tibetan government might send delegates to Yatung to discuss the whole matter. It paid to wait, and he waited.³

The year 1896 witnessed no progress in negotiations due to the denunciation of the treaty of 1890 by the Tibetans and the non-arrival of the new Chinese Amban. On the British side, the desire to promote trade at the cost of relinquishing claims to the disputed region grew and, with it, the spirit of patience and conciliation.⁴ Two years later, in December, China promised to exert her influence over Tibet to remove the customs house from Yatung to Rinchingong, if India

¹ *A. & P.*, 1904, *op. cit.*, no. 13, enclosure 9, annexure 3, p. 38.

² *Ibid.*, no. 16, p. 52; no. 17, p. 53; no. 18, pp. 53-60.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 14, pp. 42-50.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 21, p. 71.

could meet the Tibetan wishes in the delimitation of the frontier.¹ To this proposal even Lord Curzon was well disposed, but he differed from Lord Elgin in that he attached too many strings to his concession, which will be discussed presently.²

During this period there was also a great deal of debate as to the possibility and reasonableness of ascribing the increase of trade to the treaty of 1890 and the trade regulations of 1893. As far as the actual volume of trade is concerned, the figures compiled by the British government tell a more convincing story.³ The average annual amount of trade during the three-year period, 1885-1888, when the relations between Tibet and India were not strained, was valued at 5,00,000 rupees. But during the next period, 1888-1889, due to great military commotion in Sikkim, trade shrank to a diminutive fragment of the normal volume, only 7,349 rupees. A steady upward swing appeared, however, after the conclusion of the treaty of 1890, starting from 2,80,712 rupees and reaching the unprecedented high peak of 11,49,150 rupees in 1895.⁴

In November 1895, a letter came from the Bradford chamber of commerce, Yorkshire, England, to the India Office. It called the attention of the home government to the fact that the high altitude and cold weather in Tibet made the demand for woollen clothing, blankets, and other articles of British manufacture urgent and imperative in Tibet. At the same time, there were many natural products from Tibet such as minerals, skins, furs, and above all the hair of shawl goats, which Great Britain in general needed, or Bradford, Yorkshire, in particular. And in view of this need, they proposed to open Tibet more widely for

¹ *A. & P.*, 1904, *op. cit.*, no. 26, enclosure 8, annexure 1, pp. 93-95.

² *Ibid.*, no. 26, enclosure 7, pp. 86-87.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 14, enclosure 12, p. 50.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 26, enclosure 8, annexure 1, p. 95.

Lord Elgin himself hesitated to subscribe to the view that the result of the treaty of 1890 and the trade regulations of 1893 was entirely disappointing in view of the increase of trade. *Ibid.*, no. 21, p. 71.

the free flow of trade. In response to this request Lord Hamilton promised to provide more facilities.¹

(B) *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the End of British Isolation*

THE era of British isolation closed definitely with the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902. This momentous combination of two powers was primarily purposed to check the expansive movement of Russia, and Russia was checked.

After the Berlin congress Russia's dream of her historical mission in Constantinople had been shattered for the time being. She had then turned her attention, as she did usually when she failed on one of her other two diplomatic frontiers, to Central Asia. But after the second Afghan war in 1881, her advance in Afghanistan was checked.² Moreover, her economic penetration into Persia was also doomed to failure by the efforts of the energetic Curzon.³ Under these circumstances, the only field for her expansion was the Far East. The Russians know that they are an Oriental people⁴ and Bismarck had warned them that their mission was in Asia.⁵ It was at this juncture that Muravieff and Ignatieff brought the idea of the trans-Siberian railway into prominence.⁶ And with that idea came the peaceful economic penetration into China, the policy of Count Witte.⁷

¹ *A. & P.*, 1904, *op. cit.*, no. 15, p. 51.

² Lord Roberts, *Forty Years in India*, pp. 339-340.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44; 46-51; 60-62.

⁴ Kornilov, *Modern Russian History*, vol. ii, p. 283.

⁵ Tomimas, *The Open Door Policy*, p. 4. The iron chancellor used to say that all Russia could get in Europe was nihilism and other maladies. The Kaiser continued to urge Russia to seek for empire in the Far East. (Witte, *Memoirs*, pp. 137-138; also see *Willy-Nicky Correspondence*.)

⁶ Krausse, *The Far East*, p. 112.

⁷ Witte, *loc. cit.*, p. 304.

The signal of Russia's *Drang nach Osten* was given by her joint *démarche* with France and Germany in 1895, forcing Japan to restore Liaotung to China. Soon afterwards a Russian loan to China was floated.¹ The "Cassini convention" was in the air,² and was then believed to be signed.³ And after the visit of Li Hung Chang to St. Petersburg, a secret alliance was cemented against Japan, giving Russia the right to build her railway through Manchuria.⁴ In 1898 Russia took Port Arthur and Darien, and finally, after the outbreak of the Boxer rebellion, she rushed large numbers of troops into north China.

While her pretensions in Manchuria and Mongolia were assuming ominous dimensions, the tension between her and Great Britain in Afghanistan and Tibet grew.⁵ In July 1901, the Burjat Buddhist, Dorjjeff, on his mission to Russia as the emissary of the Dalai Lama, was received in the Tsar's palace, and given imperial audience.⁶ Simultaneously the eminent Russian Orientalist, G. T. Tzybikov, a Buddhist himself, was travelling in Tibet.⁷ Upon the heels of these events, the news of an alleged secret treaty between China and Russia regarding Tibet spread in England.⁸ England was spurred to change her policy from passive conciliation to active aggression, which in turn aggravated the ill-feelings of these two countries all the more desperately.⁹

Thus England and Japan found a common enemy in Russia. And when the overtures made by Ito to Russia were not heeded

¹ MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China*, vol. i, p. 35.

² *Ibid.*, p. 79.

³ Gerard, *Ma Mission en Chine*, pp. 122-123.

⁴ MacMurray, *loc. cit.*, p. 81.

⁵ Roberts, *op. cit.*, pp. 339-340.

⁶ A. & P., 1904, *op. cit.*, no. 36, pp. 117-118; *cf. infra.*, pp.

⁷ Berlin, "England and Tibet," *Novii Vostok*, 1922, vol. ii, p. 358; see also Tzybikov, *Buddhist Palomnik U Swiatyn Tibeta*.

⁸ Berlin, *loc. cit.*

⁹ Ular, "The Solution of the Tibetan Problem," *Cont. Rev.*, 1904, pp. 640-648.

by the Tsar, who was then under the hypnotizing influence of Bezobrazov and Alexieff, the seed of an alliance between England and Japan was sown. Japan could gratefully recall the attitude of non-intervention of England in 1895, and that England was the first nation to relinquish her treaty rights in Japan. Thus the road was well paved for a great event, and a page of Far Eastern diplomatic history was to be turned.

The negotiations for such an alliance were started however, not by the two parties concerned, but by Germany. As early as 1901, Baron von Eckardstein, then the German chargé d'affaires in London, proposed to Count Hayashi an alliance between Germany, Japan and England for the maintenance of order in the Far East and assured the latter that Lord Lansdowne, Mr. A. Balfour, Mr. J. Chamberlain, and even Lord Salisbury were well disposed towards this idea. So also were the Kaiser and Prince von Bülow.¹ But strangely enough, the idea was soon dropped by the German government, and the alliance was formed without its initiator. *Per contra*, the German government at a later date, through Bülow, refused to confirm that Germany had taken any initiative in such an alleged proposal.²

Hayashi was an adroit and accomplished diplomat with a deep conviction of the wisdom of concluding such an alliance, and it was through his skill and tact that the combination of the two island empires was achieved.³ The primary motive of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was, of course, the protection of the interests of the two parties in the Extreme East, in China and Korea. Thus they were allowed to take the necessary steps to preserve their special interests if threatened by any aggressive

¹ Hayashi, *Secret Memoirs*, pp. 119-120.

² Eckardstein, *Diplomatische Enthüllungen Zum Ursprung Des Weltkrieges*, p. 3; Hamman, *Zur Vorgeschichte Des Weltkrieges*, p. 101.

³ Hayashi, *loc. cit.*, pp. 88-89, 121, 127-128. For the documents related to the negotiations, see *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, vol. ii, pp. 89-138.

action on the part of another power or by the disturbance in China and Korea. In a war undertaken by one party in defense of its rights against any outside power, the other party was expected to observe strict neutrality and to use its efforts to prevent some other power from joining in war against its ally. In case some other power or powers should join the antagonist of one ally, the other ally was bound to conduct war jointly. These provisions mean clearly that if Russia should attack Japan, England would keep France from participating, thus leaving Japan to cope with Russia without fear of the operation of the Franco-Russian alliance. France, on the other hand, knowing the prowess of the British fleet, would hardly venture to declare war on Japan jointly with Russia under the penalty of losing her colonies. Furthermore, England, by cooperating with Japan to protect her rights in China, was in a better position to watch her Indian frontiers.

The result of the alliance was manifold. In the first place, France and Russia, following the conclusion of the alliance, declared that they also reserved to themselves the right to consult as to the means to be adopted to preserve their interests in case their interests in China were endangered either by the aggressive action of any third power, or by the recurrence of disorders in China.¹ This declaration showed that, whereas England and Japan merged, France and Russia were also ready to demonstrate their solidarity.

On Britain's side this alliance enhanced her moral position in world politics. She was no longer isolated. Also, by this time, the Boer war was brought to a successful close, and France was more and more inclined to a *rapprochement*. In India the ambitious Lord Curzon had been contemplating the proper means to be employed to strengthen the British position in Tibet. Now he saw that his country had found an ally. He understood that

¹ MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 325.

henceforth the home government could devote more attention to Tibetan affairs. He knew that Russia was actively absorbed in Manchuria and Korea. The field was cleared for action. The bugle was soon to be blown; the columns were to march—the Union Jack was to fly over the Potala!

III

THE PERIOD OF BRITISH ASCENDANCY IN TIBET, 1903-1906

(A) *The Character and Convictions of Lord Curzon*

As soon as Lord Curzon took office in 1899, the attitude of Great Britain towards Tibet changed, though the home government at that moment was not ready for any positive or aggressive action. When Curzon saw that all the world was actively engaged in carving out colonial empires, he undertook the task of annexing the incarnate Buddha for his country.¹ He considered India as the “noblest trophy of British genius, and the most splendid appanage to the imperial crown.”² He was described as a man, who assumed rule over others as a cross of duty and discharged that duty as a vice.³ As the viceroy of India, he perceived the need of keeping Russia at arm’s length by transforming Afghanistan and Tibet into buffer states.⁴ He derided the

¹ He was quoted as saying, “I will annex not territory, but the incarnate Buddha; I will have a divinity in my service. That is what I will do for my country.” *Parl. D.*, vol. 141, p. 149.

² *Proceedings of the Central Asian Society*, Dec. 14, 1904, p. 16.

³ Harris, *Europe and the East*, pp. 223-224.

⁴ “England sah Tibet, ebenso Afganistan, als ein ‘Glacis für seine Verteidigung Indiens gegen russisches Vordringen’ an, wie es in einer Rede des Lord Curzon hiess, und dieser Standpunkt war von englischer Seite zweifellos richtig.” Krause, *Geschichte Ostasiens*, vol. ii, p. 153

suzerainty of China over Tibet as a "constitutional fiction."¹ And in 1904 he even acted in open contravention of the orders and instructions of the home government. But he was a great viceroy. He had rare ability in administration, and subtle power in observation.² He was alert in action and skillful in diplomacy. He served his country well.

In 1899 three major problems in the relations between India and Tibet remained unsolved—the problems of the delimitation of the frontier, trade marts, and trade. As early as February of that year, Curzon manifested a willingness to give Tibet the disputed region of Giagong, because it was unimportant and unserviceable on account of its elevation and its unfitness for grazing.³ But Curzon's concession depended on three conditions: the removal of the trade mart from Yatung to Phari, the elimination of any restriction of trade by the Tibetans, and the conclusion of an extradition treaty. On the other hand, Tibet was willing to settle the controversy of the frontier without any reference to the question of trade or that of the trade marts, promising, however, that once frontier troubles were disposed of, it would be easy to enter into other arrangements. But, since Great Britain was not prepared to relinquish a piece of territory acquired through the treaty of 1890 for nothing, a deadlock occurred.⁴

In the middle of February, Curzon reported to Lord Hamilton that the attempt made by the India tea association in 1901

¹ *A. & P.*, 1904, *op. cit.*, no. 66, pp. 150-177.

² Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

Curzon, *Leaves from a Viceroy's Note Book and Other Papers*, p. vi. He was also well acquainted with the character and habits of Asiatic peoples, and the frontier affairs of India through his extensive travels. Curzon, *Frontiers*, p. A2.

Curzon was believed to be a man who had imagination, zeal, self-confidence, courage and an industry and a speed that left his colleagues panting behind him. Buchan, *Lord Minto*, pp. 212-213.

³ The elevation of Giagong is 15,000 ft. and grazing takes place there during only three months of the year.

⁴ *A. & P.*, *op. cit.*, no. 26, enclosure 7, pp. 86-87.

to import tea into Tibet under the regulations of 1893 was obstructed by local lamas and officials. The revision of those regulations had led only to protracted and unproductive negotiations with the Tibetans. China was impotent as the suzerain of Tibet. He suggested that the severance of trade intercourse with Tibet might be a possible measure, but he confessed simultaneously that such a policy had the serious disadvantage of diverting Tibetan trade from India to Nepal. In his opinion a better expedient would be to have the political officer for Sikkim undertake a tour along the border line as demarcated by the treaty of 1890, erect pillars wherever desirable and necessary, and prohibit the Tibetans from grazing their cattle south of the watershed, unless they paid a fee prescribed by India. He also proposed the use of force to intimidate Tibet, in the case of Tibetan resistance, and the occupation of the Chumbi valley in the face of a permanent and persistent opposition.¹

This proposal of a tour was approved by Hamilton, with the *proviso* that White should not cross the border.² The tour was undertaken, but no result was brought about.

The primary motive of the insistence of Great Britain on the removal of the trade mart from Yatung to Phari was commercial. As early as 1895, British merchants had already petitioned the government to open up Tibet either by a treaty with China, or by "such other means as may be expedient." In 1899 Curzon also complained that, despite the treaty of 1890 and the trade regulations of 1893, there was actually no trade at Yatung. He deplored, further, the fact that, while the merchants of Bhutan and Nepal were accorded perfect freedom to trade not only at Phari but even as far as Lhasa, Indian traders should be barred

¹ *A. & P.*, 1904, *op. cit.*, no. 44, pp. 125-130. Curzon finally grew wrathful. "We have for years carried the policy of forbearance and inaction to such unreasonable limits," he exclaimed. "Such a situation cannot in any case be lasting."

² *Ibid.*, no. 45, pp. 130-131.

from the privileges to which neighboring states were entitled.¹

In 1902 it was discovered that the tea trade in Tibet, which India could easily share in the absence of trade interference, was practically monopolized by the Chinese. As a matter of fact, Indian merchants were not prevented from participating in Tibetan tea trade. All they had to do was to pay a duty as high as that levied on Chinese tea at English ports. But the tragedy was that they were not in the mood to pay that duty. Later, an ingenious argument developed to the effect that, since Yatung was a Chinese treaty port, and since China did not levy more than 5% *ad valorem* on goods coming into her ports, the duty on Indian tea through Yatung ought to be subject to the same principle and practice.²

The absurdity of this argument of the Bengal chamber of commerce was made patent when Sir E. Satow, British minister to China, voiced a warning that though the duty on India tea would be 150% to 200% *ad valorem* according to treaty provisions, yet there was no possibility of discarding it because it had been agreed upon by Great Britain and China. He suggested, therefore, that India tea traders might trade at a loss, as merchants usually do at first, or cultivate a Tibetan taste for Indian tea by distributing free samples.³ This advice of a British diplo-

¹ *A. & P.*, 1904, *op. cit.*, no. 26, pp. 74-99.

² *Ibid.*, no. 46, enclosure, pp. 132-133. The argument is found in a letter from the Bengal chamber of commerce to the viceroy. This argument is certainly of a doubtful value. According to international law, a specific treaty always supercedes a general treaty in those respects wherein a difference lies between the general and the specific. The treaties between China and other powers, restricting her tariff, belong to the first category, and the treaties of 1890 and 1893 between China and England in regards to Tibet, to the latter. Furthermore, a subsequent treaty always supersedes a previous treaty unless otherwise provided. The treaties restricting the duty to be levied on goods at Chinese ports were concluded before the two above-mentioned treaties governing the commercial relations between India and Tibet. And if there is any inconsistency between the two, the latter should prevail over the former.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 63, enclosure 3, annexure pp. 149-150.

It must be remembered also that during the negotiation of the treaty of 1890

mat went unheeded by Indian tea traders, and the whole matter was temporarily laid on the table.

During these years the Indian government tried to communicate with Tibet directly, but did not succeed. Finally, Lord Curzon resorted to sending a man from Kalimpong, Sikkim, by the name of U-gyen (a man of considerable influence in neighboring countries) to the Dalai Lama to effect some settlement.¹ In February 1902, the third and the last attempt of U-gyen failed, and Curzon, who was always afraid that he could not accomplish much during his stay in India,² complained that the impossibility of holding direct intercourse with a neighboring state was an "extraordinary anachronism" of the twentieth century.³ But he did not understand that the Dalai Lama was prevented from communicating with foreign governments by treaties.⁴ His anger was aggravated when he watched the unhappy results of his plans. At last he became so wrathful that both China and Tibet were opposed to the importation of India tea. It was only when China became willing to make a concession that the provision in question was inserted, in favor of British interests—*cf. ibid.*, no. 46, pp. 131-133. In a debate of the House of Lords, the Earl of Rosebery said that, from reading the *Parliamentary Papers*, one would gather that the whole object of the policy of the Indian government in what they had done was to make people drink Indian tea who did not like Indian tea, and who did not want Indian tea. *Parl. D.*, vol. 130, p. 1141.

¹ *A. & P.*, 1904, *op. cit.*, no. 41, p. 125.

² When Lord Curzon was appointed viceroy, he said, "I have only five years." "For such a task every year seems a minute, every minute seems a second—one might almost say there is hardly time to begin." Harris, *op. cit.*, pp. 243-244.

³ *A. & P.*, *loc. cit.*, no. 44, pp. 125-130.

⁴ Lord Reay, in defense of the position of the Dalai Lama, said that, when the second attempt to communicate with the Dalai through U-gyen Kazi (Kazi being a courtesy title given to U-gyen by those who admired him) failed, the lieutenant governor of Bengal had pointed out that this kind of attempt was useless. In U-gyen Kazi's account, it was found that the Dalai Lama stated that he could not write to the Indian government, because during the time of Tangya Iling Demorin Pochi, an agreement was entered into by the Tibetans and the Chinese that no letter should be written without first consulting the Amban. *Parl. D.*, vol. 130, pp. 1111-1112.

he ridiculed British policy towards Tibet as moving in a vicious circle, and as both "unproductive and inglorious."¹ Years had elapsed; he was still far from his goal. The incarnate Buddha had not yet been annexed. He grew impatient. On January 8, 1903, his famous despatch was sent to the India Office. He counseled forward action, and soon the British advance on Tibet was set in motion.

(B) *Curzon's Despatch of January 8, 1903*

ON the eve of the delivery of Curzon's historic despatch on January 8, 1903, China had ordered Mr. Ho, together with Captain Parr, Chinese customs commissioner at Yatung, to discuss matters with White. But, for various reasons, Ho did not appear on the scene.² Meanwhile, the newly appointed Amban, Yu Tai, showed no sign of assuming his duties at an early date as expected by India. In view of the procrastination of the Chinese and the Tibetans, Curzon presented his concrete proposals to the home government and pressed for immediate action.³

In Curzon's opinion, two points ought to be borne in mind in dealing with Tibet and China. First of all, the fear created in the mind of the Tibetans by White's mission ought to be utilized to effect a better solution for all the problems between India and Tibet. In other words, the Indian government had to assume a more "minatory tone." Tibet must be threatened with a further British advance, if British commercial and other interests should be reduced to nullity by the Tibetan policy of obstructive inaction.⁴ In the second place, the rumored existence of a treaty between China and Russia regarding Tibet

¹ *A. & P.*, *op. cit.*, no. 26, pp. 74-99.

² Ho's non-arrival was due to his ill health and then to the decision of the Lhasa government to discuss the problem in Tibetan council before any proceeding should be instituted, and finally to the recall of Ho by the Amban.

³ For the text of the despatch, see *A. & P.*, 1904 *op. cit.*, no. 66, pp. 150-177.

⁴ *Cf. ibid.*, nos. 93, 94, p. 192.

seemed to have been confirmed by reports from various sources.¹ If negotiations should be resumed with Tibet, they ought to be invested with a more than local importance and not be limited to border disputes, or even to the mere amelioration of future British trade relations with Tibet. The whole problem of future political relations with Tibet, together with that of the degree to which the British government could allow any other power (meaning, of course, Russia) to exercise influence in Tibet, should also be threshed out.² British forbearance and inaction heretofore toward the Tibetan policy of exclusiveness was to be attributed solely to the fact that the policy of the Tibetan government did not carry with it any element of political and military danger. Now Russia was on the threshold of Tibet. It was inconceivable for the British to tolerate a rival and a hostile influence so close to the Indian borders and so pregnant with possibilities of mischief.

Under these circumstances, the most sensible countermove for the British was to assume the initiative themselves. The proposal of the Chinese for a conference was such a splendid opportunity that it should be seized to strengthen the British position. But it must be agreed in advance that the forthcoming conference was to be held in Lhasa instead of on the Indian border; and secondly, that Tibetan representatives should be allowed to participate in order to forestall the eventuality of Tibet's denouncing any treaty concluded, as it had done in regard to the treaty of 1890, on account of the absence of the Tibetan delegation.

Continuing, Curzon enumerated past attempts to work out solutions for problems through China. Their failure was due to the fact that China's suzerainty over Tibet was no more than

¹ *Infra*, pp. 130-131.

² In Curzon's opinion, Russia, the distance of whose nearest territory from Lhasa is more than a thousand miles, should not be permitted to exercise any preponderant power in Tibet.

a "political affectation" maintained because of its convenience to both parties. He admitted that China had been really anxious to open up Tibet to the "civilizing influence of trade," but her "pious hopes" were subsequently defeated because of the short-sighted stupidity of the lamas. The viceroy, however, became inconsistent when he proceeded to say that "in the same way Tibet is only too anxious to meet our advances, but she is prevented from doing so by the despotic veto of the suzerain." After reading these highly rhetorical passages, one might pause to ask who was then the real foe of trade. Curzon's conclusion seems to indicate that China was; but that is impossible, because, as he said, China had been anxious to break down the "barriers of ignorance and obstruction" in Tibet. Furthermore, were the Tibetans sincerely anxious to meet the British advances in trade? Had not the reports from British sources proved that the Tibetans had preferred isolation to commerce, so much that the transfer of the trade mart from Yatung to Phari was rendered impossible? Had not British documents also shown that the Tibetans were willing to forego their rights in Giagong rather than allow British traders further into Tibet? Had it not been the Tibetans who denounced the treaty of 1890 and the regulations of 1893 as invalid, because China threw one of the Tibetan doors open? Had not Mr. Bell, the veteran British diplomat in Tibet, complained that it was the Tibetans themselves who built walls around the trade mart at Yatung to prevent further penetration of British trade influence? Before 1903, due to the persistent requests of the Indian government, China was willing to exert herself to persuade the Tibetan government to allow the removal of the trade mart from Yatung to Rinchingong in order to meet the British half-way; and fruition was not realized only because of the determined opposition of the Tibetans themselves. Finally, when Lord Curzon despatched Younghusband to Tibet, did the Tibetans show their anxiety to

meet the "British advances?" They did—with guns and spears.

Lastly, China was not a real suzerain, because her Amban in Lhasa was not a viceroy but an ambassador, and the Chinese forces in the holy city were not more than five hundred ill-drilled troops. And, as alleged before, China, in addition to all her vices just mentioned by Curzon, was unable to enforce treaty obligations on the Tibetans. China was accused because she did not assert her suzerain rights; but she was equally vehemently indicted when she did, from 1908 to 1918.

After a bombardment of the policies of his predecessors, Curzon presented his own concrete measures. First, the British government should no longer trust to the interposition of China in the settlement of Tibetan affairs. Secondly, once decisions were made, there should be no abandonment of them simply because of the pressure of extraneous causes. Thirdly, the present Dalai Lama, fresh in age and full of energy, and being the *de facto* as well as the *de jure* ruler of Tibet, should be invited to participate in the conference to be called. Fourthly, the conference should be held in Lhasa the next Spring. In addition to the discussion of frontier problems, political and commercial relations should be touched upon and an attempt should be made to institute in Lhasa the post of a permanent British representative, "consular or diplomatic" in function. The British mission to Lhasa for the conference should be accompanied by an armed escort "sufficient to overawe any opposition." Yet at the same time, the India government might inform the Chinese government that the mission was of a purely commercial nature. Furthermore, complete cooperation with the Nepalese throughout the proceedings should be preserved. Finally, in regard to these matters, the opinion of the India government should carry weight with the home government because they affected the Indian frontiers immediately. Here was sown the seed of the struggle between the home government and the Indian government.

Here was found an immediate cause for the bitter attacks on Curzon's policies in Parliament.

(C) *The Victory of Lord Curzon Over the Home Government*

BEFORE the reply from the home government to the January 8 despatch came to India, Curzon had once more urged immediate action, because there was an "intentional" delay on the part of the new Amban, and because the situation was then, in Curzon's view, "extremely serious."¹ But at the same time, the alleged treaty between Russia and China respecting Tibet was being discussed, and Count Benckendorff had promised Great Britain to make an inquiry into its existence. In view of this active negotiation between the two governments, the attitude of the home government was not in favor of Curzon's proposed expedition, and considered it "most undesirable." So on February 20, Curzon was instructed to ask the Amban to reopen negotiations with the Tibetan representatives participating, and to wait for further orders as to the time and place for the conference.²

In his reply to Curzon's January 8 despatch, Lord Hamilton concurred with the viceroy as to the advisability of having British influence recognized in Lhasa in such a manner as to render it impossible for any other power to exercise a pressure on the Tibetan government, inconsistent with British interests. The secretary of state also agreed with Curzon that cooperation with the Nepalese should be maintained. But he told Curzon that the Tibetan question should be regarded from an international point of view; and before Russia gave her definitive answer as to the

¹ *A. & P.*, 1904, *op. cit.*, nos. 70, 71, p. 179.

² *Ibid.*, no. 74, p. 182.

truth of the secret treaty between China and Russia, the expedition, if despatched, might give rise to international complications, and the British might be accused of attacking the integrity of China.¹ Here we can say, so far as principles were concerned, Curzon had won his first victory.

In April, after Russia had given assurances to the British government that the alleged secret treaty was not in existence, Curzon proposed not only to negotiate with the Chinese and the Tibetan delegates at Khambajong and arm the mission with two hundred troops, but also suggested that, should the Tibetans fail to appear, sanction be given to the mission to proceed to Gyantse in order to hasten the Tibetans' arrival.² With this request the home government complied, as regards the place of the conference and the arming of the British mission. As to the advance to Gyantse, it doubted if such action could be justified under the existing conditions, or even in the event of the failure of the Chinese and the Tibetan parties to meet.³ But the viceroy persisted in his efforts. On May 7, he despatched another memorandum to the India Office. He suggested that the scope of the conference should be extended to cover, beside frontier and grazing questions, general and trade relations between India and Tibet; that the customary 10% tax levied by Tibet on trade in transit through the Chumbi valley should be considered;⁴ that a new trade mart should be opened; that fullest facilities must be given to the British representative for direct communication with the Tibetan government in *all matters*; that, in case such communication were obstructed, the British should have the right to advance to Lhasa; that Great Britain should have an agent at Gyantse or, if possible, at Lhasa; and that Indian traders should have the same freedom of trade in Tibet as the Tibetans had in

¹ *A. & P.*, 1904, *op. cit.*, no. 78, pp. 183-185.

² *Ibid.*, no. 86, p. 189.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 88, p. 189.

⁴ This tax had never been objected to by the India government hitherto.

India. Finally he recommended Younghusband to head the mission with the temporary rank of a colonel, with White as the joint commissioner.¹

Though the home government supported the transfer of the trade mart, it was not prepared to believe that Tibet would be willing to open Gyantse. In case of such a refusal, Great Britain did not wish to see the mission advance at once by force.² In reply, Curzon refuted the points made by the India Office and suggested two equally ill-advised alternatives, one being a pacific blockade, and the other the occupation of the Chumbi valley.³ And it is here that the ideas of the home government and Curzon clashed. In a later despatch from the India Office, Lord Hamilton reiterated his opposition to the institution of any British residency at Gyantse or at Lhasa.⁴ Furthermore, he limited the scope of the conference strictly to the problems of the frontier, grazing rights, and trade relations. He ordered Curzon to proceed, subject to the above conditions.⁵

Even after China failed to stir the Tibetans to action, and reports were received about the preparations made at Lhasa for war, the home government still viewed the proposed advance "with grave misgivings."⁶ The idea of Curzon, however, began to gain weight when the India Office, in the same despatch, al-

¹ *A. & P.*, 1904, *op. cit.*, no. 89, p. 190.

² *Ibid.*, no. 92, p. 192.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 93, p. 192.

A pacific blockade is a legally sound practice as a form of reprisal. But the occupation of the territory of Tibet, though on a small scale, is a gross violation of international law.

⁴ Hamilton said, "Such a political outpost might entail difficulties and responsibilities incommensurate, in the judgment of His Majesty's Government, with any benefits which, in the circumstances now known to exist, could be gained by it." He continued, "His Majesty's Government are unwilling to be committed by threats accompanying the proposals which may be made, to any definite cause of compulsion to be undertaken in the future."

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 95, p. 193.

⁶ *Ibid.*, nos. 104, 112, pp. 203-209.

lowed the Indian government to occupy the Chumbi valley to demonstrate the earnestness of the British.¹ Meanwhile, Sir Ernest Satow was instructed to make representations to China in order to bring the Tibetans to reason.² After Prince Ch'ing explained the difficulties of travel and the inevitable delay of the Amban in reaching Lhasa and the obstinate nature of the Tibetans, even Satow believed that China was "really desirous of seeing the matter brought to a satisfactory conclusion."³

But it would take three months for the Amban to arrive at Lhasa⁴. Besides, his presence might not be materially instrumental in bringing about a new situation. Moreover, the two British subjects who had been imprisoned at Shigatse still remained in the prison despite the repeated protests of the British. All these factors gradually moved the home government to embrace the views of the viceroy, and on October 1, it expressed readiness not only to authorize the mission to occupy the Chumbi valley but even to advance to Gyantse, if complete rupture proved inevitable, and if the advance thither could be conducted in safety.⁵ In his reply, Curzon proved that the conference was bound to rupture because of the procrastination of the Chinese and the insincerity of the Tibetans. He proposed, therefore, the advance to Gyantse for various weighty reasons.⁶

A few days later, he urged the India Office once more and tried to convince it that the rupture was not only inevitable but had actually taken place. He also warned the home government that

¹ *A. & P.*, 1904, *op. cit.*, no. 113, p. 210.

² *Ibid.*, no. 114, p. 210.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 113, p. 210.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 117, p. 212. The Amban finally started in October.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 120, p. 213.

⁶ *Ibid.*, nos. 122, 129, pp. 219-291. The first reason was that the occupation of the Chumbi was not sufficient to stir the Tibetans, because it was not regarded as part of Tibet. Secondly, Younghusband wanted to have direct dealings with the Tibetans. Finally, the desire of the British to open up Gyantse might easily materialize if the British should occupy it in the first instance.
A. & P., 1904, *op. cit.*

further delay would show the Tibetans the cowardice of the British and produce a "deplorable" impression on Nepal and Bhutan and eventually entail the sacrifice of British prestige. Furthermore, Gyantse was the best winter quarter with cheap and easily procurable supplies. On November 4, 1903, it was reported that an overt act of hostility was committed by Tibet in an attack on Nepalese yaks on the frontier.¹ The call for immediate action from Curzon became steadily more and more appealing. A lengthy despatch was sent to Mr. Broderick, the new secretary of state for India, who gave Curzon a favorable answer.² The home government, after persistent watchfulness, at last sanctioned the proposed advance. The secretary, however, warned the viceroy simultaneously that no permanent occupation of territory should be allowed or permanent interference in Tibetan affairs in any form. There should be no permanent mission established in Tibet. The sole aim of the British mission should be securing satisfaction.³

Here again the viceroy won another major victory over the home government. But, as we shall see presently, he was not contented. What he desired to achieve was exactly what he was explicitly forbidden to attempt: the permanent occupation of Tibetan territory and the institution of a British residency in Lhasa. The home government, on the other hand, had the interests of the whole empire in mind. Even when it sanctioned the advance of the mission, it wanted to avoid international entanglements by disarming the suspicions of its rival states as far as possible. Thus, Sir Ernest Satow was instructed to explain to the Chinese government the intentions of the British mission to Tibet.⁴ On November 7, Lansdowne informed the Russian embassy that because of the "frivolous pretexts" of the Tibetans

¹ *A. & P.*, 1904, *op. cit.*, no. 127, p. 218.

² *Ibid.*, no. 129, pp. 219-291.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 132, p. 294.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 134, p. 295.

Great Britain had to advance. He also assured Russia that the British government would inform her from time to time as to the progress of the mission. Finally, he reiterated that Great Britain desired nothing but satisfaction from the Tibetans.¹ The stage was cleared. The drama of the 1904 expedition to Lhasa opened.

(D) *The Progress of the Younghusband Mission, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Lhasa Convention of 1904.*²

It must be recalled that, by this time, the relations between Russia and Japan were extremely strained. The prolonged and dreary negotiations between these two countries, started by Ito in 1901, were drifting to an inevitable rupture, when the last proposal of Japan was not satisfactorily answered on October 3, 1903. The Japanese were thoroughly exasperated and were ready for war.

It was at this juncture, when Russia was fully engaged in her adventure in Manchuria and Korea, that Curzon quickened the tempo of the mission's progress. Younghusband was accordingly clothed with superior power and the title of British commissioner for Tibetan frontier matters, with White, Wilson, and Walsh as assistant commissioners, and Captain O'Connor as secretary. The forces under General MacDonalld were also placed at their disposal to repel any armed resistance.³ On December 3, the mission had crossed the Jelep la unopposed and soon reached Rinchingong. In the middle of January, 1904, it arrived at Tuna and met three monks and a general from Lhasa. The monks clamored for the withdrawal of the British to Yatung.

¹ *A. & P.*, 1904, *op. cit.*, nos. 133, 136, 141, pp. 294, 296, 298-299.

² For the personal account of the expedition by Sir Francis Younghusband, see his *India and Tibet*.

³ *A. & P.*, 1904, *loc. cit.*, nos. 155, 159, pp. 305, 307, *Cf. ibid.*, no. 29, enclosure 1, annexure 2, p. 30.

Lamaism had to be preserved! But to this plea Younghusband turned a deaf ear. Meanwhile, the Chinese Amban could not meet the British commissioner because he was prevented from doing so by the Dalai Lama, who insisted on British withdrawal to the frontier for a conference.¹

At this time, war clouds were gathering over the Yalu and the Yellow sea. Suddenly, on February 8, 1904, Japan took the offensive, and the Russian squadron at Port Arthur was defeated. On February 10, war was formally declared. In less than two weeks, a treaty was concluded between Japan and Korea, reducing the latter to a protectorate of the former. Battalions after battalions of Japanese soldiers were poured into Korea. On May 1, Kuroki defeated the Russians at the Yalu river. At the end of the month, Oku snatched another victory in Kinchau and Nanshan. And while Nogi began the siege of Port Arthur, three Japanese columns were marching, under Oyama, further into Manchuria. On September 4, the great battle of Liauyang was scored, and the Russians were forced to retreat to Mukden.

While Russian soldiers were thus desperately engaged in a life and death struggle in the Far East, and Russia's fleet was ordered to leave its base in the Baltic for the Pacific, the British mission was most active in Tibet. On April 11, in spite of repeated protests by the Dalai Lama, it reached Gyantse. The first goal of the viceroy was happily attained: The Dalai Lama was sternly questioned whether or not he had any knowledge of the attacks of the monks on the British mission at Geru. Simultaneously he was requested to send competent delegates to open negotiations. But again the Tibetan government delayed, this time saying that they had to wait for the representatives of the three great monasteries for consultation before any reply could be made.²

¹ *A. & P.*, 1904, *op. cit.*, no. 176, p. 313. *A. & P.*, 1905, (cd. 2370) part ii, no. 14, enclosure and no. 23 enclosure, pp. 101, 104-105.

² *Ibid.*, part ii, no. 74, enclosure, p. 132; no. no. 69, enclosure, p. 130; no. 44, enclosure, p. 116.

To Younghusband this was not a good excuse, and he soon proposed to the viceroy the advance to Lhasa, because the "psychological moment" had arrived.¹

The situation became acute when in May 5,700 Tibetans from Shigatse attacked the mission camp.² More and more the irreconciliability of the Lhasa lamas was manifested, as reports gave alarming news of ambitious attempts by the great monasteries to raise more troops in Shigatse.³ In view of such an emergency, the India Office finally sanctioned the advance to Lhasa in case negotiations could not be successfully resumed at Gyantse.⁴ This new policy of the home government was communicated to China. A few days afterwards, Sir C. Hardinge was ordered to repeat to the Russian government the previous British assurances to Russia and to add that, as long as there was no third power trying to interfere with Tibetan affairs, Great Britain had no intention of annexing or establishing a protectorate over Tibet, or in any way controlling Tibetan administration.⁵

On June 1, the British ultimatum was delivered to the Tibetan government. The date set for the Chinese Amban and the Tibetan delegates to appear was June 25. In case of their failure to arrive on time, Younghusband would advance to Lhasa and conduct negotiations there.⁶ Later, however, due to the protests of the Tibetans and reports about the departure of Tibetan delegates from Lhasa, the time limit was extended for five days.⁷ An armistice was also granted upon Tibet's request.⁸

¹ *A. & P.*, 1905, no. 2, pp. 1-2.

² *Ibid.*, no. 6, p. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, part ii, no. 78 enclosure, p. 133.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 13, p. 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, nos. 37, 43, pp. 13, 15.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 49, pp. 16-17.

⁷ *Ibid.*, nos. 64, 65, p. 21.

⁸ *Ibid.*, part ii, no. 179 enclosure, p. 175; no. 180 enclosure, p. 175; no. 182 enclosure, p. 176.

While Younghusband was waiting for the Chinese and the Tibetans, the viceroy was contemplating the terms of the peace treaty with Tibet. First of all, it was necessary to protect the interests of Great Britain in Tibet and perpetuate British prestige. Moreover, compensation must be obtained for the cost of the expedition. Recompense should be demanded for the insults that the British government had suffered at the hands of the Tibetans.¹ He proposed to the India Office the occupation of the Chumbi valley.² He emphasized especially the supreme necessity of stationing a resident in Lhasa. He argued that, though Russia had assured Great Britain that she "*ne viserait le Tibet en aucun cas,*" yet Lansdowne had previously told Benckendorff that Great Britain was entitled to assert a predominant influence in Tibet; and that the position of Lansdowne could now be strengthened by the institution of such a residency. Moreover, the very center of the religious and political activities in Tibet was Lhasa, where a resident could best watch over British interests. Even if the presence of such a resident in Lhasa should prove undesirable, the minimum demand would be for a resident, a commercial agent at Gyantse, with the power to proceed to Lhasa to conduct direct negotiations with the Tibetan government, especially with reference to the execution of the prospective treaty. On this point another struggle between the viceroy and the home government began: regarding the institution of a residency at Lhasa, the amount of indemnity, and the occupation of the Chumbi valley. As we shall see presently, the viceroy was eventually defeated by the home government.

While all these proposals were being discussed between the India Office and the Indian government, peace negotiations broke down at Gyantse, because the delegates sent by the Dalai

¹ *A. & P.*, 1905 *op. cit.*, no. 97, pp. 33-39.

² *Ibid.*

had not had credentials with them, and Younghusband considered himself unable to deal with them.¹

In spite of the assurances given by Tongsa Penlop that the Tibetans were really eager to negotiate, the British commissioner insisted on properly accredited delegates from Tibet. Hence another deadlock occurred, caused by the scrupulous observance of international law and the procedure of treaty-making on the part of Younghusband and the ignorance of the Tibetan government of those principles. The situation was further strained when, on July 5, Gyantse jong was bombarded by the British. On July 6, one of the Tibetan delegates fled. All this time the ardent and staunch friend of Great Britain, Tongsa Penlop, was explaining to Younghusband that the Dalai Lama was still anxious for a settlement.² But his solicitation was of no avail. By July 20, Younghusband reached Negartse. Once more Tibetan delegates appeared on the scene. But, since they begged the British to return to Gyantse for negotiations, and Younghusband refused to comply with their request, they came to another *impasse*.³

As the British columns were heading towards Lhasa, the home government sent to Curzon its concrete proposals for the peace treaty to be concluded.⁴ It did not want to have any British resident in Lhasa or elsewhere in Tibet. China should not undertake to alienate any territory of Tibet or connive at the intervention of any foreign power in Tibetan affairs. The indemnity should not exceed the amount that Tibet could pay and payments should be made in installments over the space of three years. Gyantse should be opened on equal status with Yatung. Tibet should demolish the forts on the frontier and

¹ *A. & P.*, 1905, *op. cit.*, no. 72, p. 24.

² *Ibid.*, no. 83, p. 28; no. 95, pp. 32-33.

³ *Ibid.*, part ii, no. 237, enclosure, pp. 201-203.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 79, pp.26-27.

rebuild the pillars torn down by Tibetans. The occupation of the Chumbi valley should be only a security against the payment of the indemnity and the opening of trade marts. Comparing the terms of the home government with those of Curzon, the difference is obvious. Although the viceroy still persisted in the struggle for the realization of his ambition, the final treaty and his subsequent declaration revealed the eventual victory of the home government.¹

Just before the British mission reached Lhasa, the Tibetan government made two more pleas to the British. On July 26, the Tibetan national assembly communicated with Younghusband. They promised to negotiate, but requested the British not to enter Lhasa. Younghusband refused.² Three days later, at the Chaksam ferry, several Tibetan delegates again called on Younghusband with a letter from the Dalai himself and begged the mission not to come to the holy city. Again Younghusband refused. In the meantime, signs of disorder and confusion began to appear in Lhasa. Government heads shifted responsibility. The Dalai had retired to religious seclusion eighteen miles away from Lhasa.³

Finally, the British mission reached its destination on August 3. The Dalai Lama was reported to have fled to the north.⁴ The Chinese, as anxious as ever to make a settlement, called on Younghusband immediately and expressed their readiness to assist in arranging an agreement.⁵ (This overture of the Chinese

¹ *A. & P.*, 1905, *op. cit.*, no. 66, p. 22; no. 88, p. 30; no. 93, p. 31; no. 106, pp. 42-43; no. 114, p. 45; no. 115, p. 48; no. 182 enclosure, pp. 75-76; no. 184, p. 77.

² *Ibid.*, no. 111, p. 44.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 2, p. 1.

⁴ The Dalai later wrote to the Tibetan government warning them that the English people were very crafty to deal with. (*Ibid.*, part ii, no. 280 enclosure, p. 229.) The British were ready to deal with the Tibetans in the absence of the Dalai. *Ibid.*, no. 97, pp. 33-39.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 119, p. 49.

really started the cordial cooperation between the Chinese and the British in 1904, with which the British commissioner was very much satisfied. After considerable delay, negotiations were opened. The Tibetan government, now under the control of a regent, objected to the British terms in two respects. First, they could only open Rinchingong (or Rinchengang) but not Gyantse or Gartok. Secondly, they argued that they were not able to pay the imposed indemnity, which was considered even by the India Office as "altogether excessive."¹ Yet, since the peace was not a negotiated peace but a dictated one, the terms of Younghusband prevailed. On September 2, 1904, the draft convention was approved by the India Office.² In the meantime, weather conditions cautioned the British to leave the country before the middle of September.³ So, on September 7, 1904, the famous Lhasa convention between Great Britain and Tibet was signed in the inner sanctum of the Lamaist holy city, the Potala.⁴ After the ceremony, Younghusband reported to the viceroy that the treaty not only upheld the old rights of the British in Tibet, but also added new ones. The goodwill of the people was won. In plain language, a British protectorate over Tibet was virtually created.⁵ How?

¹ The amount of indemnity demanded by the British was 50,000 rs, a day from the beginning of Tibet's attack on the British mission camp on May 4, 1904 till the last day of the month following the conclusion of the treaty. In the opinion of Younghusband, Tibet was really able to pay the sum. If there should be a reduction, that reduction should be compensated by further trade concessions on the part of Tibet. He also proposed that he be authorized to arrange the payments of the indemnity in installments over a long term of years. *A. & P.*, 1905, *op. cit.*, no. 131, p. 53; no. 139, p. 57; no. 141, p. 58; no. 66, p. 22. Also, *ibid.*, part ii, no. 303 enclosure, p. 240.

² *Ibid.*, no. 142, p. 58.

³ *Ibid.*, part ii, no. 302 enclosure, p.240; no. 309 enclosure, p. 242.

⁴ For the text of the 1904 convention, see *Ibid.*, no. 194, enclosure 1, annexure, pp. 90-92; *B.F.S.P.*, vol. xcvi, p. 148; MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 578-581; Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 284-286.

⁵ Clark, *Tibet, China, and Great Britain*, p. 9.

The purpose of this convention was: first, to strengthen the treaty of 1890 and the regulations of 1893; secondly, to remove the disturbances which had recently developed between Tibet and India; and, finally, to restore peace between these two neighboring countries. These were the pious wishes happily consecrated in the preamble. Other objectives, not holy enough to be formally and candidly admitted, were tactfully written into less conspicuous provisions of the treaty but revealed by the subsequent actions of one of the high contracting parties.

First of all, the boundary line laid down by the treaty of 1890 received fresh sanction. The Tibetan government was obliged to erect pillars along the frontier (art. 1). Gyantse and Gartok were to be opened; to them the regulations of 1893 would be applicable, only subject to such amendments as might be hereafter agreed upon by the two parties. Tibet was not only obliged to remove any restriction on trade travelling by existing trade routes, but was also bound to consider the establishment of new trade marts if so required by the development of trade (art. 2). The amendment of the regulations of 1893 should be reserved for separate consideration. Tibet also undertook not to levy any dues other than those provided for in a tariff convention to be agreed upon (art. 3 and 4). The roads to Gyantse and Gartok should be kept open and in good condition in order to facilitate trade. At each of these trade marts, as also at Yatung and others to be opened, a Tibetan agent should be stationed to communicate with the British agent and transmit despatches from the British government to the Tibetan or Chinese authorities (art. 5). The above are the provisions governing trade.

As for the indemnity for British military expenses, for breaches of treaty obligations, and for the insults and attacks on the British, Tibet was to pay £500,000, that is 75,00,000 rupees, or 75 lakhs. The place of payment was to be specified by the British

government. Beginning the first day of 1906, the Tibetan government was to pay each year one lakh till the whole indemnity should be liquidated after seventy-five years (art. 7). As a security against the payment of the indemnity and the fulfillment of treaty obligations by the Tibetans, Great Britain was to occupy the Chumbi valley for seventy-five years in order to have "a clear run into Tibet."¹ Furthermore, all forts and fortifications should be razed and armaments removed that might impede trade between the British frontier and the two cities of Gyantse and Lhasa (art. 8). Yet, as a matter of fact, were traders the only and the most important beneficiaries of the demolition of forts? Perhaps another Younghusband might also find it easier to conduct military movements into a defenseless Tibet.

In order to anticipate the penetration of Russian influence into Tibet, the ninth article stipulated that, without previous British consent, no Tibetan territory should be alienated in any way, that no intervention in Tibetan affairs by any power should be allowed, that no foreign representative should be admitted, and that no concession, concerning either mining or communication, should be granted. In the event of consent to such concession being granted by Great Britain, the British government should be entitled to the same privileges. Lastly, no Tibetan revenue either in the form of cash or kind was to be pledged to any foreign power or its subjects.

The 1904 convention was certainly another manifestation of British genius in that it anticipated practically every kind of contingency that might arise to disturb the relations between India and Tibet, and also in that it laid the foundation of the influence that Great Britain enjoys even to the present moment. Thus, the infiltration of Russian political and economic influence was once and for all blocked. The desired impetus to British trade was given because of the opening of new trade

¹ *Parl. D.*, vol. 141, p. 134.

marts and the possibility of additional ones, the improvement of roads, the elimination of dues, and the removal of restrictions on trade. Through the destruction of Tibetan forts this treaty flung open all the gates of Tibet for future guests, no matter how unwelcome they might be, to intrude freely into the holy city. In other words, the drawbridge was permanently lowered. From the point of view of international politics, the treaty was also a piece of questionable diplomacy. Chinese suzerainty, long regarded by Curzon as a constitutional fiction, was now barefacedly thrown overboard.

Furthermore, the indemnity exacted from the Tibetans was not only too heavy for them to pay, but also diametrically contrary to the instructions of the home government. Yet Younghusband was bold enough to impose that crushing burden on the Tibetans in order to reduce Tibet to a state of financial vassalage to India. Closely connected with the indemnity was the stipulation for the almost permanent occupation of the Chumbi valley, which was again contrary to the orders of the home government and the assurances given by Great Britain to Russia. The Tibetans had to pay punctually for seventy-five years. One failure in payment might give the Indian government excuse for the postponement of evacuation, since excuses sometimes present themselves without being searched for with a candle light. Seventy-five years was a long period! Unexpected episodes might turn up, besides those skillfully planned, which would "justify" the perpetuation of occupation, or even the annexation of that strategic and rich valley to the "noblest trophy of British genius."

Yet the Indian government was not the all-powerful diplomatic agency of the British empire. The violations of the home government's instructions on the part of Younghusband or the viceroy himself, possibly the latter, formed the center of the attack on Curzon in Parliament. The indomitable viceroy was at

last brought to bow before the final authority of His Majesty's Government and was ordered to issue a declaration to reduce the amount of the indemnity and the length of the occupation of the Chumbi valley.

(E) *The Modification of the Lhasa Convention and the Treaty of 1906*

As early as February 26, 1904, even before the British mission had reached Gyantse, attacks in Parliament were launched against Curzon's policy.¹ Such problems as the grazing of the Tibetans in Sikkimese territory, the necessity of advancing beyond Gyantse, the armed escort, the place for conference, the tearing down of boundary pillars by the Tibetans, and the rumored treaty between China and Russia regarding Tibet as justifications for British forward action in Tibet were fully discussed, and on those points Curzon was severely criticized.² When Lord Reay assailed the viceroy's policy, embodied in the latter's famous January 8 despatch to the home government, he called Curzon's phrase, "constitutional fiction," an "extraordinary expression." He continued: "This (meaning the epithet of Curzon) strikes me as an extremely impolitic assertion, that a situation which our government has always recognized, which is founded on law, history and tradition, should be considered as a constitutional fiction, extremely impolitic, when we realize what suzerainty means to us in India."³ He also condemned the viceroy's proposal to station a resident in Lhasa, which had been happily discarded by the home government as a "most imprudent" measure. Others opposed Curzon, because the negligible

¹ For the exhaustive and heated debates that raged in the sessions in 1904, see *Parl. D.*, vols. 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, *passim*.

² *Ibid.*, vol. 130, pp. 1112, 1115, 1128, 1114.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 1116.

trade in Tibet was not worth the effort.¹ Some attacked the inappropriate method used by Curzon to advance British interests; or else they maintained that Tibet had the right to close her doors if she pleased.² Still others extenuated the crimes laid at the door of the Tibetans. Sometimes they tried to remove Parliament's fear of a Russian invasion of Tibet by arguing that such an eventuality was remote in view of the great geographical barriers between Russia and Tibet.³ In the opinion of the statesmen, the forward policy of Curzon might curtail the integrity of China.⁴ Or, they deplored the imposition of Indian tea on the Tibetans, who had every right to reject anything they did not like.⁵ They also ridiculed the Indian government for launching such an expedition simply because pillars were demolished.⁶ Finally, they attacked the home government because it had surrendered to the unwarranted policy of Curzon.⁷

In the February 14 session, various suggestions to censure the Indian government were made. Mr. A. J. Balfour, trying to calm the rising tempests in Parliament, explained that there was no need to make such efforts, because the Indian government would eventually recognize the supremacy of the home government in these matters.⁸ But the resentment of the Commons and the Lords was beyond the control of Mr. Balfour, when later Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman proposed to direct the censure not only against Younghusband but also against the "principal." He attacked the home government for suffering itself to be goaded into proceedings which brought damage to the

¹ *Parl. D.*, vol. 130, pp. 1134, 1140.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 1111-1126.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 1114, 1133-1134.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 1136-1137.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 1141.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1142.

⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. 141, p. 154.

prestige of the country and involved the massacre of unarmed men, though all this time it was conscious of the ambitious objectives of the Indian government.¹ The Marquess of Winchester shared the opinions of Campbell-Bannerman and condemned the usurpation of power by the Indian government as contrary to the "spirit and letter" of British assurances to Russia. If, therefore, anyone were to be censured, it should be the Indian government, not Younghusband, who had acted under their orders.² This accusation of the viceroy was disallowed by Lansdowne. He proved that it was not the Indian government but the commissioner who deviated from the instructions of the home government.³

Now the whole responsibility seemed to have shifted to Younghusband. They might have censured him, but, at the same time, both the opposition and the government parties recognized with a full meed of admiration the feats of arms and diplomacy executed by the commissioner. A dilemma appeared. Some compromise seemed unavoidable. The outcome was the declaration of the viceroy on November 11, 1904, to be appended to the ratified convention of Lhasa.⁴

The viceroy's declaration was a significant document. It reduced the indemnity from seventy-five lakhs to twenty-five. It shortened the period of the occupation of the Chumbi valley from seventy-five years to three, and prompt evacuation of that region was promised upon the payment of the third installment. Concurrently, the Tibetan government was obliged to open the new trade marts effectively and carry out the provisions of the treaty faithfully. Finally, it was stated in the declaration that

¹ *Parl. D.*, vol. 130, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-135.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-34.

⁴ For the text of the declaration, see *A. & P.*, 1905, no. 194, 2, p. 93; *B. F. S. P.*, vol. xcvi, p. 151; Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

all these concessions were made as an act of grace, for which the Tibetans were expected to be grateful. As a matter of fact, this the Tibetans were instantly. They evinced their happiness on learning the news. And it was not too much to say that the wounds of the 1904 strife started to heal from that very moment, and friendship began to develop continuously despite friction of minor importance, till, in 1910, the Dalai openly begged for protection and even proposed an alliance with India against China.¹

The next step for the British after 1904 was to secure the adhesion of China to the Lhasa convention, without which the position of the British government might not be easily defensible in international law. On the other hand, China, thoroughly alarmed by the expansion of British interests in Tibet, was even more anxious to re-assert her rights as the suzerain over Tibet by some form of agreement with Great Britain. After considerable difficulties and diplomatic haggling, the adhesion treaty between China and Great Britain was finally signed in 1906, and with this additional convention the episode of 1904 came definitely to a close.² From that time on the chief rôle in the Tibetan drama was assumed by the Chinese, who did not quit the stage till 1912.³

The significance of the British achievements was far-reaching. The convention of 1904, especially the last article, which restricts the freedom of the Tibetan government in matters of foreign intercourse, virtually imposed a protectorate over Tibet, though in a subtle and embryonic form. What was then meant by "any foreign power" was certainly not Great Britain,

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, (cd. 5240), no. 8, pp. 7-11.

² Later when China took steps to restore herself in Tibet the adhesion treaty of 1906 was deplored as one which virtually recognized China's sovereignty over Tibet. *Ibid.*, no. 141, p. 86.

³ For the negotiation of the 1906 Treaty and the activities of China after that date, see the chapter on the relations between China and Tibet.

in view of the fact that she subsequently extended her telegraphic line from the Indian frontier to Lhasa in 1920. The postal service from Gyantse to India was also under British control.¹ Mines were opened by British engineers. The Tibetan army was trained by British officers after the Russians and the Japanese were dismissed from their posts. Thus the last article was a sop for Russia at that time and possibly for some other potentially dangerous empire in the future. It might be taken as an instrumentality against China. Even though we exclude China from the category of foreign powers, we have to admit that Great Britain had secured at least an equal voice with China in Tibetan affairs, since Tibet was explicitly forbidden to make any one of the above-mentioned concessions without previous consent of the British government.²

From the point of view of world politics, the brilliant success of the British in 1904 would not only shatter Dorjjeff's cherished dream of a close bond between Tibet and Russia, but would also awaken the Dalai to the glaring impotence of Russia in times of emergency.³ In other words, it was demonstrated to him that it would be useless to rely on the white Tsar for assistance against any foreign foe. The enhanced prestige of British not only overawed the Tibetan Buddhists but also those in Bhutan and Nepal. Indeed, the Buddhist world of the East was made to realize the might of British arms. The Russian colossus was a scarecrow!

In regard to China, the significance of the conventions was even more obvious. First of all, she showed her helplessness in the face of foreign invasion of a portion of her territory. Hitherto, Tibet had been in the habit of considering China as her protector. But now this dream was dispelled. Henceforth, if she

¹ *Bell, op. cit.*, pp. 201-202.

² *Clark, op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

³ *Infra*, pp. 132-134.

should need help, she would turn to Great Britain. Furthermore, the very bold step taken by Younghusband and the Indian government to concluding a treaty with a part of the Chinese empire without consulting the Chinese government was not only a violation of international law but also paved the way for direct dealings later between India and Tibet. A dangerous precedent was established. Great Britain could have justified herself in declaring a war on China on account of Tibet's unfriendly conduct towards India. Even if Great Britain had annexed Tibet through a treaty with the Chinese government, her position would still have been unimpeachable so far as procedure was concerned. But to deal with Tibet without any reference to its suzerain was a *prima facie* evidence of aggression, which might have given China ample cause for war, had she not been too weak to fight.

Finally, China, impressed with the seriousness of the situation in Tibet and aware of the possibility of further British penetration into that part of her empire, made up her mind at once to strengthen her position in Lhasa. The era of intense Chinese activity dawned. On the other hand, Russia, conscious of her weakness and the futility of the continuation of her adventures in Tibet, was willing to reach some kind of agreement with Great Britain in regard to Central Asia. Thus, the British success in 1904 foreshadowed the Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907.

IV

THE PERIOD OF BRITISH ALOOFNESS.

(A) *From Aggressiveness to Aloofness from 1906 to 1912.*

FROM 1906 to 1912 Britain's policy towards Tibet contrasted sharply with her policy during the administration of Curzon.

The chief concern of the British was to preserve the rights, primarily commercial, secured through the 1904 convention. Further political expansion in Tibet was, for the time being, discountenanced by the responsible statesmen of Great Britain. Even towards the energetic and assertive policy of the Chinese in Lhasa and their extensive and thorough-going campaigns against the lamas, the Indian government did not evince any fear although at times British diplomats reminded China of her duty under international treaties not to disturb the *status quo* of Tibet or impair the commercial rights of Great Britain there. Why?

In the first place, the removal of Russia as an active rival changed the mood of British statesman and slackened the pace of further British advance. As we have seen, Russia had already encountered defeats in Manchuria in 1904. On January 2, 1905, Port Arthur surrendered. On February 20, the decisive battle of Mukden sealed the fate of the Russians in southern Manchuria and Korea. After the memorable naval engagement at Tsushima, every hope of Russian victory vanished. At the same time, Russian internal stability was greatly shaken. The government built on autocracy, aristocracy and orthodoxy tottered on the surging waves of revolution. Russia was too much absorbed in her home affairs to put her finger in the Tibetan pie. In the meantime, the second Anglo-Japanese alliance was signed on August 12. The scope of the original Alliance was enlarged to cover India as well as China, which signified that the British territorial rights and special interests in Asia were henceforth entrusted to the combined military strength of Japan and Great Britain.¹ By August 13, 1907, the element of Russian rivalry was materially reduced, when Sir Arthur Nicolson and Izvolsky concluded an agreement for the settlement of the disputes of these two traditional foes in Persia, Afghanistan, and

¹ Dennis, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, pp. 22-28, 101.

Tibet. Almost simultaneously Russia and Japan reached an agreement which harmonized their interests in Manchuria and China and later proved to be an insurmountable impediment to the immature proposal of Secretary Knox for the internationalization of Manchurian railways in 1910. At the outbreak of the Great War, the unity of these three powers was further strengthened when they fought shoulder to shoulder against the central powers. Thus, from the defeat of Russia in 1905, the tendency of world politics in the Far East was towards a gradual *rapprochement* between England and Russia, Japan and Russia, and finally the combination of the three. Under these circumstances, circumspect and far-sighted British diplomats naturally saw little to be gained by political expansion in Tibet. Hence, the aloofness.

In the second place, from 1905 continental diplomacy had entered on such a perilous course that war was more than once threatened. From the first Moroccan crisis to the Turko-Italian war, events moved with such rapidity and nervousness that the importance of Tibet in the eyes of British statesmen dwindled.

Finally, the head of the Indian government was changed in the latter part of 1905 and with him the policy of India towards Tibet. On August 25, 1905, Lord Curzon resigned. Lord Minto was appointed the new viceroy by the conservative government.¹ At the same time, Mr. John Morley took the post of the India Office. The unimpaired friendship that Morley had for Minto, together with the tact and assuasiveness of the latter, made the cooperation between the two possible. And the central policy of Morley in regard to Tibet was the maintenance of the British commercial rights already secured and the disapproval of any further political expansion.² Furthermore, the long expected war broke out eventually on the northwest frontier of

¹ Dodwell, "Lord Minto as Viceroy," *National Review*, vol. 85, p. 293.

² *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 143, pp. 87-88; no. 97, p. 53; no. 352, pp. 217-218.

India in 1907, and it was not till March, 1908 that it was suppressed. In the summer of that year, however, a recrudescence of barbarous outrages by these inflammable elements blazed up again. The horizon of the Indian administration was not altogether bright until reforms were later affected. Then, in 1909 and 1910, the Nasik murder case, followed by the murder of a Mohammedan policeman in the open court in the next year, created throughout India a sense of insecurity. During these years, as Minto himself said, the policy was to "uphold the credit of British administration with all the power of the government."¹

Thus, with the removal of Russian rivalry, the shift of political rivalry to other arenas, the changed attitude of the India Office towards Tibet, and the absorption of Minto in problems of local consolidation, the period from 1906 to 1912 witnessed a comparative aloofness on the part of the British. Yet it would be far from the truth to say that Great Britain, in her aloofness, failed to watch over her interests. The difference between her policy of this period and that of Curzon's administration was that now she guarded her acquired rights against seizure. She was on the defensive.

(B) *The Settlement of Minor Disputes between Great Britain and Tibet.*

THE chief interests of Great Britain during this period with reference to her Tibetan policy were five: the removal of points of friction with Tibet; the maintenance of her rights; the protest against China's policy of asserting control over Tibet; the development of friendship with the Dalai; and, finally, the desire to settle the disputes between China and Tibet in order to check the further advance of the former.² Despite the modifica-

¹ Buchan, *Lord Minto*, pp. 219-224, 300.

² *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 7, pp. 6-7.

tion of the 1904 convention, there were left problems to be solved, of minor importance, but of sufficient magnitude to disturb the friendly relations between India and Tibet. As early as January 1905, the Tibetan government had asked the British agent, Captain O'Connor, about the intention of the Indian government in building houses in the Chumbi valley, a procedure which was not contemplated in the Lhasa convention. It also informed the British agent that, since the Phari fort was already dilapidated, there was no need of further demolition of it by the British, and that the Jongpens should be allowed to reoccupy their former quarters. Concerning these questions, Captain O'Connor showed ignorance but promised to refer them to the Indian government for an explanation. Concurrently, Tibet was asked by the British to depute representatives to Calcutta to agree on a tariff, so that Tibet could levy duties and be benefited by them. Furthermore, the British broached the question of the construction of a cart road from Gyantse to Kamgma. Finally, the British agent complained about the destruction of British telegraphic lines and posts by the Tibetans between Phari and Gyantse.¹ Answering this accusation of the British, the Tibetan government made a countercharge concerning the inconvenience caused to the peasants by British telegraphic posts and resting houses built in the middle of cultivated fields.² Some time later, two vexing problems appeared. Tibet demanded the right of administration in the Chumbi valley, because the convention of 1904 gave the British right only of occupation and not of administration. On the British side, one grievance was

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 8, pp. 7-11.

² In August, 1905, Tibet notified the Indian government that the planting of telegraphic lines was not contemplated in the 1904 convention. Tibet insisted, therefore, on their speedy removal. But the British did not heed this plea. *ibid.*, no. 20, p. 15. See also *ibid.*, no. 9, p. 11; no. 40, pp. 27-28.

that the Tibetans were reconstructing the Phari jong, and the other concerned the demarcation of the boundary.¹

In regard to the administration of the Chumbi valley, the British government refuted the Tibetan argument by asserting that occupation meant administration.² In this matter, Tibetan wishes were smothered, and the administration of the Chumbi valley was not restored to Tibet till the evacuation of that region upon the payment of the last installment of the indemnity by China. But with reference to the fortification of the Phari jong the British yielded because they discovered that the fort did not obstruct the road in any way, and that it was necessary for the Tibetans to reconstruct it for officials' headquarters.³ Against the protest of Tibet regarding inconvenience caused to peasants by telegraphic lines in their fields, the Indian government took a firm stand, and in this matter Tibet yielded. As to the demarcation of the boundary, the Tibetans were warned that they had to abide by the line laid down by the treaty of 1890. But, at the same time, the British government allowed the Tibetans to cross the border line to graze their cattle at certain times of the year, with a reciprocal concession on the part of the Tibetans towards the Sikkimese, who also needed the pasturage for their herds on the Tibetan side of the frontier.⁴ And when the Chumbi valley

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 40, enclosure 3, p. 28; no. 92, p. 48.

Tibet alleged that general MacDonald had promised to allow Tibetan officials to administer the settlement of legal disputes and taxation in the Chumbi valley. (*Ibid.*, no. 20, p. 15) Regarding the fortification of the Phari jong, see *ibid.*, no. 27, p. 20; no. 32, p. 24; no. 33, p. 24.

² The Indian government further maintained that by administration was meant the collection of taxes and the administration of justice. (*Ibid.*, no. 39, enclosures 1 and 2, pp. 25-26; no. 40, p. 27.) Concerning the administration of the Chumbi valley by the British, see *ibid.*, no. 60, pp. 35-37.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 41, p. 29; no. 49, p. 32.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 92, enclosures 1, 4, 5, pp. 49-51; no. 93, p. 51. Later in July, 1906, upon the recommendation of the Indian government, the proposal of erecting pillars was dropped, because no inconvenience was felt in their absence, and because the British wanted to avoid unnecessary causes of controversy with

was evacuated in 1910, many of the points of friction between India and Tibet had already been removed. The scars left by the 1904 expedition gradually disappeared. And as China advanced more and more into Tibet and reasserted herself more and more in Tibetan affairs, Tibet drifted steadily to the fold of England.

(C) *The British Opposition to China's Assertive Policy in Tibet*

THE British policy towards China during this period was, on the one hand, insistence on the fulfillment of treaty obligations by China, and on the other hand, abstention from interfering with Tibetan affairs.¹ It was further recognized that all disputes between Tibet and India "should, if possible, be put right, not by separate action in Tibet but through the medium of the Chinese government."²

In 1907 China sent Mr. Chang Yin-tang to India to negotiate new trade regulations. In February of that year, Chang took two steps, among others, for the consolidation of China's position in Tibet, which did not seem reasonable to the British. The first was that he forbade direct communications between the British and the Tibetans in commercial transactions at trade marts, and the other was his appointment of five trade agents, who were alleged by India to be Chinese instead of Tibetans. On February 3, 1907, the Indian government cautioned the home govern-

the Lhasa government. (*Ibid.*, no. 97, p. 53; no. 100, p. 54.) Concerning the evacuation of the Chumbi valley, see *ibid.*, no. 210, p. 135; no. 211, p. 136; no. 212, p. 136; no. 213, p. 137; no. 217, p. 139; no. 221, p. 140; no. 226, p. 243.

¹ Morley in a despatch to Grey said, "The British government are precluded by the terms of the conventions from interfering, even if they had the desire to do so, with the Chinese actions in Tibet." *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 143. pp. 87-88.

² This was the opinion of Grey. *Ibid.*, no. 144, p. 88.

ment that this act of Chang was a violation of the 1904 convention which stipulated that these agents should be Tibetans.¹ The viceroy further remarked that such a violation would defeat the British aim of putting these trade marts into a different category from regular treaty ports.²

While the home government agreed with the viceroy that representation should be made to the Chinese government in regard to the replacement of Tibetan trade agents by the Chinese, it hesitated to sponsor the proposal to remind the Tibetans directly of their obligations under the 1904 convention without consulting China first.³ After the conclusion of the new trade regulations of 1908, which solved practically all the above-mentioned problems, another question arose regarding tea. In September 1908, it was learned that Indian tea imported into Tibet was detained at Yatung.⁴ Protest to the Chinese government was suggested. The India Office, in a reply to the viceroy, stated that, since the new trade regulations did not repudiate art. 4 of the 1893 regulations, Indian tea should still be subject to a 150-200% duty. The home government promised, however, to take up the matter with the Chinese government, when the moment seemed propitious.⁵

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 141, pp. 86-87.

² In the viceroy's opinion, the substitution of the Chinese agents for Tibetans would transform these trade marts into Chinese treaty ports, which was incompatible with the original intention of Great Britain in establishing such treaty marts for the benefit of British merchants. But not long before, the Indian government had argued that Yatung, also a trade mart, should be considered a treaty port of China, where Indian tea ought to be subject to 5% duty only.

³ "An exceedingly difficult position will be created if it should be found necessary for us to call on the Tibetan government to fulfill the obligations of the convention in opposition to the Chinese government and the Amban at Lhasa." (so said Morley). The attitude of Grey appeared to be a little more aggressive, when he said that the British had to right to address the Tibetan government but reserved that right, preferring to adjust disputes in conjunction with Chinese authorities. *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 144, p. 88.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 257, p. 162.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 269, p. 172; no. 272, p. 174; no. 274, p. 175; no. 275, p. 175.

Later, when China was sending her troops into Tibet,¹ Great Britain became a little uneasy. Numerous representations were made to the Chinese government against the change of the *status quo* in Tibet. Concurrently, inquiries were instituted as to the number of Chinese troops in Tibet, and the future policy of China, with persistent suggestions that she should deal with Great Britain in an open manner, and that she ought not to forget her treaty obligations while strengthening her hands in Lhasa.² In another despatch, Great Britain intimated that it was not objectionable for China to station sufficient troops to maintain internal order, to police the trade marts. But China should appoint an Amban less hostile to British interests and should not forbid direct dealings between the British and local Tibetan officials.³

At the end of March, Morley seemed convinced that China was "deliberately making its suzerainty over Tibet effective." What the British government should consider carefully, in this stage of development, was the safeguarding of the trade relations between India and Tibet and of those between India and its buffer states, such as Bhutan and Nepal. In Morley's opinion, therefore, it seemed imperative that China should be reminded that the forthcoming negotiations on the subjects of tariff, trade agents, monopolies, tea trade and so forth should not be prejudiced by any delay due to a change of administration in Tibet. China should also be advised not to station her troops in the neighborhood of India in such number as would necessitate a corresponding movement of India's battalions.⁴ Had China learned enough of diplomatic tactics, she might have consolidated her

¹ *Infra*, pp. 114-116.

² *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 340, pp. 207-208.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 336, pp. 205-206.

⁴ As a matter of fact, sufficient troops of India had been mobilized on the frontier, and were ready for action in case of attacks on British trade agencies at Yatung and Gyantse. *Parl. D.*, vol. 19, (1910) p. 2708.

position in Tibet once and for all. The British demands during these years were certainly not too extravagant for China to meet to the satisfaction of the Indian government. But China blundered again, and for that she paid a heavy price.

(D) *Great Britain as the Host of the Dalai Lama*

WE may recall that, before the British mission reached Lhasa, the Dalai had fled. Since 1904 he had been roaming in Kokonor, Mongolia and China.¹ In October 1905, he was reported to be planning a return to Tibet. Great Britain was then afraid that his presence in Lhasa might cause the repudiation of the 1904 convention. In order to forestall such an eventuality, the Indian government reminded the Tibetan government that they ought to abide by their treaty obligations.² China, on the other hand, trying to allay the fear of the British, more than once assured them that she had no intention to let the Buddhist pope go home at that time.³ The situation began to change, however, when, in January 1908, a message from the Dalai reached the British minister in Peking, couched in complimentary and friendly terms, expressive of a sincere desire for cooperation with Great Britain and attributing past misunderstandings to the fact that his subordinates had concealed from him the true circumstances.⁴ So on February 3, Morley despatched a letter to the viceroy stating that the return of the Dalai was a matter to be decided by China alone. In July, Mr. R. F. Johnston, of the British colonial service at Wei-hai-wei, saw the Dalai at Wu Tai, Shansi. In their conversation, the Dalai inquired if Johnston had brought any letter from the British minister. Johnston said he had not,

¹ Cf. *infra*, pp. 111-114.

² *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 35, p. 24; nos. 36, 38, p. 25.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 109, p. 62; no. 126, p. 67.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 222, p. 141.

but hoped that the minister would write to the Dalai soon. With the promise the Dalai seemed to be much gratified.¹

When the Dalai arrived at Peking in September 1908, he sent a messenger to the British legation and hinted that his Holiness would be pleased to see Sir J. Jordan. But since he was not sure of the attitude of the Chinese government towards such an interview, he very tactfully declined the invitation, preferring to present himself, in company with other ministers, to the pontiff in a purely ceremonial visit. When Jordan saw him in October, the Dalai referred to the proximity of India and Tibet. His hope and desire was to work for peace and amity between Tibet and India, and he requested Jordan to transmit his ideas to the "King Emperor."² The response of the British to these courteous overtures was a statement to the Chinese and the Russian governments that Great Britain wished to put no difficulties in the way of the Grand Lama's return to Tibet.³

The Dalai Lama arrived at Lhasa in 1909. But much to his dismay he learned that large numbers of Chinese troops were *en route* to Lhasa. He petitioned the Chinese throne in order to stop them. His memoranda were, however, willfully suppressed by the Chinese Amban, Lien Yü. Then he appealed to the ministers of foreign states for intercession. But England did not move on his behalf.⁴ Every day the Chinese regiments were approaching the Potala. Every day the Dalai's consternation increased. Then suddenly the Chinese soldiers entered the holy city. The Dalai had to flee in order not to be embarrassed by the haughty Chinese. Where should he seek refuge? China was hostile to him. Russia was a broken reed. He made up his mind at last. He fled to English territory.

On February 21, 1910 he reached Yatung. He wrote a letter

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 223, p. 141; no. 249, p. 159.

² *Ibid.*, no. 258, p. 163; no. 260, p. 165; no. 262, enclosure, p. 171.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 252, p. 160; no. 253, p. 161.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 207, enclosure 2, annexure 2, p. 187.

to Minto, explaining that, in the face of Chinese oppression, he had to flee to India in order to consult the British authorities. He importuned the British humbly. "I now look to you for protection, and I trust that the relation between the British government and Tibet will be that of a father and his children."¹ With this humble request, Minto could comply only in part. He ordered local officials to accord him protection but to treat his visit as private in nature.²

The news of the Dalai's flight came as a shock to the British home government. Morley, though admitting that the situation was delicate, maintained that China should be reminded that her recent policies, unexplained to the British beforehand, appeared to subvert the political condition set up by the 1904 and 1906 treaties. Great Britain could not remain indifferent to disturbances so near to her frontier, and *a fortiori* the substitution of a Chinese for a Tibetan government in Lhasa could not be accepted, regardless of whatever future policy China might take.³

On March 4, Minto received a visit from the Dalai, at the latter's request. The Dalai expressed his hope of restoring Tibet's right of direct dealing with India. He explained his plan for staying in India till a satisfactory settlement with China was effected.⁴ In April, Tibetan authorities asked that British officials be sent to Lhasa or Gyantse to inquire into the conduct of China in order to elucidate the situation. They even proposed an alliance with the British on the same basis as the treaty between India and Nepal. Thus, in dire need of help, Tibet threw herself wholeheartedly into the arms of the British!⁵

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 311, p. 193.

² *Ibid.* Minto also ordered local officials to show to the Dalai high consideration, for he was regarded in India with veneration and awe.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 314, pp. 194-195; no. 315, p. 195.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 332, p. 203.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 349, pp. 215-216.

V

THE BRITISH BECOME ACTIVE AGAIN IN TIBET AFTER 1912

AFTER the Chinese revolution the policy of Great Britain in Tibet changed again from aloofness to aggressiveness. Once more the aim was to bring Tibet under British protection.¹ The constant internal disturbances in China, the defeat of the Chinese army in Tibet and the friendliness of the Dalai towards India afforded opportunity for the British to carry out their program. Above all, the recent activities of China together with her unfriendly attitude towards India alarmed the British. If China should restore her power in Tibet, the security of the Indian frontier would probably be endangered. After 1917, to anxiety about the recrudescence of Chinese influence was added the fear of the possible spread of Bolshevik ideas in India. Under these circumstances the best means to protect India seemed to be the transformation of Tibet into a buffer state.

(A) The British Rôle in the Simla Conference 1913-1914

DESPITE the defeat of the Chinese troops in Tibet as a result of the revolution of 1911,² China's interest in Tibetan affairs never slackened. During March and April, 1912, President Yuan Shih-kai issued decrees declaring Mongolia and Tibet integral parts of China, and putting them on an equal footing with the provinces. This action Great Britain considered as a violation of the treaties hitherto concluded. In order to make China yield, it was suggested that passage from Sikkim to Tibet should be denied to officials from China.³ The Dalai was speedily re-

¹ *Tibet*, p. 43.

² *Infra*, pp. 118-119.

³ Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 148; Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

stored to his former position. In Parliament, proposals were made to the effect that Great Britain should not recognize the new Chinese republic till China had settled the problem of Tibet with her. Neither one of these means, however, was adopted by the British government.¹

When the internal situation in China became more stable, a Chinese army was sent from Szechuan to Tibet. Immediately, (August 1912) Great Britain addressed an emphatic note to the Chinese government, stating that though she recognized China's suzerainty over Tibet, she could tolerate neither China's intervention in Tibetan internal affairs, nor the stationing of an unlimited number of Chinese troops in Tibet.² Simultaneously, Russia's new aggressive policy took form in her convention of 1912 with Mongolia, which practically placed that portion of the Chinese republic under her effective control. Great Britain was alarmed, and more so in January 1913, when Mongolia and Tibet concluded an additional treaty which, though later repudiated by the Dalai, showed the possibility of Russia's domination of Tibet through Mongolia. In order to check Russia's advance, it seemed to British statesmen that it was necessary to conclude some agreement with China in regard to Tibet. Furthermore, if China could be induced to recognize Tibet's autonomy in this prospective agreement, Great Britain would not only do a great favor to the Tibetan government, but would also dismiss permanently the possible revival of new Chinese drives on Lhasa. Hence the Simla conference.

The diplomatic pressure exercised by the British minister on China not only forced China to accept the idea of a conference to settle the Tibetan question, but also forced the promotion of the Tibetan delegation to an equal footing with the Chinese

¹ Grey explained that the only condition for the recognition would be China's pledge to adhere to her previous treaties. *Parl. D.*, vol. 53, (1913) p. 12.

² Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 149. *Cf. Annual Register*, 1913, pp. 402-403.

plenipotentiary. Moreover, China gave up her proposal of having the conference meet in Peking, and took the British suggestion of transferring it to India, where British influence combined with that of Tibet, could easily make its effect felt on the Chinese representative.

Before the opening of the conference, the Tibetan representative, Lön-chen Shatra, told the British that Tibet did not desire the presence of the Chinese Amban and Chinese troops in Tibet. China should not intervene in Tibetan internal affairs. Freedom to manage Tibetan foreign relations should be given to the Lhasa government. In regard to the boundary line between China and Tibet, Tibet claimed all the regions east of Tachienlu, which had been under Chinese jurisdiction for more than two hundred years. These were then the most important demands of Tibet, and only a portion of them was endorsed by the British as shown by the draft convention proposed by them.

In October 1913, the conference was formally opened in Simla. Sir Henry MacMahon, the secretary to the Indian Foreign Department represented Great Britain, Lön-chen Shatra, Tibet, and Mr. Iven Chen, China. The conference lasted for six months. On April 27, 1914, after much bargaining, an initial convention was proposed by the British, and this the three parties signed.

According to this convention Tibet was to be divided into two zones, Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet, patterned primarily on the scheme in Mongolia. Outer Tibet comprised the western portion of Tibet, near the Indian frontier, including Lhasa, Shigatse, Gyantse and Chamdo. Inner Tibet consisted of the regions already under the effective control of China for centuries, including Batang, Litang and Tachienlu. China's suzerainty over the whole of Tibet was recognized, but China was pledged not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province. Outer Tibet was to be autonomous, and to this region China was forbidden to send troops, civil or military officers. Nor could she colonize it.

In Inner Tibet, China could maintain her administrative system subject to the *proviso* that the Tibetan government in Lhasa was to retain its existing rights of controlling monasteries and appointing local chieftains. The Chinese Amban was to be restored, but his escort should not exceed three hundred bodyguards. On the other hand, Great Britain engaged not to annex Tibetan territory, or send troops, civil or military officers to Tibet. The escort of British trade agencies in Tibet should be no larger than three fourths of the total force of China in Tibet. Furthermore, the British agent at Gyantse was given the right to proceed to Lhasa in order to settle matters with Tibet, if they could not be satisfactorily settled at Gyantse. Lastly, this convention abolished the trade regulations of 1893 and those of 1908. A new trade agreement was to be arranged to govern the trade relations between Outer Tibet and India.¹

For various reasons, this convention was subsequently repudiated by China.² The attitude of Great Britain, however, was very determined. Her minister in Peking informed the Chinese government that Great Britain and Tibet regarded the convention as concluded because it had been initialed; and if China should abstain from ratifying it, she and Tibet would sign it independently.³ China, however, did not yield in the face of the British threat. In July, the Chinese delegate and the Tibetan

¹ *Bell, op. cit.*, pp. 154-155.

² Regarding the part played by China in and after the conference, *infra*, pp. 119-121.

³ According to international law, a treaty becomes valid, only when the contracting parties have ratified it and exchanged the ratifications. Mere initialing does not give legal sanction to any treaty. China's position in international law is unimpeachable if she repudiates the Simla convention any time before she ratifies it. Furthermore, if the representative of one party should act in excess of his power, his government always has the right to denounce him, and withhold the ratification of whatever treaty he may have concluded or signed. In the opinion of the Chinese government, Ivan Chen did act in excess of his power. Under these circumstances, China had the right to free herself from the obligation of ratification. *Cf. Annual Register, 1915, p. 289.*

representative left Simla. Soon afterwards, the World War broke out, and the whole Tibetan problem was kept in abeyance.

(B) *Anglo-Tibetan Relations during the World War*

DURING the World War, both England and China were very much occupied with more important problems than that of Tibet. While England was fully absorbed in a life and death struggle against Germany, China had to ward off the threat of the twenty-one Japanese demands. Yet, despite all these distractions, the quiet development of friendship between India and Tibet continued. British mining engineers were recommended to open up mines in Tibet. The establishment of an English school in Gyantse or Lhasa was expected to materialize.¹ When the British were driven back and farther back on the western front during the first part of the War, Tibet offered one thousand native troops to fight for the British crown. The Dalai further ordered prayers for British success to be offered in the leading monasteries.² Previous to the War a number of Tibetan boys had been sent to England for education, chiefly military training and engineering. The British had also secured the complete control of the Tibetan army, when they substituted British training officers for the drill-masters from Japan and Russia.³ In 1916, the Dalai invited Mr. Charles Bell to Lhasa, but twice the invitation was declined.

In 1917, after a long period of armed truce, the war between China and Tibet broke out again. After a series of victories Tibetan soldiers advanced towards the center of eastern Tibet. A truce was effected, however, through the mediation of Mr. Teichman, the British consul at Tachienlu, and the late Dr. Shelton, head of the Christian mission at Batang.⁴ After the

¹ Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 160-161.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 162-164.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 167-168; Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

World War was concluded, the Dalai sent his congratulations to the king of England. Friendship between these two countries deepened as the British intensified their activities in Tibet and as Tibet had to rely upon the British to force the Chinese to make concessions in the solution of the Tibetan problem.

(C) *The Bell Mission to Lhasa*

THE Dalai's invitation to Bell, who had been his very intimate friend during his exile, was finally answered favorably by the British government for the purpose of having Bell "explain" matters to the Tibetan government, and so to restore confidence and friendship in the face of the alleged Japanese and Russian aggression in Tibet.¹ Simultaneously India acceded to a request made by Tibet during the World War for the extension of the telegraphic line from Gyantse to Lhasa.² When Bell reached Lhasa, he was most cordially received by the Dalai himself and by the Tibetan government. In his conversation with the pontiff, Bell touched upon the question of the defense of Tibet. He suggested that a gradual increase of the entire Tibetan army should be worked out.³ He advised his Holiness that recruitment be spread evenly throughout the whole territory, that monks be spared from military duties, that the portion of revenue contributed by the districts around Lhasa be the heaviest, and that monasteries and landed estates be free from taxation for the expenses of the army. Before he returned to India, he wrote a long and elaborate memorandum to the Indian government, suggesting the concrete policies that the British should adopt towards Tibet in the future. He reiterated that the desire of Great Britain was to see Tibet strong and free, so that India could always be assured of an effective barrier against the spread

¹ Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

² *Ibid.* The extension was effected one or two years afterwards.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 184-185.

of Soviet influence. He even devoutly hoped that by maintaining close relations with Tibet, British power might be extended to Mongolia, with the result that Russia's expansion would be definitely halted, and the growing influence of China in Tibet stopped.

In order to help Tibet defend herself better, the embargo on Indian munitions into Tibet should be raised.¹ In his opinion, assistance should be lent by the British to open up mines in Tibet. Finally, for the purpose of civilizing the Tibetans, Bell proposed the establishment of some English school in Gyantse, and in Lhasa also if possible. He stressed the importance of inducing China to come to an agreement on those questions still at issue.²

Much to the gratification of Bell, these recommendations were wholeheartedly accepted by the India Office and the Indian government in October 1921. Before he left Tibet, the British became quite popular among the people as well as among government heads. Bell was even invited to arbitrate cases connected with purely Tibetan internal affairs. He was given the highest honor ever bestowed on any white man. In a letter to the Indian government on New Year's Day, 1922, two months after Bell's arrival in India, the Dalai expressed his satisfaction with the recent visit of the British diplomat, and concluded, "Thus all the people of Tibet and myself have become one mind, and the British and the Tibetans have become one family."³ From that time, the definite direction for the systematic consolidation of British power in Tibet was mapped out. Though the press was

¹ This embargo was agreed upon by the foreign powers interested in China for the purpose of stabilizing China's internal situation. It was intended to cover the whole area of China, Tibet included. India had been for some years forbidding the importation of munitions into Tibet in deference to this agreement, which Bell regarded as inadvisable.

² Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-198.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

quite indifferent to the Tibetan problem, and books on British activities were very scant, yet it can be easily surmised that the growth of British interests and influence in that forbidden land was steady and persistent. And if the measures proposed by Bell have been faithfully carried out, Tibet may before long be taken under Britain's wing. A distinguished British historian once remarked that "by the opening of the twentieth century . . . even remote Tibet was soon to admit a sort of vague British suzerainty."¹ Would "informal" be a better adjective than "vague?"

CONCLUSION

THUS we see that from 1774 the British began to take an interest in Tibet, primarily commercial. But due to the exclusive disposition of the Tibetans, and their innate abhorrence of any foreign influence, the projects of great viceroys of India were defeated before fruition. As Great Britain became more and more firmly entrenched in India, she looked around for further expansion. In 1890 through diplomacy and by military force, she succeeded in opening up Tibet for her trade. But due to the various distractions of wars, revolutions and diplomacy in the nineteenth century and the indifferent attitude of Russia and China towards Tibet, she did not pay serious attention to Lhasa.

But with the coming of Lord Curzon, the formation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and the growing activities of Russia in Tibet, the situation changed. Great Britain wanted not only commercial rights, but also political rights, including the recognition of British predominance in Tibet by Russia. From the conclusion of the Lhasa convention and the agreement with Russia, her preponderant influence grew steadily at the expense of China, and not infrequently in violation of international law, which Great Britain so gallantly upheld in the case of Belgium in 1914,

¹ *Muir, The Expansion of Europe*, p. 146.


but seemed to forget most conveniently in lonely parts of the wide world. With the exception of the period 1905-1911, she emerged step by step as the "protector" of Tibet presumably for the preservation of Tibetan rights against outside aggressors. With China considerably weakened after 1912, it seemed that a buffer state, to which Tibet was frankly compared, was gradually being transformed into a protectorate.

So long as China is unable to win Tibet through friendship, or legal processes, or by arms, and so long as Great Britain remains unshaken in India, and above all, so long as Russia is persistently eager to extend the "benevolence" of soviet ideas to oppressed races, especially those in Asia, Great Britain will never retreat from the present position she has gained. India has to be protected! But the irony of history is that every inch of territory taken to safeguard another inch already acquired, will eventually "justify" a further step of prudence and circumspection. The creation of a buffer state does not usually satisfy empire builders. To them it is an expedient, never an end.

Perhaps it may be too much to assert that the British have had a definite and preconceived plan of annexing or dominating Tibet. In the eyes of British statesmen Tibet may be more inaccessible and less desirable than many of the territories near and around India, such as Burma, Assam, Sikkim, Afghanistan and Persia. But it is indisputable that they have taken an interest in the hermit nation beyond the Himalayas since 1774, and their interest has been growing as I have indicated in the previous pages. That expansion may be due to the intrinsic worth of Tibet, or the necessity of protecting the Indian frontiers. It is even possible that the British have been simply compelled by forces which they cannot control to seek for new markets and new ramparts for their empire in India. They may have done these things by accident—they may have established their dominion over India by accident. They may have built

their entire empire in the same fashion. But into their real motives of expansion I shall not attempt to inquire. Probably the British have not known them themselves. What I am concerned with are facts, and on the foundation of facts I have drawn my tentative conclusion.

All the ties between Tibet and China have been broken since 1912. The only thing that China can hold as a ground for her claim of suzerainty is a feeble thread, which is altogether too technical to be of any avail. Tibet may not be annexed outright by the prudent British, if their position there is not challenged. Indeed, it is unnecessary, in that case, for Great Britain to do so, just as it was superfluous for Germany to annex Turkey so long as Liman von Sanders was in the control of Turkish troops, and German economic penetration was the order of the day.



Adapted from Teichman's "Travels in Eastern Tibet."

CHAPTER TWO

SINO-TIBETAN RELATIONS

I

SINO-TIBETAN RELATIONS BEFORE 1904

(A) *From Time Immemorial to the Ming Dynasty*

WHILE Tibet's relations with England and Russia are chiefly diplomatic and commercial, those with China are racial, cultural, historical, and political to a great extent. According to tradition, the contact between these two countries was first established when Emperor Shuen drove certain tribes into the mountains of Tibet in 2225 B.C.¹ Definite relations were founded, however, in the Tang dynasty, about the first part of the seventh century. Tibet was then called Tu-fan. Its king was so powerful that he had annexed not only central India, but also molested the borderland of China constantly with his army of 100,000 men. In order to bring about peace on the frontier, the great emperor Taisung married a princess of the imperial house to the Tibetan king, much as one Byzantine emperor had done in the face of a Russian invasion in the tenth century.² In the eighth century a peace treaty was concluded between Tibet and China, transforming the relationship between

¹ This story comes from the "Biography of Emperor Shuen," in the *Book of History*. It was alleged that Shuen expelled certain tribes into the region of San Wei, Three Peaks, which was taken to mean Tibet. A British scholar was, however, mistaken in saying that Shuen drove San Wei into Tibet. Edgar, "The Tibetan and His Environment," *Royal Asiatic Society Journal*, 1926, vol. 57, p. 30.

² Bushell, "The Early History of Tibet from Chinese Sources," *Royal As. Soc. Jour.*, 1880, vol. 12, p. 435.

the heads of these two kingdoms into that of an uncle and a nephew.¹ In 1253, Kublai Khan of the Yuan dynasty conquered all eastern Tibet and invited the Sakya monk, Phagspa, to his imperial court. Phagspa invented a language for the Mongols and accomplished a great deal in the translation of Buddhist classics. After thirteen years' stay in China, he was given the title of the King of Tibet. He was escorted to Lhasa, where he assumed temporal power. Henceforth the reign of the Sakya lamas began.²

During the Ming dynasty, Tibet was known as Wussutsang. At that time, Tsongkaba, the reformer, was attacking the red church of the Sakya lamas, who believed in demons and superstition and indulged in immoral practices. The new church that he advocated was called the yellow church, from the color of the vestments.³ Tsongkaba's reforms were supported and approved by the Ming emperors, and, because of that affiliation, the new religion spread fast all over Tibet and the lost relations between China and Tibet were re-established.⁴

¹ Willoughby, "The Relations of Tibet to China," *Central As. Soc. Jour.*, 1924, vol. xi, p. 189. The text of the treaty was recorded on a stone pillar below the Potala. The Chinese and Tibetan versions are included in Bushell, *loc. cit.* at the end of his article. The English version is found in Bell, *Tibet*, pp. 271-272.

² Willoughby, *loc. cit.*, p. 189.

³ Koeppen, *Die Lamaische Hierarchie und Kirche*, pp. 108-119, 122-324, *passim*. Waddell, *Buddhism in Tibet*, pp. 38-292 *passim*. Hoche, *Tibet the Mysterious*, pp. 53, 315.

Tsongkaba was born in 1417 in Hsi Ning. His name meant "the man from the land of onions." His new religion was the return to the primitive doctrine and observances of the religion of Shakyamuni. They used yellow because this color, representing gold, was first used by the Buddha himself.

⁴ Two well-written articles in English on the historical relationship between China and Tibet are those by Bushell, (*op. cit.*) and Rockhill. Rockhill, "Tibet," *Royal As. Soc. Journ.*, vol. 23, pp. 1-133, 185-291. A concise summary is given in Chen, *The Problem of Hsi Kam*, pp. 9-19. A shorter sketch is found in Wang, *The Tibetan Questions*, pp. 1-9. Cf. Wei, *Shen Wu Chi*, book 5, pp. 1-3.

(B) Sino-Tibetan Relations during the Ching Dynasty 1642-1876

BEFORE the middle of the seventeenth century, the Manchus had consolidated their position in Manchuria and Mongolia and had come into conflict with the Ming dynasty. Through the efforts of a Mongol chief, Gushi Khan, the Dalai and the Pan-shen (or Tashi) Lamas came to Mukden and tendered allegiance to the Manchu emperor. That was in the year 1642, just a little before the overthrow of the Ming dynasty.¹ After 1644, the relations between China and Tibet became more intimate. The emperor and the Dalai bestowed on each other grand titles, and a concordat seemed to have been established, recognizing the Manchu emperor as the supreme political overlord of the kingdom and the Dalai as the pope of the Buddhist world. In 1652, the Dalai came with tribute to Peking, where he was shown great courtesy and reverence by the imperial court and the people.²

After the death of the Dalai Lama V, internal disorder broke out in Tibet. The result of this prolonged intestine strife for forty years was the invasion of the Dzungarian Mongols in 1716 and the capture of Lhasa by the invaders. Tibet appealed to China. Emperor Kan Hsi readily responded. He despatched two armies, one from Hsi Ning and the other from Tachienlu. After a series of military victories, the Chinese troops conquered Lhasa in 1720. A new seal and title were given to the Dalai. A monument in memory of the reconquest of Tibet was also established in Lhasa.³ In 1723 disturbances broke out again in Kokonor. A Chinese army was sent to quell the revolt and drove all

¹ Chi, *The Dependencies of the Imperial Dynasty*, book 17, p. 3b.

² *Ibid.*, p. 5a; Wang, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10; Willoughby, *op. cit.*, p. 190; Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 17; Lü, *Chinese History*, vol. ii, part 4, pp. 56-59. Cf. Wei, *op. cit.*, book 5, pp. 4-16.

³ Wang, *loc. cit.*, p. 10; Chen, *loc. cit.*, p. 18; Lü, *loc. cit.*, pp. 61-63.

the rebellious troops from Tibet. The Dalai received the title of the Merciful and Self-existent Buddha of the Western Heavens. Chinese garrisons were left in Lhasa with two Chinese officials, the precursors of the Ambans. Chinese military posts were established along the main road from Lhasa to Tachienlu. After 1725, Chinese power in Tibet was further enhanced through the subjugation of local tribes, the establishment of peaceful relations with Nepal and Bhutan, and other measures of consolidation.¹

Tibet was divided into four regions: Chien Tsang (Anterior Tibet) or Kam, comprising those tribes near the border of Szechuan; Chung Tsang (Central Tibet), the territory about Lhasa; Hou Tsang (Ulterior Tibet), comprising the land west of Lhasa, with the seat of the Panshen Lama at Tashilumpo; and Nyari, the extreme western section of Tibet.

Two Chinese Ambans were stationed in Lhasa: Chu Tsang Ta Chen, the imperial resident in Tibet, and his assistant, Pun Pan Ta Chen. Both were appointed from the Manchu banners with the rank of the governor general of Szechuan. Their duties were to supervise the entire administration of Tibet, memorialize the throne on important matters, and serve as a medium between China and Nepal. They were also given the power of nominating the officials who should serve under them.

An army about 1500 strong, under Chinese control, was distributed over all the important strategic points of Tibet. In addition to this force, there was the Tibetan army composed of native conscripts from the villages. It was estimated that the total number of these auxiliary forces was 64,000. In order to facilitate communication and military transportation, three commissaries, Liang Tai, were stationed in Lhasa, Tashilumpo, and Nyari respectively. These governmental agents were assisted by various

¹ Wang, *op. cit.*, p. 11; Chen, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19; Cf. Hsiao, *General History of the Ching Dynasty*, vol. ii, pp. 131-138; also see Chi, *op. cit.*, books 17 and 18.

paymasters and deputies of imperial representatives, who took care of all matters concerning Chinese interests in Tibet.¹

In 1780 Panshen Lama VI came to Peking to congratulate Emperor Chien Lung on his seventieth birthday.² During his stay in Peking he contracted smallpox and died subsequently. His disciples, while carrying his bones to Tibet, were unscrupulous enough to divide among themselves the precious gifts from the emperor to their master. This high-handed robbery infuriated the brother of the deceased lama so much that he went to Nepal and instigated the Gurkhas to invade Tibet. In 1791, a Nepalese army entered Tibet under the pretext of objecting against the excessive Tibetan duties on Nepalese goods. The Chinese Amban was so timid that he retreated continually before the vanguard of the Gurkhas. In 1792, Emperor Chien Lung sent an expedition into Tibet. In September, Nepal begged the intervention of the English, but failed. Soon the Chinese army entered the country of the Gurkhas and a battle took place near Katmantu. Nepal was completely brought to its knees, and a treaty was signed.³

The results of this victory of China were manifold. Nepal, for the first time, formally acknowledged the suzerainty of China and started her regular tribute to the Chinese emperor. In the second place, China's power in Tibet was greatly enhanced. Chinese forces were increased in order to forestall any emergency. Chinese Ambans were raised to the same rank as the Dalai and the Panshen Lamas, with complete control of financial and military affairs. Most of the important posts in the Tibetan government were appointed upon the recommendation of the imperial representatives. In other words, while the Dalai and Panshen were given absolute power in religious matters, the

¹ *Ta Ching Hwei Tien*, books 974, 980, 981, 986, 992, 993, *passim*. A convenient summary is given in Mayers, *The Chinese Government*, pp. 109-119.

² Wei, *op. cit.*, p. 206; Chi, *op. cit.*, book 18, p. 18a.

³ *Hsiao op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 125-130.

Chinese representatives were the supreme political heads. China had not only got the right of a suzerain in Tibet, but also that of a sovereign.¹ In addition to these measures, the Chinese government delimited the boundaries between Nepal and Tibet. All smuggling from the side of Nepal was explicitly forbidden. On the Dalai himself special favors were showered. All land taxes in Tibet were suspended. Strict decrees were issued to forbid Chinese officials from oppressing the people. A huge quantity of grain and money was sent to Anterior Tibet to relieve the poor. All demolished houses of the natives were reconstructed for them by the government. All refugees were invited back to their peaceful occupations. Thus a demonstration of honest government and a display of prowess compelled the Tibetans to look upon China as their protector and saviour. Even today, when Chinese influence has vanished, the Tibetans still long for the return of Chinese magistrates, because they were more honest than the Tibetans.² It was due to the foolish haughtiness of the Chinese in later times, the weakness of their military strength, and the aggressiveness of England that Tibet gradually drifted away from China.

In 1876, on account of the murder of a British official in Yunnan, the treaty of Chefoo was concluded. Great Britain was permitted *inter alia* to send a mission from Peking to Lhasa.³ This attempt was, however, later abandoned. One thing was significant: in regard to Tibet, Great Britain had scrupulously observed international law in consulting China before she did anything concerning Tibet. Downing Street, however, did not permanently continue to be so meticulous.

¹ Chen, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20; Wang, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-13.

² Wang, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14. The affection of the Tibetans for the Chinese was even admitted by Bell, the man who advocated the independence of Tibet with an apostolic fire. See Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 214.

³ For the text see *A. & P.*, 1877, (*cd.* 1832) no. 14, enclosure 1, p. 16. The provision is contained in a "separate article."

(C) *Sino-Tibetan Relation, 1876-1904. The Period of Indifference and Helplessness*

CHINA'S power in Tibet was already on the decline by the year 1876. The opium war had humiliated China. The Nanking treaty had forced her to cede Hongkong to England. It imposed a heavy indemnity on her treasury. It took away from her the right of tariff autonomy. Her prestige as a power in the East and a suzerain of her dependencies suffered an immeasurable blow. From 1850 to 1864, she was in a great turmoil due to the Taiping rebellion, which shook the very foundation of the Manchu dynasty. Her resources were exhausted; her strength was well-nigh spent. Even after the dynasty succeeded in crushing the rebels, the work of rehabilitation consumed a great part of the government's energy and money. Furthermore, the Manchus, conscious of the possible danger of another uprising against their rule, were bent on consolidating their position in China proper. Their attention to frontier affairs slackened. In 1857, began the war against France and England. Crippled by internal calamities, and humiliation from without, she had to cede a large slice of territory to Russia as the price of Ignatieff's "mediation."¹ Although the Taipings were finally suppressed in 1864, she discovered that another revolution was aflame in Kashgar. Her Mohammedan subjects revolted in Yunnan and Kansu in 1870. In 1871, Russia annexed Kuldja. From 1877 to 1878 terrible famines swept away hundreds of farms and swallowed thousands of Chinese peasants. China had so many pressing problems to solve at home that she could no longer maintain her firm grip on the situation in Tibet.

¹ For the astute tactics employed by Nicolas Ignatieff in his "mediation," see Cordier, *L'Expédition de Chine de 1860*, pp. 121, 187, 209, 247; Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, vol. i, pp. 91-97.

A possible war with Japan loomed up in 1882 but was averted through diplomacy. However, an inevitable clash seemed near when Japan fastened her eyes on Korea, and China was not prepared to relinquish that dependency without a struggle. The contest came in 1894, and China, hitherto posing as a great country, was broken by little Japan. She was completely discredited before the eyes of the western world and before those of her dependencies. After 1895, she was confronted with the imminent danger of a partition of her territories, and spheres of influence were gradually marked out. In the palace intrigues were actively brewing for some *coup d'état*. The progressive party was struggling with the conservatives for power, and behind them continued the contest of the emperor and the empress-dowager. The woman finally won the battle; but lacking the vision needful for a sane and sound diplomacy, she was very soon enticed into a trap. She connived at the activities of the Boxers, and before long a huge and organized anti-foreign movement broke out. Then came foreign intervention, the capture of Peking by foreign troops, and the peace protocol of 1901. China was again humiliated. The crushing indemnity reduced her to such a position that she found herself in the constant clutch of financial embarrassments. Not long afterwards, in the war between Japan and Russia, Chinese territory was taken as an arena for two imperialistic powers. She trembled for the outcome. Russia was eventually driven out of southern Manchuria, but another guest intruded into her garden. During these years, she was so busy in warding off one blow after another that she scarcely paid attention to her outlying provinces. The devil was eating her heart; she did not mind if a toe was to fall off.

In the third place, China did not have able representatives in Lhasa during these years. They were generally corrupt, with a few exceptions. Such an Amban as Lien Yü could not but

exasperate the Tibetans. He was so haughty and so obstinate that it was due more to him than to any other force that the hatred of Tibet for China was aroused. He treated the Dalai with contempt. He did not listen to the sound advice of Chang Yin-tang, concerning reforms in Tibet. Indeed, he became so furious with the latter's criticisms of the Chinese officials in Lhasa that he conspired with his confederates to oust Chang from his position.

It has been a settled policy of China towards Tibet not to move unless there should be imminent danger of losing Tibet. Thus, she sent her army into Tibet in 1720 in the face of the Dzungarian invasion, and also in 1792 when the Nepalese encroached upon the territory of Tibet. Later, when her military strength waned, she had recourse to diplomacy to preserve Tibet as a protectorate. She tried to conclude a treaty with Great Britain in 1890 in order to guard her right as a suzerain and also to avert a further penetration of Indian troops. After the Younghusband expedition, she again tried to reassert her position by concluding another treaty with England in 1906. China was too supine to do anything unless prodded, but as soon as she was aroused to action, she acted with great firmness—sometimes overweeningly. We have seen that it was after 1792 that the complete and thorough-going control of Tibetan affairs by the Chinese was consummated. It was after the convention of Lhasa that the greatest period of her activities opened.

But we are now talking about events before 1890. There was no imminent danger of losing Tibet. It is true that Russia had already taken an active interest, as evinced by the planting of her influence in Lhasa, but the possibility of any Russian success was remote, in view of the fact that England was bound to react unfavorably towards her, and also that Russia was so much absorbed in her Far Eastern adventures. England had had some friction with the Tibetans in 1888, but China's inter-

vention seemed to have removed the possibility of an English invasion into Tibet. Hence, China's inaction.

Finally, we may infer, from the events that occurred before and during this period, that China's power as a suzerain had actually declined in Tibet. Her prestige as a protector suffered an eclipse from her defeats by various powers. The imperial residents allowed the supreme control over the entire administrative system to slip out of their hands. The Dalai XIII was ambitious to be the religious head, as well as the temporal king and therefore found himself in complete harmony with the rising nationalist movement in Tibet, whose goal was autonomy. Indeed, China's power waned to such an extent that the treaty concluded by her for Tibet in 1890 and the regulation of 1893 were subsequently denounced by Tibet herself. China's promise to Great Britain that she could enforce the treaties was never fulfilled.¹ During the years 1903 and 1904, the Chinese Amban tried to persuade the Tibetan government to negotiate with the British. The Amban repeatedly assured the British mission that he was about to start from Lhasa to meet Younghusband in order to settle matters, but it was due to the persistent refusal of the Lhasa government to furnish the Amban with transport that he could not start negotiations with Younghusband before the latter entered the holy city.²

Thus, it was due to the weakness of China's internal political organization, her absorption in defending herself against outside aggression, the lack of able Chinese representatives in Tibet, and the general waning of her power in Lhasa that China did not show any tendency to enhance her influence in Tibet. Even in those cases wherein she did act, she did so only to ward off a threat. She was, during this period, entirely on the defensive. It would have taken a great deal to arouse

¹ *Supra*, pp. 21-24.

² *A. & P.*, 1905, *op. cit.*, part ii, enclosure, no. 95, annexure, p. 140.

her, but she was finally stirred by the British expedition. She realized that she ought to take some action in order to preserve Tibet as her protectorate, and it is perhaps not too much to say that the years from 1906 to 1910 represented the period of her greatest activity.

II

THE PERIOD OF INTENSE CHINESE ACTIVITY

(A) *The Negotiation and Conclusion of the Adhesion Treaty of 1906.*

A DELICATE situation was created after the Lhasa convention.¹ Tibet had been regarded as a portion of the Chinese empire, but now Great Britain, for various reasons, forced upon the Lhasa government a treaty without consulting China. The embarrassment on the part of China was great. Should she give sanction to the *fait accompli*? If so, would that create a dangerous precedent for other foreign powers, who might prefer to deal directly with other parts of the Chinese empire? Should China refuse to recognize the Lhasa convention? Even granted that she was able to force the Tibetan government to repudiate it, could she overcome the resistance of the British? It was obvious that she could not fight Great Britain. Could she bring diplomatic pressure to bear on the Indian government? Hardly. Should she expect the abstract principles of international law to furnish invulnerable ramparts against the British act of intrusion? No. The *Zeitgeist* of that period was *Realpolitik*. Might she remain reticent? But silence sometimes implies acquiescence. Besides, what would be the psychology of the Tibetans, who believed that China could protect them? Not even a single voice raised on such an occasion! What a government!

¹ *Supra*, pp. 50-52.

Yet, on the other hand, the embarrassment on the part of Great Britain was also noticeable. Although the British government was prepared, even in 1905, not to alter its policy towards Tibet, or modify its recent treaty with Tibet in the absence of an adhesion treaty by the Chinese,¹ she felt it was safer to abide by general international practices. If China should persist in refusing to accept the treaty, what would Great Britain do? Evidently she could not throw the treaty into the waste basket; this would be too great a blow to British prestige. Should she force the treaty on the Tibetans, if they were backed by the Chinese and the Russians? Could England lead another expedition into Tibet? Of course, she would encounter no serious obstacle in entering Lhasa, but sometimes, in international politics, occupation is much easier than evacuation. How could her troops gracefully retreat? Most probably she would have to conclude a treaty with China. Moreover, a prolonged protest by China, possibly with a chorus by Germany and Russia, might arouse some sort of moral resentment against Great Britain. Perhaps British statesmen themselves would feel a sense of compunction regarding the occupation of a foreign territory without a scrupulous observance of procedure. All these troubles would vanish in the presence of a treaty with China. Furthermore, Great Britain might reasonably expect China to help her in the execution of the treaty.²

Indeed, this question of China's adhesion was broached early in July, 1904, when the Lhasa convention was not yet born.³ In September of the same year, the Chinese Amban actually promised to sign a separate agreement as soon as formal sanction should arrive from Peking.⁴ The expected sanction never

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 20, p. 20.

² *Ibid.*, no. 144, p. 88.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 104, p. 41; no. 107, p. 43.

⁴ *A. & P.*, 1905, no. 150, p. 61.

arrived, because China prohibited the Amban from signing any such agreement at Lhasa.¹ She preferred to send a more competent diplomat, Mr. Tang, to handle the problem with the Indian government.² Concurrently, the British government decided that the negotiations for the adhesion treaty should be conducted by the viceroy in Calcutta.³ But after March the meeting should take place at Simla. China was duly informed, and Tang was instructed to proceed to Calcutta.⁴ In September, 1905, Tang was ill and had to go home. His able secretary, Mr. Chang Yintang, was appointed to conduct the negotiations.⁵

The most important question in the negotiations centered around the desire of China to pay the indemnity for Tibet, because of the poverty of the latter. Satow cautioned the British government not to accept this proposal before China adhered.⁶ Lansdowne shared the opinion of Satow. In a despatch to the India Office, Lansdowne pointed out that the purpose of imposing an indemnity on Tibet was to punish the Tibetans. If Tibet should be released from such a burden, that fundamental purpose would be lost. Furthermore, by insisting on an annual payment for a long period, the Tibetans would be made to realize the binding power of the treaty with the British. In case they were freed they might just as well forget all about the episode of 1904, and the trouble that Great Britain had taken to make an impression on Tibet might have been in vain. The motive of the Chinese government in making such an overture could be attributed to its desire to re-establish its "theoretical right to supremacy over the Tibetan government." China might also be prompted by the fear that British troops would remain in the

¹ *A. & P.*, 1905, no. 162, p. 65.

² *Ibid.*, no. 167, p. 67; See also *A. & P.*, 1910, no. 2, p. 5; no. 3, p. 5.

³ *A. & P.*, 1905, *loc. cit.*, no. 186, p. 77.

⁴ *A. & P.*, 1910, *loc. cit.*, no. 2, p. 5; no. 4, p. 5; no. 5, p. 5.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 31, p. 23.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 42, p. 29.

Chumbi for a long time in case of default of payment by the Tibetans. As long as China refused to adhere to the Lhasa convention, Great Britain could not accept China's proposal. If China should consent to adhere, Great Britain might consider the proposition.¹

Later, when China seemed disposed to negotiate the adhesion treaty, Great Britain still objected to the payment of the indemnity by China, because the latter insisted on a provision in the adhesion treaty which would allow her to be the sole intermediary for all communications between India and Tibet.² Should China be willing to adhere to the Lhasa convention "in the form in which it is presented them", the British government would accept the arrangement regarding the liquidation of the indemnity by China. For, as soon as China adhered, Great Britain would be relieved of the pain of enforcing the Lhasa convention alone. Of course, it was understood that even the adhesion treaty should not deprive her of the right to compel the Tibetan government to observe scrupulously the provisions of the Lhasa treaty.³ It was further agreed that, even if China undertook to pay, the money should be actually handed to the Indian government by the Tibetan government.⁴ Finally the adhesion treaty was signed, and immediately Great Britain consented not only to allow China to pay the whole indemnity,⁵ but also to pay it in three installments.⁶ And later when the last installment was

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 43, pp. 29-30.

² *Ibid.*, no. 59, p. 35; no. 63, enclosure, p. 39.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 46, pp.30-31; no. 47, p. 31.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 50, p. 32; no. 54, p. 33; no. 56, p. 34.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 44, p. 30; no. 61, p. 38; no. 65, p. 41; no. 68, p. 42; no. 69, p. 42; no. 70, p. 42; no. 71, p. 42; no. 72, p. 43; no. 76, p. 44; no. 77, p. 45; no. 78, p. 45; no. 79, p. 45; no. 81, p. 46. For the text of the treaty see *Ibid.*, no. 94, pp. 51-52; *B. F. S. P.*, vol. 99, p. 171 *et seq*; Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 287-289; MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 576-577.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 83, p. 46; no. 84, pp. 46-47; no. 85, p. 47; no. 87, p. 47; no. 89, p. 48; no. 91, p. 48.

paid by China in January 1908, the evacuation of the Chumbi valley was carried out effectively.¹

The preamble of the adhesion treaty conveniently shifted the entire responsibility for the 1904 episode to the Tibetans, who had refused to carry out the treaty of 1890 and the trade regulations of 1893, and consequently "compelled" the British to take action. But the mystery as to why the British should undertake such an expedition without consulting China, who had been recognized by Great Britain as the suzerain of Tibet, was not unravelled.

The adhesion treaty gave sanction to the Lhasa convention, which China now promised to carry out faithfully. Thus, the ultimate aim of the British government to make use of the Chinese for the execution of a treaty between the Tibetan government and itself was realized. At the same time, the British government did not deprive itself of the right of bringing pressure directly on Tibet in case of violation of the 1904 convention by the latter (art. 1). Though Great Britain pledged herself not to interfere in Tibetan internal administration, or to annex Tibetan territory, China was bound, on the other hand, not to allow any other state to do the same (art. 2). Railway and mining concessions were not to be given to any state except China. Great Britain, however, had the right to connect the trade marts with India by telegraph lines (art. 3).

For Great Britain the adhesion treaty was certainly a great diplomatic victory. Not only did the treaties of 1890 and the regulations of 1893 receive fresh sanction, but also the fatherless child born of the rendezvous between Tibet and Younghusband in Lhasa was solemnly legitimated. The burden of forcing the Tibetan government to fulfill previous treaty obligations was

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 210, p. 135; no. 211, p. 136; no. 212, p. 136; no. 213, p. 137; no. 217, p. 139; no. 221, p. 140; no. 226, p. 143. On February 12, 1908, the viceroy of India informed the home government that evacuation had been carried out.

shared by China. Russia was more definitely excluded from Tibet. Above all, the British now appeared faultless before the world because China had adhered.

On the other hand, China could also derive some consolation from the new treaty. Her imperiled position in Tibet was saved. Great Britain formally acknowledged her suzerain rights. Her payment of the indemnity for the Tibetans might also deepen the friendly feeling between them and herself. Finally, with Russia definitely excluded and Great Britain tied to a self-denying clause, China was given a clear field to consolidate her power in Tibet. She had a splendid opportunity to save Tibet from foreign encroachment once and for all, if she should follow a wise and sober program with greater cooperation from the Dalai. But Chinese officials did not have enough vision to map out a consistent and coordinated policy. Their measures were often too harsh for the natives. The court in Peking did not have the courage to effect real reforms by removing corrupt officials in Lhasa. Due to these causes, Chinese power in Tibet finally fell to the ground in 1912, after its previous meteoric rise.

(B) *The Negotiations and the Conclusion of the Trade Regulations of 1908.*

THE treaty of 1906 was followed by an equally important agreement between Great Britain, China, and Tibet: the 1908 trade regulations. We may recall that in the 1906 treaty, China and Great Britain had promised to carry out the provisions of the Lhasa convention. Now, according to article 3 of the Lhasa convention, the question of the amendment of the trade regulations of 1893 was reserved for separate consideration, and the Tibetan government was bound to send representatives to negotiate with British delegates concerning the details of such amendments as might be necessary.¹ Since China was the suz-

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 239 and enclosure 1, pp. 151-155.

erain of Tibet, she was entitled to participate. Hence, the tripartite agreement. Furthermore, during the years 1906 and 1907 there had been considerable friction between the Chinese officials on the Tibetan frontier and the British authorities regarding the question of direct dealings between Tibet and India, the appointment of Tibetan officials to, and the opening of, trade marts, and differing interpretations of previous treaties. In order to remove the sources of strained relations between the three parties, it seemed necessary to conclude a new treaty which would elucidate the obscure and misconstrued provisions and thus improve friendly intercourse.¹

As early as July, 1906, when Chang Yin-tang was sent to Tibet to open up trade marts as provided by the 1904 treaty, the question of amending the 1893 regulations was brought forward for discussion.² The Indian government showed its readiness for discussion but insisted that Tibetan representatives be present in order to avert the possibility of Tibet's repudiation of any agreement to be concluded.³ China also showed her willingness and instructed her representative in Tibet to effect a friendly settlement.⁴ But she insisted that the Tibetan representative should act under the direction of the Chinese delegate. This point she finally won,⁵ and negotiations opened. The whole agreement was signed on April 20 at Calcutta.⁶ Ratifications by the Chinese

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 101, pp. 54-56; no. 103, p. 56; no. 105 & enclosures, pp. 57-61; no. 106, p. 61; no. 107, p. 62; no. 108, p. 62; no. 113, p. 63; no. 122, p. 66; no. 124, p. 66; no. 129, p. 67; no. 133, p. 75; no. 135, enclosure 8, annexures, p. 79; no. 148, p. 93; no. 150, pp. 94-95; no. 160, p. 100; no. 162, p. 101; no. 177, p. 107; no. 178, p. 107; no. 192, p. 116; no. 218, p. 139; no. 196, p. 119.

² *Ibid.*, no. 95, p. 53.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 193, p. 117; no. 194, p. 118; no. 195, p. 118.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 234, enclosure 2, pp. 147-148; no. 236, p. 148.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 239, enclosure 1, pp. 151-154.

⁶ *Ibid.*; also see *B. F. S. P.*, vol. 101, pp. 170-175; MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 582-585; Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 291-297.

and British governments were exchanged on October 14 of the same year.

The regulations defined and enlarged the boundaries of the trade mart at Gyantse. It gave the British merchants the right to build houses on leased lands within and outside the mart. Except in cases of disagreement between the lessee and the lessor, the rent and the period and conditions of the lease were to be settled between the British and the Tibetans (art. 2). The administration of trade marts should remain with the Tibetan officials under Chinese supervision and direction. But direct relations between local Tibetan officials and British trade agents were established. Even in cases of disagreement between these officials, China was not given the right to settle. She was to be notified, but the settlement was to be effected by the Tibetan government and India. Only when disputes could not be satisfactorily adjusted between the highest Tibetan and Indian authorities was China invited to make some arrangement with Great Britain. Thus, practically direct diplomatic relations between India and Tibet were legalized (art. 3).

In the event of disputes between the subjects of India and those of Tibet and China, they should be adjudicated by a personal conference between the British trade agent at the nearest trade mart and the Chinese and Tibetan authorities of the judicial court at the mart. Where there was a divergence of views, the law of the defendant's country should prevail, the officials of the plaintiff's country being allowed to watch the trial. All questions regarding personal or property rights between British subjects and cases wherein British subjects had committed crimes should be tried by British authorities alone. In cases involving the nationals of Tibet or China and Great Britain, the authorities of the defendant's country had the right to try the case with, however, the representatives of the plaintiff's state present in the

court (art. 4). Extraterritoriality could be abolished only when Tibet, in obedience to Chinese instructions, had effected judicial reforms so as to bring the legal system in Tibet into accord with that of western countries, when the same rights enjoyed by foreigners were relinquished in China, and when "other considerations" would warrant such abolition (art. 5).

Great Britain also undertook to hand over to China the telegraphic lines from Gyantse to the Indian border when those from China reached that trade mart. Meanwhile, China would have the privilege of transmitting her messages by the British telegraph line, and the duty of protecting it (art. 6). The British trade agents were allowed to make arrangements for the carriage and transmission of their mail to and from the Indian frontier. Local officials should accord the couriers due protection. When China founded efficient postal service in Tibet, Great Britain would consider the abolition of her couriers (art. 7). British officers and traders were free to employ Chinese and Tibetans in their service. Direct business transactions between British and Tibetan merchants should not be molested (articles 7 and 12). On the other hand, British officers and subjects and goods should adhere to trade routes from the frontier of India. They could not proceed beyond trade marts, nor reach those trade marts through the interior. The natives of the Indian frontier, who already were accustomed to trade and reside in Tibet, were not subject to the above provision, though they were, when continuing their practice, amenable to the local jurisdiction (art. 9).

In cases of robbery, local police forces should be bound to arrest the offender if he remained in Tibet (art. 10). In law suits involving cases of debt on account of loans, commercial failure, and bankruptcy, the authorities concerned should grant a hearing and take the necessary steps to enforce payment, but

they were not to be responsible for such debts (art. 7). The trade regulations, thus concluded, were to be effective for ten years and continue to be operative thereafter if no demand came from either party for revision within six months after the end of the first ten years (art. 13).

Certain topics were reserved for subsequent consideration. They related to extradition, the levy of custom duties, the importation of Indian tea into Tibet, and the appointment of Chinese trade agents with consular privileges.¹

The significance of the trade regulations of 1908 was well pointed out by Mr. G. Clark.² First of all, this tripartite treaty was the last treaty formally entered into by Tibet, China and Great Britain. Technically, it still remains in force, because no party has demanded revision since the time of its conclusion. Actually, however, the provisions were rendered null and void by subsequent events. In the second place, it was the most comprehensive treaty governing the relations between the three countries heretofore concluded. In the third place, the long cherished desire of Great Britain to establish direct commercial and diplomatic dealings with Tibetan authorities was fulfilled. In all matters, almost without exception, China is merely to be informed of what is negotiated between Tibet and India; only when they cannot agree is she to be consulted.

In Mr. Clark's opinion, there is no justification for such a procedure. Furthermore, he doubts whether the provision is compatible with the agreement between Great Britain and Russia in 1907, in which the former pledged herself to deal with Tibet

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 239 and enclosure 1, pp. 151-155.

² Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-20.

through the medium of China.¹ It is true that the 1907 agreement gave British agents the right to deal directly with the local Tibetan authorities, but that right cannot be stretched so as to permit dealings between the "government of India and the high authorities at Lhasa." Such a right would be tantamount to allowing the British to send representatives to Lhasa, a thing explicitly forbidden by the 1907 agreement. Besides, the provision with regard to extraterritoriality in Tibet is interesting. Great Britain promises to consider the relinquishment of such a right in case extraterritoriality is abolished in China and judicial reforms in Tibet are accomplished, and "other considerations" are satisfactory. What is meant by "other considerations" is not clear. "One wonders, too, just how this distinction between Tibet and other parts of Chinese territory—since Tibet is to be treated differently from the rest of China in the matter of the withdrawal of extraterritoriality—is to be reconciled with Britain's formal recognition of China's suzerainty over Tibet."²

(C) *China's Activities in Sino-Tibetan Borderlands and Eastern Tibet.*

THE Younghusband expedition awakened China to the possibility of England's annexation of Tibet. In order to forestall such an eventuality, she thought it advisable to entrench herself more firmly in that region. During the absence of the Dalai, the symbol of Tibet's solidarity, China perceived a chance to carry out her ambitious policies. While she was negotiating with India for a treaty which would confirm her suzerain power in

¹ According to international law, a suzerain often manages the foreign intercourse of the state under its suzerainty. But what matters law, if we are dealing with facts? Great Britain had actually dealt with Tibet directly and on a grand scale in 1904. Who allowed her to do that? Not international law. Who can prevent her from doing it again?

² Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

Lhasa, she had already taken measures to strengthen her position in Tibet as a whole.

Her first step was to bring the Sino-Tibetan borderlands west of Tachienlu under effective control. This policy was inaugurated by the creation of a new post of imperial resident at Chamdo for the purpose of subjugating not only the tribes nominally under China's sovereignty, but also those under Lhasa's supervision, those in eastern Tibet.¹ In the eyes of Tibetan authorities, the institution of such an agency was unjustifiable, and might be an act of usurpation of Tibetan power.

As a matter of fact, historically, the boundary line between China and Tibet before 1724 was at Tachienlu, west of which the territory was inhabited by Tibetan people. In 1724, however, Emperor Yun Chen annexed a portion of eastern Tibet to Szechuan and moved the Sino-Tibetan boundary to the district of Batang. The districts west of Batang, including Chamdo, were left to Tibet.² This boundary was not changed until Chao Erh-fen altered it in 1911.

Quite naturally the aggressive policy of China was greatly resented by the Tibetans, who soon found a chance to give vent to their indignation. In the first part of 1905, Feng Ch'uan, the newly appointed imperial resident at Chamdo started his program of effective control. He was bent on the curtailment of lamas' power as a preliminary step towards his general aim. He proposed to revise the old law to limit the number of lama priests and prohibit laymen from becoming clergymen for a period of twenty years. This policy aroused great resentment among the lamas. Furthermore, he had determined to carry out reclamation works and mining projects. Serious opposition manifested itself, especially after the execution of one of the lamas. In March, Feng's troops were fired upon by priests. On

¹ Teichman, *Travels in Eastern Tibet*, pp. 19-20.

² Wei, *op. cit.*, book 5. p. 18a.

April 2, chapels were destroyed. On April 5, Feng himself was treacherously killed by the lamas.¹ During the disturbances, two French Catholic missionaries were murdered, together with two hundred converts.²

China was prompt in taking punitive measures. In the same month the viceroy of Szechuan, when tendering apologies to the French consul for the murder of French priests, declared that Choa Erh-fen and Chien Hsi-pao, two Hou-pu Taotais, were ordered to Tachienlu with 1,000 men and an additional force of 2,000 men to be collected on the way.³ The throne was also angered. An imperial edict ordered the viceroy to take prompt action. The punitive force was increased to 5,000. General Ma Wei-chi at Tachienlu made preparations for an advance.⁴ In May, Chinese officials from Batang reported that the Tibetans did not want to revolt, and that the death of Feng had been caused by his harsh and unpopular measures; the lamas were willing to settle the matter peacefully and to hand over the guilty parties. On the other hand, China was warned, if Chinese troops were despatched thither, great disturbance might result.⁵ To this petition the viceroy did not reply. Meanwhile, Chinese military preparations continued.⁶

During the summer the situation grew more dangerous.⁷ In August, fighting took place near Batang, and the Chinese were victorious.⁸ Nevertheless the great monasteries of the north-

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 12, p. 13; no. 24, pp. 18-19; no. 23, pp. 16-18.

² *Ibid.*, no. 10, p. 12. The murder of the two Catholic priests was not due to the Tibetans' hatred of foreigners, but their enmity towards the teachers of a strange religion. Teichman, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

³ *A. & P.*, *loc. cit.*, no. 15, p. 13.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 16, p. 14.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 18, p. 15.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 22, p. 16.

⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 25, p. 19.

⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 21, p. 16.

western part of Yunnan joined the Batang rebellion.¹ More missionaries were killed; fresh reinforcements were hurriedly despatched.² At the same time, those of the Batang lamas who escaped, fled to a turbulent district known to the Chinese as Hsiangcheng, a week's journey south east of Batang.³

After Chao had quelled the lamas in the district of Batang, he undertook the siege of the Hsiangcheng lamasery. Built on a plateau and surrounded by high mountains, this community had hitherto defied Chinese power. The Chinese had never been permitted to enter Hsiangcheng, under the pain of being skinned alive. In 1905, a Chinese official with an escort of twenty soldiers had tried in vain to persuade the abbot to swear allegiance to China. This challenge of China's power together with the presence of the rebellious Batang lamas in Hsiangcheng made Chao take decisive action.⁴ In January 1906, Chao led his modern troops, 2,000 strong, to lay a long siege. After months' of bombardment, he succeeded in taking the lamasery by means of a ruse. On June 19, he entered the lamasery. Thus a new territory was added to his realm,⁵ and the southern road from Tachienlu to Batang and adjoining districts came into the hands of the Chinese.⁶

Towards the end of 1906, Chao subdued more tribes along the border. Triumphantly he returned to Chengtu, the capital of Szechuan.⁷ He was granted a new decoration and appointed to a newly created position: frontier commissioner. He had a rank equal to that of the Amban in Lhasa and controlled a vast region from Kansu and Kokonor in the north to the frontier of

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 29, p. 21.

² *Ibid.*, no. 45, p. 30.

³ Teichman, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

Yunnan in the south, and from Tachienlu in the east to the confines of Central Tibet in the west. He was known as the "warden of the marches", and he discharged his duties well.¹

In December, Chao published his regulations in the district of Batang. The Tibetans and the Chinese were directly under the jurisdiction of the Chinese emperor. Chinese officials should collect land taxes and discharge judicial functions and supervise the provisions for transport of the imperial commissioners. The latter were not to have "squeezes". In the absence of chieftains (in Chinese, Tu Ssu) every village was to elect a headman for the term of three years, subject to recall upon petition from the villagers. In every district there were three Tibetan and three Chinese officials for the collection of land taxes and the administration of justice. For Tibetan and Chinese laymen and clergy there was a land tax proportionate to the fertility of their soil. Officials in transit should pay for their transport, and the natives could free themselves from furnishing such transport (*wula*) by paying additional taxes. Payment of land taxes was made, either in kind or in cash, at the time crops were gathered. Official assistance was given to those willing to reclaim land on a perpetual lease from the government. The custom of compounding a charge of murder by payment of compensation to the relatives of the deceased was abolished. All capital charges must be tried. Highway robbery was punished with execution, no matter whether the injured party was killed or not. The fee for law suits was reduced to three rupees, and the court was reorganized. An attempt was made to curb the power of the lamas.² Lamas were forbidden to interfere with administration by Chinese authorities. A law fixed the number of lamas in each temple at three hundred, for which a register was kept. All

¹ Teichman, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

² The failure of the Dalai to stop the British expedition was cited as an example to show the futility of the lamas' prayers.

lamas who wished to become secular could do so. A government school was established and compulsory education was decreed for boys from five to six years of age. Barbarous methods of burial were prohibited. The habit of cleanliness was inculcated. Slavery was eradicated. Every family was required to have a name. Tribesmen were advised not to smoke opium. Finally, roads were cleaned and new streets were to be constructed.¹

One of the most significant features of Chao's régime was his endeavor to promote Chinese colonization of the Tibetan borderland. He not only established his residence at Batang, but he also invited Chinese farmers to settle in that neighborhood.² In February 1907, a comprehensive public notice was proclaimed to all farmers in the Chinese province of Szechuan. It described the fertility of the soil of the district of Batang. The climate was similar to that in China proper. During the last two years, due to the attitude of local chieftains, Chinese pioneers had been forbidden to colonize, with the result that the land had been lying idle. But now the power of China had been extended over this region, and Chinese settlers would be protected. Robbers had been arrested; armed posts had been established; tranquility reigned over all the country. The proclamation offered special inducements to pioneers. No price was to be charged them for the land; no travelling expenses would be necessary; and, finally, the women there were diligent and numerous, and these farmers could easily establish themselves as permanent settlers. But the qualifications for these pioneer farmers were strict. They must be of good antecedents. Criminals were not wanted. They must be strong and healthy and under thirty years of age. They must be free from the opium habit. They must furnish security to insure their not turning back before they reached their desti-

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 159, enclosure, pp. 98-99.

² *Ibid.*, no. 167, enclosure, p. 103.

nation. Those having families with them were given additional travelling fees for their wives and half-fare for children from six to fifteen. When they arrived, they would be provided with food, cattle for ploughing, seeds, and all agricultural implements by Chinese officials. The money, food, and grain thus borrowed must be refunded by them at harvest time, either in one year or in several years, according to the output of their land. As soon as the funds borrowed from the government were repaid, title deeds were to be issued and the ownership would pass permanently to the farmers. The decree also informed the prospective settlers that living on the frontier was very cheap. Domestic animals could be easily raised and the hillsides were full of wood, furnishing natural fuel everywhere.

It seems, however, that little response was made by the people, probably because of their fear of migration and their conservative attachment to their native soil. The decree itself was, nevertheless, significant. It marked the beginning of a comprehensive and far-reaching movement by the Chinese government. If the revolution of 1911 had not burst out and if Chao had been allowed more time to carry out his plans, the region of the Sino-Tibetan borderlands and even eastern Tibet might have been assimilated to China. But events took another turn, and Chao's hopes were not realized.¹

After the proclamation of this decree, Chao intended to proceed to Batang to resume his work of colonization. But in the spring of 1907, due to the transfer of the viceroy of Szechuan to Yunnan, he was appointed the acting viceroy pending the arrival of his successor. For more than one year he was occupied with the affairs of the provincial government in Chengtu. Yet, despite his absence from the Sino-Tibetan borderlands, he managed to substitute Chinese magistrates for native chieftains in such important and strategic districts as Batang, Litang, Tachi-

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 182, pp. 109-110.

enlu and all the districts hitherto under China's nominal control along the southern road between China and Tibet.¹

In March, 1908, Chao was appointed as Amban in Tibet.² In April of the same year, his brother, Chao Erh-hsün, who had just succeeded Chang Chih-tung in Hankow, was transferred to the less important position of the viceroy of Szechuan.³ Co-operation was expected of these two distinguished brothers in the extension of Chinese sway on the frontier.⁴ Furthermore, the board of finance appropriated to Chao an annual subsidy of £ 60,000. He was also ordered jointly with the impetuous Lien Yü to investigate local conditions and prepare comprehensive schemes for measures to be undertaken in Tibet.⁵

In the fall of 1908, Chao conquered another important district called De-ge, one of the richest, largest and most important in eastern Tibet.⁶ A small revolt near Batang was also suppressed.⁷ These aggressive campaigns alarmed the Lhasa government. It petitioned Peking authorities to stop Chao's advance, but in vain.⁸

Having annexed De-ge, Chao moved onward. At the end of 1909, he conquered the districts of Chamdo, Draya and Markam in eastern Tibet, which had been under the control of the

¹ Teichman, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.

² *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 230, p. 145. Hitherto China had only one Amban and one assistant Amban in Tibet. With Chao's appointment, and with Lien Yü remaining in Lhasa there were in 1909 and thereafter two Ambans. Lien arrived at Lhasa in 1906 as the assistant Amban. With the dismissal of Yu Tai as Amban in 1907, he was promoted. In August 1908, Wen Tsung-yao was appointed the assistant Amban. (*Ibid.*, no. 250, p. 160.) Despite his appointment, Chao did not assume his duties in Lhasa. He remained in eastern Tibet till 1911.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 238, p. 149.

⁴ Teichman, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

⁵ *A. & P.*, *loc. cit.*, no. 230, p. 145; no. 238, p. 149.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 297, p. 185; no. 310, pp. 192-193; Teichman, *loc. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

⁷ *A. & P.*, *loc. cit.*, no. 248, p. 159.

⁸ Teichman, *loc. cit.*, p. 26.

Lhasa government.¹ Meanwhile, a comprehensive scheme for eastern Tibet was worked out, which covered military training, reclamation work, the spread of education, the encouragement of trade and the general improvement of the administration. Despite his successes Chao was beset with difficulties. The revenues for his troops were not sufficient. His colonization schemes had not produced any appreciable results. It was obvious to him, also, that military strength could not be relied on for the subjugation of the wild tribes west of Batang.² The Lhasa government had recently accused him. Though they had failed in petitioning for his removal, he knew that stubborn opposition was in store for him if he actually took up his residence in Lhasa.³

By February 1910, Chinese troops from Chamdo marched into Lhasa. With the Tibetan government under China's control, Chao cooperated with Amban Lien Yü and General Chung Yin to establish Chinese rule over all Tibet, which aim was realized in 1911. During the year 1910, Chao was engaged also in founding effective Chinese administration in all the regions east of the Salween river by creating new Chinese districts out of the territories under the rule of native chieftains. Simultaneously, he memorialized the throne, proposing that Giamda should be the boundary between China and Tibet.⁴

In the spring of 1911, Chao was appointed the viceroy of Szechuan, "the most important and the most lucrative provincial office in the empire."⁵ On his way to Chengtu, he annexed the district of Nyarong without the instruction of the Chinese government.⁶ In August of the same year, he left the

¹ Teichman, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.

² *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 254, enclosure, p. 161.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 250, p. 160.

⁴ Teichman, *loc. cit.*, pp. 28-31.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 32. The description is a little exaggerated.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

frontier.¹ His place was taken by his chief assistant, General Fu Sung-mu.

Soon after he assumed his office, Fu petitioned the throne for the creation of a new Chinese province to be called Hsikang (western Kam). This new province was to be made up of the Sino-Tibetan borderlands and eastern Tibet. Its area was to extend from Tachienlu to Giamda and the Dangla mountains, and from Kokonor to the frontier of Yunnan. In his memorial he explained the important reasons for his proposal. First of all, England was "closely watching Tibet," and in order to safeguard China against territorial aggression the conversion of this newly conquered frontier region into a regular Chinese province was advisable. Besides, this area, so far away from Chengtu could hardly be administered by the viceroy of Szechuan. A governor for this new province with the seat of his government there would exercise better control over the vast and difficult territory.²

His request had not been answered when the Manchus were overthrown. In December 1911, Chao was beheaded in Chengtu by the revolutionaries.³ With him passed away Chinese ascendancy over Tibet and the effective creation of the province of Hsikang.

Chao was a man of stern character. He punished his foes and his own men with equal severity. His administration was at times relentless, but just, so much so that in eastern Tibet his justice and fair dealing are still remembered.⁴ Nevertheless his successes on the frontier were superficial. It is true that he created thirty-three districts each of Giamda and west of Tachienlu,⁵

¹ Teichman, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁵ For the list of those districts, see *ibid.*, p. 35.

and even sponsored the establishment of a new province. It is true that he encouraged various activities of the Chinese, especially their migration into the borderlands and beyond. But colonization requires time and persistency on the part of the colonizing power. After he had been executed and China thrown into incessant internal warfare, the seemingly imposing edifice he had erected in 1911 collapsed as rapidly as it rose.

(D) *China's Failure to Tame the Dalai Lama and Her Activities in Central Tibet*

FROM the first flight of the Dalai in 1904 to his second flight in 1910, China had been planning to bring the Buddhist pope under control. By the firm character, however, of the Dalai, and by the folly of Chinese officials not only were such plans defeated, but the Dalai was alienated and driven to beg protection from the British.¹

After the Dalai left Lhasa in 1904, he wandered in Mongolia. In the fall of 1905, he was reported to have left Urga for Lhasa, and this hastened the British to remind the Tibetan government of its treaty obligations.² Apparently his return was due to his disagreement with the Kutuktu at Urga and to the orders of the Chinese government.³ Possibly, also, due to the opposition of the British government, the changed policy of China, and the unwillingness of Russia to lend him help,⁴ he stopped in the province of Kansu.⁵ He remained in Hsi Ning for some time.⁶

Meanwhile in 1906, Chang Ying-tang was sent to Lhasa to make a general investigation and undertake such reforms as

¹ *Supra*, pp. 68-69.

² *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 35, p. 24; no. 36, p. 25.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 74, pp. 43-44; no. 119, p. 65.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 109, p. 62; no. 126, p. 67.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 104, p. 57.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 37, p. 25.

might seem desirable. He was an honest man and a capable diplomat. He exposed the corrupt practices of the Chinese officials in Lhasa and even went so far as to petition the throne to remove the guilty ones. His denunciation caused an opposition movement headed by the assistant Amban Lien Yü, who had arrived at Lhasa September 10, 1906.¹ Finally, Chang was recalled. But before he left Tibet, he had won the friendship of the Tibetans. He was responsible for the introduction of a military training school, of financial and agricultural reforms, and a better salt administration. He had made concrete recommendations for the organization of the Tibetan government. He stood for the policy of conciliation, but he was not allowed to remain.²

While Chang was in Tibet, the court in Peking took another false step. Amban Yu Tai, a capable man, was dismissed and imprisoned, probably because of the part he had played in the Lhasa convention.³ On January 12, 1907, his secretary was fettered also. Many officials of high standing in the Tibetan government concerned with the 1904 negotiations were degraded or dismissed. Meanwhile, British trade agents were informed that China had appointed officials as diplomatic and commercial representatives at trade marts to settle diplomatic disputes and look after the interests of traders at respective marts.⁴

When these events took shape in close succession, the idea was comparatively clear. China punished Yu Tai and the Tibetan officials connected with the 1904 negotiations possibly for a two-fold purpose; to impress the Dalai and to check the growing affiliation with Great Britain. That China was determined to make her hand visible everywhere in Tibetan foreign relations was also confirmed by her appointment of diplomatic represen-

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 130, enclosure 1, annexure 1, p. 68.

² Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

³ *Supra*, p. 48.

⁴ *A. & P.*, *loc. cit.*, no. 141, pp. 86-87.

tatives to marts. Technically, her conduct was faultless, but it was crude and unwise.

In March 1907, Chinese drill sergeants were imported into Tibet *via* India.¹ In July, the formation of a modern drilled army of 6,000 men for service in Tibet was proposed.² Simultaneously, provision was made for minting a silver coin for circulation in Tibet. The grain commissioners were replaced by new officials of the rank of sub-prefect to adjudicate Chinese law suits and to be stationed in eastern Tibet, central Tibet and ulterior Tibet.³

While these events took place, the Dalai was in exile. Early in 1908, in order to remove the fear of the British, he sent a message of goodwill to the British minister, which softened at once the tone of British opposition.⁴ Tribute was also paid to the Chinese court, probably to facilitate his early return.⁵ In March, he reached Tai Yuan Fu. He stayed three months in Wu Tai until finally an imperial decree ordered him to proceed to Peking.⁶

Before his arrival elaborate preparations were made, ostensibly for the purpose of according him due respect. When he arrived, he was lodged in the Yellow Temple, built in 1653 by Emperor Shun Chih for the reception of Dalai V.⁷

China tried three means to impress on the Dalai the sovereignty of China over Tibet. He was not allowed to receive foreign

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 156, p. 97.

² *Ibid.*, no. 205, p. 132.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, nos. 222, 223, 224, p. 141. Great Britain declared that the return of the Dalai should be decided by China. *Supra*, p.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 222, p. 141.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 243, p. 157; no. 246, p. 157; no. 249, enclosure, pp. 159-160.

In the decree it was stated that Chang Yin-tang had memorialized the throne that the Dalai begged an audience. It was not allowed at that time, but since he was now in Wu Tai, and the affairs in Tibet were settled, the Dalai's petition was granted.

⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 258, p. 163; no. 256, p. 162.

ministers except on Sundays between twelve and three o'clock in the presence of a Chinese official.¹ China was probably within her right to resort to such means in her capacity as a suzerain, but she took two decidedly false steps in other directions. She compelled the grand lama to *kow tow*, thus treating the head of the Buddhist world on the same plane as her subjects. The Dalai rightly refused, and a compromise was struck. He was to kneel before the emperor and the empress-dowager on October 30, when he was formally received by them. He had also to kneel before the empress-dowager on November 3, her birthday.² China had overreached herself and had quite unnecessarily hurt the susceptibilities of such a high religious dignitary. Finally, a decree was issued bestowing a new title on the Dalai: "The Loyally Submissive Vicegerent, the Great, Good, Self-existent Buddha of the Western Heaven."³ He was given an additional subsidy of 10,000 taels. He was ordered to return after the investment of the new title. He was expected to observe the laws and ordinances of the "sovereign state and make known to all the goodwill of the Chinese court." He was also to teach the Tibetans to obey the laws and learn the ways of rectitude. Lastly, the Peking government expressed its earnest wish to maintain the yellow church and see the cleavage between the priests and the people completely effaced.⁴ But when the Dalai very reasonably petitioned the throne to allow him to memorialize the court directly, his request was rejected.⁵ It seems that the Dalai was estranged by China as a result of his visit to Peking.

Towards the end of the year he left Peking.⁶ After one year

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 260, p. 165.

² *Ibid.*, no. 260, p. 165; no. 262; pp. 168-169.

³ The original title of the Dalai given by Emperor Shun Chih was without the first four characters. *Ibid.*, no. 264, p. 170.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 264, p. 170 and enclosure.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 263, p. 170.

he reached his destination.¹ In Lhasa he discovered the high-handed policy of Amban Lien Yü and the pressing advance of Chao's troops. He tried to petition the throne, but in vain. He appealed to the foreign minister, but received no response.² He was further alarmed by the stern measures of Chao in eastern Tibet, especially the burning of three big monasteries in Litang.³ In January, 1910, the troops from Szechuan reached Giamda. The Dalai was alarmed. He asked the assistant Amban Wen Tsung-yao, who had been appointed in 1908, for a conference and promised him that he would recall all the Tibetan troops east of Lhasa, that he would respect the imperial Amban, and that all supplies should be provided. In return, Wen promised that the Chinese troops would receive strict orders not to cause any disorder on their arrival, that disputes would be settled peacefully, that the religious prerogatives of the Dalai were not to be rescinded, and that no lamas would be harmed.⁴ Nevertheless, when the Chinese troops arrived, the Dalai fled.⁵ He fled day and night with the pursuing Chinese behind him.⁶ On February 20, he reached Yatung.⁷ From that time, until his return in 1913, he was the guest of the Indian government.

The Chinese government was not slow in taking action to punish the intractable Dalai. Immediately a decree was issued denouncing him as "proud, extravagant, lewd, and slothful beyond parallel," and responsible for the disasters of 1904 and the oppression of the Tibetans. Since he had been disobedient to the imperial orders and was not fit to be the head of the Buddhist church, he was deprived temporarily of his titles. The decree

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 295, p. 185.

² *Ibid.*, no. 297, enclosure 2, annexure 2, p. 187.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 330, (March 3), pp. 201-202.

⁴ Wang, *The Tibetan Question*, p. 62.

⁵ *A. & P.*, 1910, *loc. cit.*, no. 327, pp. 199-200; no. 326, p. 199.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 305, p. 190; nos. 306, 307, 308, p. 191.

⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 311, p. 193.

explained that the sending of troops into Tibet was for the purpose of preserving order and policing trade marts. The Dalai should not have been alarmed. Furthermore, he should not have spread false news to startle the Tibetans, nor should he be so haughty to the Amban, nor intercept supplies to Chinese officers. The Dalai was to be deposed and his successor elected accordingly.¹ This policy was speedily communicated to the powers on February 25.² China took special pains to explain the situation to the British chargé and attributed the British expedition of 1904 to the Dalai's intrigues and his wild disregard of treaty obligations. China denied that the power of the Dalai had suffered any diminution before his flight, that the Chinese troops attacked the Tibetans without provocation, and that China had the intention of transforming Tibet into a province. China pledged herself, also, that there should be no action taken to disturb the Tibetan administrative system or the yellow church. As a matter of fact, a recent telegram from Tibet had reported that the country remained very quiet and that the troops from Szechuan behaved properly.³ A few days afterwards Sir J. Jordan was informed that the deposition of the Dalai was not without precedent. The emperor Kang Hsi had deposed Dalai VI in 1710 because of his misconduct.⁴

Judging the events from a distance, the historian may suspect that the Dalai was ambitious and wanted to make himself the real ruler of Tibet. It was probable that he disobeyed orders from Peking. It was also certain that he did stop supplies to Chinese officers and did not treat the Amban courteously.⁵ From

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 340, enclosure 1, pp. 208-209.

² *Ibid.*, no. 322, pp. 197-198.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 334, pp. 203-204.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 344, pp. 211-213.

⁵ This inference is drawn from the promise he made later to Amban Wen that he would provide necessities for Chinese officers afterwards according to usage and that he would show due respect to the Amban.

the point of view of the Chinese he was further guilty of concentrating large troops in Giamda, ready to oppose the Chinese. If he spread some alarming news about the dark motives of the Chinese, he might have done that out of sheer fear. Perhaps nobody, conscious of his power, would have acted otherwise in the Dalai's position. He might have known that the sending of troops into Tibet by China was primarily for the consolidation of Chinese power in Tibet, against outside aggressors and not directly against him. But, from another angle, the enhancement of Chinese power meant the curtailment of his own. He knew enough history to comprehend the significance of the ascendancy of Chinese influence. The activities of Chao in eastern Tibet had left a deep impression on his sensitive mind. The haughtiness of Lien Yü convinced him of the remote possibility of a cordial cooperation with him. His memoranda to the throne were suppressed. What could he do except escape?

The blunder lay with the Chinese. Had they reached a cordial understanding with the Dalai, had they understood his character and the trend in Tibetan affairs, had they realized that it was better to rely on friendship than on force in order to achieve anything enduring, they might have consolidated their position in Tibet efficiently and quietly. There would have been no turmoil. No diplomatic battles need have been fought. Those things were unnecessary and expensive. But China's statesmen in Lhasa were too untaught in history, too crude in their conduct, and too narrow in their outlook. They used antiquated methods and through their folly China suffered the loss of the friendship of the Dalai, and even the loss of Tibet.

After the Dalai's flight, China took pains to explain to the British minister in Peking that the purpose of sending troops into Tibet was primarily to enable the Tibetan government to have more effective control over the country, and fulfill the international obligations of the Tibetans. She assured the British that

no change of *status quo* was contemplated, regarding internal administration. These troops were to be used merely for the policing of trade marts. The dismissal of the Dalai would not be used to alter the political situation in Lhasa in any way.¹

Meanwhile affairs were going awry in Lhasa. Amban Lien Yü had brought fresh troops to Lhasa in order to strengthen his position, but strangely enough, he gave them no presents of any kind nor did he even pay them regularly. They had hardly enough money to buy food. Naturally a mutiny was bound to brew. General Chung Yin, who commanded the troops, had to *kow tow* to the soldiers in order to keep them at peace. But when the news of the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty (1911) reached Lhasa, Chung Yin could no longer control his men. On November 13, the soldiers, and even Lien's bodyguard, rose in mutiny. They looted the Amban's treasury, and Lien was imprisoned by Chung Yin, partly as a means to protect him from the wrath of the troops.²

The looting of the yamen was followed by a general looting of Chinese residents in Lhasa. When, later, the Tibetans were attacked, they resisted. At that time no monasteries were pillaged.³ After order was restored, the soldiers elected Chung Yin as Amban, which act was subsequently confirmed by President Yuan Shih-kai in 1912. Things became quiet again, but trouble was soon to break out. The Chinese soldiers learned that a small detachment along the border was in dire need of help against the Tibetans. They applied to the Tibetan government for permission to go to their relief. Their request was refused, and they started immediately on a career of pillage. This time

¹ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 319, p. 196; no. 340, p. 207-208. Though the British did not find fault with China's reply, they urged, nevertheless, that unsettled problems in regard to Tibet such as the tariff and the importation of Indian tea be discussed. *Cf.*, Wang, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

² *Clark*, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

³ *Ibid.*

monasteries were sacked. The Tibetans rose in indignation, and fighting lasted till July 19, when a truce was arranged. Later, an agreement was entered into by the two parties. Chung was to remain as Amban with his two hundred soldiers, while Lien was to leave Tibet with the rest of Chinese troops. Friction, however, did not end there. The Tibetans still refused to recognize Chung as Amban. Tension increased steadily till finally Chung was besieged. He fought bravely with a handful of men till December 31, when his provisions gave out. He consented to leave Tibet, and on January 6, 1913, he and his troops marched out of Lhasa.¹

With the withdrawal of Chinese troops all the achievements built on the foundation of military power crumbled. Since that time, China's position in Tibet has never been as strong as it was before 1905. The feeble suzerainty symbolized in the person of the Amban was wiped out of existence. "The British, with a more unified administration and a shrewder sense of values, had taken advantage of the reaction against China to win the friendship of the Tibetan leaders."²

III

SINO-TIBETAN RELATIONS AFTER 1912. THE GREAT DECLINE OF CHINESE INFLUENCE IN TIBET

(A) *Before and After the Simla Conference*

AFTER China became a republic, she tried to regain her lost position in Tibet. A joint expedition formed of the forces from Szechuan and Yunnan was despatched to recover most of the important cities captured by the Tibetans during the preceding year. Such cities as Batang and Litang were soon reconquered. Order was restored in eastern Tibet, but before long, China's

¹ Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-31.

² *Ibid.*, p. 31.

vanguards halted, probably because President Yuan Shih-kai, who had been contemplating a *coup d'état* in order to make himself emperor, scrupulously avoided ignoring British warning,¹ and because Tibet had already sent troops to check them.² Another cause might be found in the changed attitude of some of the most influential Chinese statesman towards Tibet. Their policy indicated an aversion for the use of force, because extensive campaigns would surely bring the British on the scene again. They preferred to negotiate directly with the Tibetan government; they advocated the restoration of the Dalai's titles and the sending of a mission to Tibet to explain the situation. The treaties concluded with reference to Tibet were to be enforced in order to avoid international complications. It was due to the adoption of a pacifist policy by China that the Dalai was given back his honors in 1912 and Tibet was welcomed as one of the five races to form the new republic.³

But the Tibetans proved to be obdurate. This stiff-necked obstinacy may have been due to the support they had secured from Great Britain, or to hatred for the Chinese who had tried to curtail the Dalai's temporal power, or to enmity between the Chinese and the Tibetan people, for which the Chinese soldiers were chiefly responsible, or to the rise of a nationalist psychology in Tibet. Anyhow, China did not succeed in winning Tibet by force or through persuasion.

In 1913, China accepted the invitation to the conference held at Simla. It failed to solve the Tibetan problem, and the deciding factor for that failure was the inability of the three parties to agree on the boundary between China and Tibet. While Tibet extended its claim as far as Tachienlu, which appeared absurd

¹ *Annual Register*, 1913, pp. 402-403.

² Teichman, *op. cit.*, p. 42; Wang, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-66.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67. China beheaded Chung Yin in 1915 to please the Tibetans, but in vain. Teichman, *loc. cit.*, p. 40.

to a British writer,¹ and China extended hers as far as Giamda,² the British proposed a line, which would coincide approximately with the historical line laid down by Emperor Yun Chin in 1724.³

At the conference, however, China gave up her claim on Giamda. But she insisted on taking the Salween river as the boundary. Despite China's concession, there remained some difference between her proposed line and that advocated by the British. Furthermore, the British suggested that the territory north of the Dangla mountains and south of the Kuenlen mountains in Kokonor should form a part of Outer Tibet. China refused to yield on this point, because this region in question had long been a portion of Kokonor, over which China had full control.⁴ Since no compromise was possible, the Simla conference was adjourned without any result, and ever since the Tibetan problem remains unsolved.⁵

(B) *Before and During the Washington Conference*

AFTER 1912 the *de facto* boundary between China and Tibet

¹ Sir John Jordan said in 1924, "The Tibetans, in my opinion, have always been very unreasonable about the boundary, and have claimed a frontier right away to Tachienlu. No one could make me believe that Tachienlu and Batang are not Chinese." *Central Asian Society Journal*, vol. ii, 1924, p. 201.

² China's claim on Giamda is not without proof from official records. This whole matter has been dealt with comprehensively by a Chinese scholar, C. L. Hu, in his treatise, *A Historical Study of the Boundary of Hsi Kang*. For a detailed description of proposed province of Hsi Kang, see Chen, *The Problem of Hsi Kang*.

³ *Supra*, p. 102.

⁴ The fallacy of British arguments concerning the region between the Dangla mountains and the Kuenlen mountains was exposed by a British brigadier-general, a distinguished officer of the Indian army, who served in China and its borderlands for a considerable time. He said, during an address, "By the way, I would here remark the inclusion of Kokonor in our European maps in Tibet is somewhat misleading. Tibet under the temporal control of the Dalai Lama extends northwards only to the Dangla range, separating it from Kokonor." Willoughby, "The Relation of Tibet and China," *Central Asian Society Journal*, vol. ii, 1924, p. 188.

⁵ *Supra*, p. 73.

was a little west of the Mekong river. For several years this boundary line was not crossed by the troops of either side. Then, in 1917, due to another blunder of the Chinese, strife was renewed.¹ After one year of fighting China, handicapped by her internal calamities, and Tibet, conscious of the financial burden involved in a prolonged war, came to a truce through the mediation of Mr. Teichman of the British consular service in China. Both parties agreed in 1918 temporarily on a frontier line which was placed farther east than the historical boundary of 1724. Both parties also agreed that the whole question of Tibet was to be settled by the representatives of the Chinese president and the Dalai Lama later in Chamdo.² Despite this truce, small frictions were frequent.

On the eve of the Washington conference, China lost to Tibet all the territories west of the district of Batang. Furthermore, the Sino-Tibetan boundary dispute, which had wrecked the Simla conference in 1914, made subsequent negotiations futile. China, however, had the intention of threshing out the Tibetan question in the Washington conference when it was convened.³ Consequently, she did not heed the urging of the British minister in 1921 to settle the dispute,⁴ regarding Tibet. But, when the conference opened, the Shantung problem seemed so much more important both to the Chinese and the foreign powers that the Tibetan issue was not touched.⁵ So, instead of debating the question at the conference, China and England dealt with it through ordinary diplomatic channels. In January, 1922, the

¹ *Wang, op. cit.*, p. 92. The Chinese killed a Tibetan soldier who crossed the boundary to cut some grass.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 92-96.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Perhaps China had to drop the Tibetan issue in order to gain the support from the British in resisting Japan's pretentious claims to Shantung. This was her own fault. She ought to have been aware of such an eventuality and tried to solve the problem before the conference with the British.

Chinese minister to England informed the home government that Great Britain had formulated three conditions for the solution of this problem: Tibet was to have complete control over her foreign relations; Great Britain was to have the right to construct the Indo-Tibetan railway; and absolute independence was to be given to Tibet in regard to internal administration. Reading these conditions in the light of the progress Great Britain had been making recently in Tibet, especially since Bell's mission to Lhasa in 1921, the general direction of British expansion cannot be mistaken. The tone of British diplomats was now more dictatorial than during the World War, when Great Britain was beset with difficulties, or just before the Washington conference, when she preferred to settle the matter quietly instead of bringing it before the assembly of world powers. But, since the conditions specified by the British were so stringent, China declined discussion and the whole issue has been suspended till the present moment, despite occasional overtures tendered by either side, or missions sent to Lhasa by China and Great Britain. A deadlock persists.¹

CONCLUSION

At the present time, China has lost practically all control over Tibet. No Chinese soldiers and officials are found in Lhasa, although several British high officials have been there. Along the Sino-Tibetan boundaries in eastern Tibet, Chinese troops lack both provisions and ammunition to maintain order. Bandits are numerous and trade has been stopped. The small amount of Tibetan trade previously carried on by Chinese merchants has been prohibited by the British without any grounds in treaty or in law. Whatever commercial intercourse there may be between Tibet and China is conducted, in most cases, by Tibetan merchants serving as representatives of Chinese traders in Lhasa.²

¹ Wang, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-101.

² Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.

All the achievements of the Manchus are practically gone. Furthermore, due to the withdrawal of Chinese troops into Szechuan, the Tibetans have been continually pushing forward to extend their sway as far as Tachienlu. On the map Tibet still has the same color as China, because she has neither been formally annexed by any other power nor recognized as an independent state. But China's political relations with Tibet have been virtually severed.

Will China eventually lose Tibet? This depends largely upon the Chinese themselves and, to a certain degree, on the Tibetans also. The cultural and racial relationship between these two countries has been much closer than that between Tibet and any other nation, with the possible exception of Mongolia. That relationship still exists in the absence of Chinese troops. It can only be extinguished if barriers between the two remain for a long time and friction further stifles every good and friendly feeling. If China can readily understand the temperament of the younger generation of the Tibetans, if she can sincerely cooperate with them after she has put her own house in order, if she can assure British traders freedom and security on their frontier, China will surely win Tibet over. If, on the contrary, she should insist on small points, or still treat the Tibetans as inferiors, or act, not for the welfare of Tibet but for the promotion of self-interest; or, above all, if she should fail to work out some plan with the British, she will not make much progress in regaining Tibet.

Recently, there have been rumors about the gradual leaning of the Dalai toward China, due to the pressure of English policies. Since 1912 several Chinese missions have been to Tibet to effect some understanding. Not long ago a lady was sent to Lhasa to spread the teachings of Dr. Sun among the Tibetans and bring back friendship. Tibet is now a self-conscious country, and its people are learning world affairs.

A British writer once said, "The eclipse of the power [of China] there was due more to the rot engendered by the revolution than the strong arm of Tibet. . . . I cannot think that a great and populous nation will quietly submit forever to be shut out entirely from a region which they have controlled for centuries." It may be added that, if Tibet comes back to China, it will not be because she is forced to by Chinese arms, but because she will be much better off to cast her lot with a nation with which she has had such indissoluble ties in racial likeness, religious affiliation, and intimate historical associations.

¹ Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 199-200.

CHAPTER THREE

RUSSO-TIBETAN RELATIONS

I

Before the 1907 Agreement

BEFORE Dorjjeff was sent north to establish closer relations between the Dalai and the Tsar,¹ Great Britain and Russia had had many occasions for conflict in Central Asia, especially in Persia and Afghanistan.² Despite the success of the British in these regions in checking temporarily the Russian advance, the rising tide of a mighty nation had been sweeping forward.³ By the end of the nineteenth century, Russia had not only annexed all the Central Asiatic states north of Afghanistan, Persia and Chinese Turkestan but had also completed several important railways connecting the heart of the Slavic empire with its new tentacles. The trans-Caspian railway from Samarkand to Tashkent, with its branch to the border of Afghanistan, and a proposed fiddler from Ashkabad to Meshed, together with the new line from Orenburg to Tashkent, changed the political situation in Central Asia considerably. Raw cotton from Central

¹ *Supra*, p. 26. A Dorjjeff was born a Russian Buriat in the province of Verchnyudrinsk. He was brought up in the convent of Azochozki. He settled in Tibet in 1881 at the age of thirty-five. [*A. & P.*, 1904, *op. cit.*, no. 34, enclosure, p. 115.] Later, he became one of the three tutors of the Dalai, and due to his erudition he monopolized the confidence of the Buddhist pope, who held him in great esteem and affection. Kawaguchi, "Russia's Policy in Tibet," *Open Court*, vol. xxx, pp. 371-373.

² Curzon, *Frontiers*, p. 6; Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia, passim*; *German Diplomatic Documents*, vol. i, p. 195; Gooch, *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, vol. ii, pp. 199-214.

³ Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

Asia could be brought to Moscow cotton mills at less expense. and troops from St. Petersburg could be easily assembled for action in Tashkent within one week.¹

Simultaneously, Russia was making attempts to plant her influence in Tibet, a fact which alarmed the British even more. Having put the Near Eastern question on the shelf by an agreement with Austria in 1897,² Russia was ready to concentrate her energy on internal reforms and Asiatic projects. She had consolidated her position in her new possessions in Central Asia, and she had cast greedy eyes on the Chinese watermelon. Though she had given up the idea of the conquest of India,³ which Alexander I might have conceived at Tilsit, she did not forget her Buriat subjects in Tibet. Concurrently, the Dalai Lama showed a strong inclination towards Russia, partly because of the influence of Dorjjeff⁴ and partly due to his fear of Great Britain after China had thrown open Yatung in 1890.⁵

Russia did not establish relations with Tibet through diplomatic channels⁶ but through the influence of Russian Buriats and unofficial expeditions. Buriats were already numerous in Tibet and their pro-Russian influence was manifest. In 1896, a member of the Russian Geographical Society, Raborovskiy, and Kozlov, an officer of the Russian general staff, made a

¹ Ronaldshay, "Notes on a Journey across Asia," *Proceedings of the Central Asian Society*, December 14, 1904, pp. 10-14.

² Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary*, vol. i, pp. 185-195.

³ Popov, "Russia and Tibet," *Novii Vostok*, vol. 18, 1927, p. 101.

⁴ Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 249. Buriats were Russian subjects in Central Asia near Chinese Turkestan. They believed in Buddhism, and came in large numbers to Tibet to study, frequently with financial assistance from the Russian government. At the beginning of the twentieth century, there were two hundred of them in Tibet. Many were able priests, and because of their ability and scholarship they gained the respect and confidence of the Dalai Lama. Kawaguchi, *op. cit.*, pp. 371-372.

⁵ Ular, "The Tibetan Puzzle," *Contemporary Review*, vol. 185, January 1904, p. 26; Berlin, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

⁶ Ular, *loc. cit.*, pp. 24-26.

journey to Lhasa.¹ From 1896 to 1897 Badmaiev's interest in Tibet grew, and he received 2,000,000 rubles from Count Witte for a commercial enterprise in Tibet which was expected to usher Russian political influence into Lhasa.² From 1899 to 1900 a Russian scientific expedition under Pievtzov travelled to the northern limits of Tibet. In the meantime, Tzybikov's journey was also undertaken, as was, also, the second tour of Kozlov.³ From among these unofficial emissaries emerged the great diplomat of Tibet, A. Dorjjeff.

Dorjjeff was a Russian Buriat and had been educated in Russia. When he went to Lhasa, his erudition and wisdom won him the respect of his associates, and he was soon promoted to be the Dalai's tutor. Through long and intimate association with the Dalai, he succeeded in convincing him that Russia was the country to rely on in order to resist the English.⁴ In October 1900, he was openly received by the Tsar in the palace of Livadia.⁵ In June 1901, he went to Russia again. He was hailed by the *Odesskïa Novosti* as the head of the "extraordinary mission" from the Dalai to St. Petersburg, with "diplomatic instructions of importance." The mission was described as consisting of eight prominent Tibetan statesmen. Its object was to promote good relations with Russia. Autographed letters and precious presents from the Dalai were also sent with the mission, and a permanent Tibetan mission was to be established in St. Petersburg.⁶ When Dorjjeff arrived at the capital, he furnished inexhaustible material for the newspapers. His visit was considered as a most natural step by Tibet to effect a *rapprochement* with Russia, after

¹ Popov, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

² *Ibid.* Dr. Badmaiev was a student of Oriental affairs. He was also an adventurer. He was greatly interested in Tibet though he was regarded by Lamsdorff as a man of "eccentric character" *A. & P.*, 1904, *op. cit.*, no. 35, p. 116.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Chen, *op. cit.*, p. 29; *A. & P.*, 1905, part ii, no. 244, enclosure, p. 207.

⁵ *A. & P.*, 1904, *op. cit.*, no. 31, p. 113.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 32, p. 113; no. 33, enclosure, pp. 113-114.

China had been defeated by Japan and in view of the fact that Great Britain would seize every opportunity to force her entrance into Tibet. Russia alone could afford Tibet protection against intrigues such as the British had employed in South Africa.¹ In an interview, the famed Russian adventurer, Badmaiev, remarked that Tibet was quite accessible to Russia, and the object of the Tibetan mission was to make her even more so.² But he cautioned Russia that Great Britain might steal a march on her.

After his interview with the Tsar, Dorjief was received by Witte and Lamsdorff. He presented to them the autographed letter and the gifts from the Dalai. A few days later, Sir C. Scott called on the Russian foreign minister and made inquiry into the nature of Dorjief's mission. Lamsdorff assured the British that Dorjief was not a diplomatic agent but came to Russia to collect money from Russian Buriats.³ At the end of the year, Dorjief was presented to the Tsarina and was given honors. Thus was started the long series of his visits to Russia, which finally aroused the suspicion of the British despite Russian assurances. For it can hardly be refuted that his mission had political and diplomatic implications, in view of the events that took place during these years. In 1900, Russia gave her promise to defend Tibet diplomatically against the English.⁴ In 1901, the Russian foreign ministry memorialized the Tsar that it was willing to sponsor a pro-Tibetan movement among the Russians, in order to advance Russian interests in that country.⁵ In the same year, the question of establishing a Russian consulate at Tachienlu was raised. On November 6, 1901, the project was accepted by the government, and in the following year, details

¹ *A. & P.*, 1904, *op. cit.*, no. 33 and enclosure, pp. 114-115; no. 35, p. 116.

² *Ibid.*, no. 34, enclosure, p. 114.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 35, p. 116; no. 36, pp. 117-118. This assurance was accepted by Great Britain with satisfaction, *ibid.*, no. 39, p. 124.

⁴ Berlin, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

⁵ Popov, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

were worked out. Though the plan was not carried out, the attention of Russia to Tibet was obvious.¹

Soon there were rumors of a treaty between Russia and China in regard to Tibet. (A British writer even succeeded in securing a copy of the alleged treaty and published it in English and German.² According to the documents that he produced, China and Russia pledged themselves to preserve peace in Tibet. In the event of disturbances, they were to despatch troops on mutual notification. They also promised to take measures to prevent a third power from causing trouble in Tibet. Lamaism and Greek Orthodoxy were to be tolerated, but other religions were prohibited. Russia was to reorganize the Tibetan army, whereas China was to improve the economic situation. Other reports revealed even more ambitious Russian schemes.³

At that time, the relations between Great Britain and Tibet, were not very smooth. British letters to the Dalai were returned, and boundary pillars were torn down. Yet simultaneously, missions and representatives were rushing between Lhasa and St. Petersburg like busy shuttles weaving Russia and Tibet together. Now the rumored treaty suddenly came to the notice of Great Britain, giving her a shock. Was the combination of China, Russia, and Tibet possible?

The worries of Great Britain could be discerned in the stern notes she addressed to China regarding the alleged treaty. She reminded the Chinese government that, if the treaty had been concluded, she would take the necessary steps to safeguard her in-

¹ Berlin, *op. cit.* Simultaneously, a Japanese tourist in Tibet learned from a Tibetan officer that three hundred camels with loads of rifles and bullets from Russia had arrived at Lhasa. In 1902 the same traveller saw fifty miles from Lhasa, another caravan of two hundred camels fully loaded heading towards Lhasa from the northeast. Kawaguchi, *op. cit.*, p. 377.

² Ular, "England, Russia and Tibet," *Contemporary Review*, vol. 82, 1902, pp. 845-851.

³ *A. & P.*, 1904, *op. cit.*, no. 49, pp. 140-141.

terests.¹ China assured her that the treaty was not in existence, and similar assurances were later given by Russia.² Despite these denials, Russian influence in Tibet was still visible. In the latter part of 1903, when Younghusband was on the border of Tibet, he learned from independent sources that Tibet put great confidence in Russia's support, and Russian ammunition was actually found in Tibet.³ Later, when Younghusband reached Geru in January 1904, the Lhasa officials who came to see him threatened that, if the British should first fight them, and if they should be defeated, they would turn to another power and matters would be bad for the British.⁴

On the other hand, Russia had been suspecting that Great Britain would invade Tibet. When Mr. White was instructed to make a tour along the Indo-Tibetan frontier with an armed escort, Russia was greatly alarmed.⁵ At the end of the year, she asked the British whether they contemplated a military expedition.⁶ In the spring of 1903, suspicion of British motives increased.⁷ Later, when Younghusband was ordered to proceed to Gyantse, Russia was given assurance that Great Britain sought only for satisfaction.⁸ Before long the Russo-Japanese war flared up. Because of this, Russia was forced to be indifferent towards Tibet, though she attempted, without effect, to encourage China

¹ *A. & P.*, 1904, *op. cit.*, no. 52, p. 141.

² *Ibid.*, no. 83, p. 187.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 158, p. 306; no. 166, p. 309. Russian rifles were later found at Karola (in May 1904). *A. & P.*, 1905, *op. cit.*, no. 17, p. 8.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 173, p. 312.

⁵ *A. & P.* 1904, *loc. cit.*, no. 56, pp. 143-144.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 64, p. 150.

⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 68, p. 178; no. 69, p. 179; nos. 72 & 73, pp. 180-182. The Russian ambassador conveyed to the British government that Russia considered "the invasion of Tibetan territory by British forces was calculated to involve a grave disturbance of the Central Asiatic situation." Such an event was "most unfortunate." *Ibid.*, no. 141, pp. 298-299.

⁸ *Ibid.*, no. 133, p. 294; no. 136, p. 296.

to resist the British.¹ After Russia had been defeated by Japan and revolutionary influences were seething at home, she could not show an active interest in the Dalai, though the latter had tried to enlist the help of Russia to establish an independent state, and even endeavor to go to Russia during his sojourn in Mongolia.² Thus, with a lukewarm Tsar and the hostile British, the Dalai had to seek protection from the Chinese. This was a good chance for the Chinese to cement Sino-Tibetan relationships, but they missed it, and it has never come again.³

II

The Negotiation and the Conclusion of the 1907 Agreement Between Great Britain and Russia.

THE seemingly intense rivalry between Great Britain and Russia in Tibet subsided after 1904⁴. Russia became more and more indifferent, until, in 1907, she concluded the 1907 agreement with Great Britain, which pulled down the veil over the hermit nation by precluding the influence of both parties, at least *pro tempore*. Why did Russia change her attitude and policy? Why did the British accept a compromise?

On the Russian side, forces were at work for such a *rapprochement*. In the first place, the success of the Younghusband mission convinced the Russian statesmen that they were handicapped by geographical barriers in their struggle with the British in Tibet.⁵ At the same time, the war with Japan had not only drained Russia's military power but also had brought about a revolution. She knew that for many years to come she would

¹ Popov, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

² *Ibid.*, 1928, p. 36; p. 42, Berlin, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

³ *Supra.*, pp. 111-117.

⁴ *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 74, pp. 43-44; no. 80, p. 46.

⁵ *Parl. D.*, vol. 130, p. 1114; Ular, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

not be in a position to compete with Great Britain in Tibet.¹ Furthermore, Russia turned her attention to Europe after 1905. In 1906 Isvolsky became the foreign minister of Russia. He was a man who had no confidence in the Kaiser.² He did not think it wise to adventure in the Far East; besides, he was bent on the improvement of the Russian situation in the Straits.³ Indeed, his pro-British feeling and his wish to work out an understanding with the British on colonial problems was shown when he broached that question to King Edward VII, when the latter was at Copenhagen.⁴ Besides, France, now an associate of England and, concurrently, the ally of Russia, was eager to effect some understanding between Russia and Great Britain.⁵

On the British side, the defeat of Russia and the success of Younghusband assured them of their indisputable predominance in Tibet. Why could they not afford to be generous with a helpless Russia? On the other hand, Germany loomed in the British mind as a more dangerous foe to British supremacy.⁶ This fear of Germany was, therefore, shared by both British and Russian diplomats. As early as the beginning of 1906 Morley had suggested to the foreign office that a change of policy towards Russia was sensible, because the latter's position in the world had been materially altered. He even wrote to Lord Minto asking the latter's opinion about the terms that ought to be demanded of Russia in negotiations for the settlement of the existing problems.⁷ Minto replied that an *entente* with Russia that left out Central Asia would be a "sorry trophy" for British diplomacy.⁸ In the meantime, the talk about a Russo-Japanese

¹ Ronaldshay, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

² Isvolsky, *Memoirs*, pp. 40-83.

³ Cf. Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, vol. i, pp. 215-217.

⁴ Isvolsky, *loc. cit.*, *passim*. Nicolson, *Portrait of a Diplomatist*, pp. 15 & 159.

⁵ Berlin, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Buchan, *Lord Minto*, p. 225.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 227.

rapprochement was spread early in 1907. England, comprehending the meaning of such a combination in Asia without her own participation, was naturally disposed to enter some sort of agreement with Russia in order to concentrate her mind on European affairs and save herself worry concerning the Indian border.¹

Indeed, in 1904 Russia was disposed to enter into an agreement with Great Britain to settle their colonial disputes.² Negotiations were started before the Russo-Japanese war and were resumed afterwards in 1906.³ It was true that in March, due to a telegram from the Tsar to the Dalai assuring him of personal safety in response to his request, some embarrassment was created between the two governments, but, after Lamsdorff had given his assurance that Russia's policy in Tibet was non-intervention and that the Tsar was forced to send the telegram to the Buddhist pope in order not to disturb the sentiments of the Russia Buriats in Russia, Great Britain's suspicion seemed to subside.⁴ Later, when the British learned that a huge number of Buriats were escorting the Dalai with arms supposedly furnished by the Russian government, they protested again; and again British confidence in Russia was slowly restored, when the latter explained the voluntary nature of such an escort and that she had issued strict orders not to allow them to enter Tibet.⁵

Meanwhile, Sir A. Nicolson was appointed British ambassador to Russia to carry on the work commenced by Hardinge. In view of the traditional ill-feeling between Russia and England, he proposed to limit the scope of the negotiations to certain specific regions.⁶ Since the Tibetan question seemed least

¹ Buchan, *op. cit.*, p. 260. Cf. Fay, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 217-219.

² *Parl. D.*, vol. 130, p. 1115.

³ *B. D. O. W.* vol. iv, no. 32, pp. 622-623.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 306, p. 327; no. 307, p. 328.

⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 308, p. 328; no. 309, p. 329; no. 310, p. 331.

⁶ Nicolson, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-152.

likely to lead to controversy, it was tackled first.¹ In May, Grey instructed Nicolson to present to Russia Great Britain's basic demands, which stated that both parties should recognize China's suzerainty over Tibet; that Great Britain should have the special right to see that Tibet's external relations were not disturbed by other powers; that neither should seek concessions in Tibet, nor should revenue be assigned to them.² Nicolson also declared that the negotiations should not touch upon the interests of any third power.³ At first, Isvolsky seemed to be troubled by the British claim of special interest. He also maintained that, since there were so many Buddhists in Russia, she could not sever her spiritual relations with the Dalai.⁴ Russia's anxiety about the Dalai's return was, however, removed by the agreement that it was to be decided solely by China.⁵

In June, despite the fact that the Tsar acknowledged the liberality of the British demands, Isvolsky was still dubious about the implications of the British claim of special interest in Tibet and the exact meaning of the phrase "disturbed by any other power." He still maintained that the spiritual relationship between the Russian Buriats and the Dalai ought not to be interrupted. Furthermore, he wished that scientific and geographical missions to Tibet should not be vetoed.⁶ At one time, he hinted at the extension of the scope of the prospective agreement to cover Mongolia, in view of the growing influence of Japan, but the British dissented and the matter was dropped.⁷

Despite the growing antipathy between Russia and Great Britain, because of the dissolution of the Duma, the massacre of

¹ Nicolson, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-160.

² *B. D. O. W.*, *op. cit.*, no. 310, p. 131.

³ Nicolson, *loc. cit.*, p. 158.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *B. D. O. W.*, *loc. cit.*, no. 314, pp. 336-349.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 313, pp. 334-335; no. 314, p. 340.

⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 314, pp. 141-342; *cf. ibid.*, no. 314, p. 349.

Biyelostock, and the general distintegration of Russian political structure,¹ the negotiations were not entirely suspended, but the situation seemed, nevertheless, extremely delicate, and Nicolson had to proceed slowly and cautiously.² After October, the prospect became brighter. Besides, Germany, a country Isvolsky distrusted but avoided offending, had just given her assurance that she would welcome an agreement between Russia and Great Britain.³ Thus, at the end of 1906, negotiations received a new impetus and a draft treaty was drawn. Isvolsky accepted practically all the British points, only remaining reticent on the British claim of special interest in Tibet. He also wished a declaration attached to the agreement to the effect that the occupation of the Chumbi valley by the British was a temporary measure.⁴ Although later he allowed Great Britain a "special right" in Tibet, he still insisted on incorporating it only in the preamble and changing or dropping the word "disturb."⁵

By January 1907, a general agreement on the provisions of the treaty was reached, partly through mutual concessions⁶ and partly through the astute diplomacy of Nicolson.⁷ Every point they had been discussing was included in the treaty except that

¹ Nicolson, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-163, Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman in a speech exclaimed, "*La Douma est morte, vive la Douma!*" The *London Times* also published articles attaching the Russian government in various ways, which hurt the Tsar. When Nicolson asked Isvolsky to give an outline of his view of the Tibetan question, the latter returned a blank stare and said he had no views at all.

² *Ibid.*, p. 164.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 170-173; *cf.* *B. D. O. W.*, no 422, pp. 363-364; no. 425, pp. 366-370.

⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 314, pp. 342-344.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 345, footnote 8.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 345-346, footnote 9.

⁷ At the end of 1906, Nicolson and Hardinge held out to Isvolsky a sugar-coated promise to consider any proposal that Russia might later submit in regard to the Dardanelles, with which the innocent Isvolsky was delighted, "beaming with pleasure." Nicolson, *loc. cit.*, pp. 177-178, 183.

relating to scientific missions into Tibet. It was agreed, however, that within the coming three years both parties should undertake not to allow any such expedition to cross their respective boundaries into the hermit nation, the whole question being reserved for later discussion.¹ As to the exact extent of Tibet, they consented to accept China's delimitation.²

The preamble recognized Great Britain's "special interest in the maintenance of the *status quo* in the external relations of Tibet . . . by reason of geographical position." Both parties pledged to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and refrain from interfering with its internal administration (art. 1). China's suzerainty over Tibet was recognized, and both parties engaged not to deal with Tibet except through China. Direct communication between British commercial agents and Tibetan authorities was not subject to this provision. Though the spiritual relationship between Russian and British Buddhists and the Dalai was to continue, it was not to be allowed by the two governments to infringe upon the stipulations of the present treaty (art. 2). Furthermore, they promised to refrain from sending representatives to Lhasa (art. 3). They also undertook not to seek any concession for railways, roads, telegraph lines, mines, or other rights for themselves or their subjects (art. 4). They agreed that no part of the revenue of Tibet, whether in kind or in cash, should be assigned or pledged to themselves or their subjects (art. 5). In regard to the occupation of the Chumbi, Great Britain pledged herself to carry out her promise as embodied in the viceroy's declaration in 1904. If evacuation should be de-

¹ *B. D. O. W.*, *op. cit.*, no. 314, pp. 116-349.

² *A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 209, pp. 134-135. China was surprised that Russia and Great Britain should limit the exclusion of scientific expeditions only to three years.

³ For the text of the treaty see *Ibid.*, no. 203, pp. 128-131; *F. F. S. P.*, vol. 100, p. 555-559; *B. D. O. W.*, *loc. cit.*, no. 314, pp. 352-354; Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 289-291; MacMurray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, 674-678.

laid for any reason, the two governments would exchange views upon the subject in friendly fashion. This provision was, however, not embodied in the treaty but was found in an annex attached to it.

III

The Effect of the Anglo-Russian Agreement. Russia in Tibet After 1907.

RUSSIA seemed to be quite satisfied with the agreement and was sincere in carrying it out. Not long after the conclusion of negotiations the Dalai again begged the Tsar for protection. In reply the Tsar advised him to maintain a friendly policy towards England.¹ Such a denial of protection by the Russians was probably responsible for the conciliatory attitude that the Dalai took after 1907. At any rate, the moment Russia quit her Tibetan game, the Dalai had to rely either on the Chinese or the British. Since the Chinese made blunders, the British took advantage of the situation. Indeed, Russia's indifference grew to such an extent that in 1913 Sasonov told Buchanan that Russia would not mind if the British changed the 1907 agreement to suit themselves, if Russia could be given compensation in Afghanistan.² Russia's attention was focussed on the European stage.

On the British side opinions were divided. Some blamed the government for throwing away everything gained by the Younghusband mission.³ Some protested that Russia should be given a voice in all Tibetan affairs.⁴ Curzon regarded the

¹ Berlin, *op. cit.*, p. 360; *cf. A. & P.*, 1910, *op. cit.*, no. 260, p. 165.

² Berlin, *loc. cit.*

³ *Parl. D.*, vol. 184, p. 537.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 528-529.

agreement as a great humiliation to Great Britain.¹ Ronaldshay deplored the fact that Great Britain should allow Russia to have equal privileges with her, after she had spent so much money and energy in 1904.² In defense of the agreement, Grey argued that since the British policy towards Tibet was, from the beginning, a negative one, the insertion of a self-denying clause would not mean any loss on the part of Great Britain. Further, he continued, the Russian interest in Tibet was a "real one," because she had so many Buddhist subjects in Lhasa, and British control of the center of the Buddhist world would mean trouble for Russia.³ Those opposed to Curzon's policy cheered the agreement as a "death knell" to such a policy in the future.⁴ Some declared that such an *entente* with Russia would not only win the favor of China, because it recognized once more in emphatic terms the suzerainty of the latter, but would also unite the two western races in the face of rising nationalism throughout the east.⁵

By virtue of the 1907 agreement, the strife between Great Britain and Russia was suspended at least for a few years. But, after 1911, when China was further weakened, Russia and Great Britain became active again. After Russia had concluded a convention with Mongolia which virtually established her protectorate over that northern dependency of China, an additional treaty was concluded in January, 1913 between Mongolia and Tibet. Both parties declared their independence of China. They also pledged themselves to render mutual assistance in preserving their religion and removing danger both from within and from without.⁶ Since they were so close in race, faith, and senti-

¹ *Parl. D.*, vol. 184, p. 516; Curzon, *Frontier*, p. 31.

² *Parl. D.*, vol. 184, pp. 504-506; *cf. ibid.*, p. 463.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 492-493.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 539-540.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 516-517.

⁶ For the text of the treaty, see Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 304-305.

ments, the road for possible Russian penetration southwards was opened.¹ It was due to the possibility of the renewed activities of Russia in Tibet that Great Britain forced on China the proposal of a conference to solve the Tibetan question.² When China refused to sign the proposed convention, Great Britain warned her bluntly that she would sign a separate treaty with Tibet. At this moment, perhaps, she had already forgotten her international obligations under the 1907 agreement towards China and Russia.

Meanwhile, Dorjjeff had returned to Lhasa,³ together with Zerempil, another Russian Buriat. While the former was preparing for the return of the Dalai from India, the latter was driving the Chinese troops gradually out of Tibet. When the Dalai returned in 1913, he offered Zerempil the positions of foreign minister and commander of the army. Zerempil, knowing the pro-British tendency of the Dalai, declined to accept the honors. He went north to Russia, toward which his feelings drew him irresistibly. With the departure of Zerempil the pro-Russian tendencies in Tibet suffered a great blow. Later, Dorjjeff was discredited by the Dalai, when the former concluded the Mongolian-Tibetan Treaty. Russian influence waned. In 1917, at the outbreak of the Russian revolution, Zerempil fought for the Tsar against the Reds and was captured. Later, he was released and pardoned so that he might join the workers' army to defend Russia against England and France, towards whom Zerempil had no friendly feeling. He did not return to Tibet, but he hoped that the gospel of Bolshevism might reach Tibet and save her from the imperialist yoke. So far, that gospel has not come.⁴

¹ Cf. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, vol. ii, p. 533.

² *Supra*, p. 70.

³ *Parl. D.*, vol. 141, p. 1978 *et seq.*; p. 1955 *et seq.*; vol. 142, p. 1391.

⁴ For the efforts made by Dorjjeff and Zerempil after 1910 to free Tibet from

Conclusion

RUSSIA'S affiliation with Tibet was primarily religious, but frequently because of it she gained political influence there. However, she lost her position gradually, due to distance, the determined opposition of the British, the waning of her power in the east after 1905, and her increased attention to European affairs. At the present time, no Russian influence is visible in Tibet, although religious association is still maintained.

A revival of Russia's interest in Tibet, and perhaps in India also, will be quite possible when the Soviet government has consolidated its position in Russia and developed her resources. While the British may use economic forces and military means to keep the visible Russia at a great distance and employ the sacred inviolability of treaties in arguments with her diplomats, they cannot dam the stream of ideas. And it is in the field of ideas that the relative positions of Great Britain and Russia in Tibet will eventually be determined.

China, Zerempil's resignation, and his return to Russia, see Filchner, *Sturm über Asien*, pp. 250-311.

CONCLUSION

THE preceding three chapters should indicate the relative positions of Great Britain, China and Russia in Tibet.

Russia's political influence in Tibet has been, for the time being at least, wiped out. She is too far away from the stage,¹ and her foreign policies and internal catastrophes have given her too much worry to allow her to pay attention to a distant and comparatively unimportant country. But Russian religious relationships with Tibet have not been severed. From Mongolia, Siberia, and the district around the Caspian Sea, Russian Buriats are still going to Lhasa every year to pay homage to the Dalai. Recently the approach of two railroads to Chinese Turkestan had revived Russia's interest in Tibetan trade. Will she succeed in drawing Tibet into her economic vortex? This depends on several conditions. She would have to fight the innate conservatism of the Tibetans—especially of the lamas. She would have to overcome the resistance of Tibet's religious hierarchy. Above all, she would have to combat Great Britain. Trade may be developed slowly without causing a determined British opposition; but a serious attempt to propagate Soviet ideas would find foes among the Tibetans as well as the British. History has created these obstacles, and perhaps history alone will be able to remove them. Unless Russia persists in her propaganda for a long time and Great Britain's power in India wanes, and unless the mass of the people in Central Asia and in India come to believe in communism, Russia's immediate success will be slight.

Despite geographical propinquity and the tenacious affiliations which the years have fostered, China has lost the political in-

¹ Kawaguchi, *op. cit.*, p. 379.

fluence which she once wielded in Tibet. This eclipse of her power can be traced to several causes. During the last century she has failed to follow a persistent, consistent and coordinated policy. The men in the field seldom cooperated with the central government; dissension in policy and action was frequent even among her representatives on the frontier. In the absence of foreign aggression, she did not make efforts to forestall it. When she was goaded to action, she acted without forethought or subtlety. She did not understand enough of international law to argue with the British or to realize that she had broken treaty stipulations. Her representatives in 1908 stopped ordinary business transactions between the Tibetans and the British at Yatung! They connived at the publication of anti-British newspapers in 1910! Such measures were really unnecessary and unprofitable. China did not understand the British. What the British must demand, what they could yield to China, and what they could trade with, were all the incomprehensible to corrupt Manchu officials; nor did they know the temperament of the Tibetans or the trend of Tibetan affairs.

For the arrogance and ignorance of Manchu officials China paid a heavy penalty. Nevertheless, the ties between the two countries remain strong. China will regain Tibet if she can settle her affairs at home; if she can reach an agreement with India by conceding the latter's reasonable demands; if she can learn how to enhance her prestige, not by arms, but by culture and trade. Above all, if she can regain the confidence of the Tibetans by demonstrating her sincere desire for cooperation, Tibet will naturally return to her.

However, Tibet's affiliation with China does not necessarily mean her antipathy towards the British. Indeed, while Tibet associates freely with China, it would be a serious mistake for the latter not to encourage friendly relations with India. Great Britain, like every other country, has the inalienable right to ex-

pect friendship from her neighbors. She has also the right to develop her trade in Tibet as freely as the Tibetans are allowed to in India. If, however, Great Britain should overreach herself, China ought to resist on the basis of law and treaty rights.

Although the Chinese and the Russians have lost their influence in Tibet, the British have been gaining in power and prestige. At present they are the only ones who have close official and commercial contacts with Tibet. Trade has been developing steadily.¹

Twenty seven years ago, when Younghusband led an expedition into Tibet, these two countries were enemies. It seemed that overnight hatred melted into good will and good will grew into partnership. Certainly it was because of the incessant blunders of the Chinese and the feebleness of the Russians that the British were given a golden chance to develop friendship with the Tibetans. Also, it cannot be denied that great credit was due to the foresight, tact and vigor of British statesmen. They knew that India needed frontier security and trade, which they could not bargain away; they knew what they had to yield, and when and how to yield it; they knew history and diplomacy, but, above all, human nature. Their success was not an accident, nor was it confined to one field. They have supplied the Tibetans with ammunition; they have helped to build telegraphs and establish posts; they have controlled the Tibetan army and police; they have given a great impetus to trade; they have fostered direct diplomatic relationship; and they have entered various government services.

Thus, by using the power of diplomacy and the still greater power of trade, Great Britain now finds herself almost the partner of the Dalai in the control of Tibet. Without throwing China's suzerainty overboard, she has quietly secured whatever

¹ *Tibet, op. cit.* The annual volumes of trade between India and Tibet during the period 1914-1917 amount to 50.76; 64.05; 71.40 lakhs respectively.

she has desired. But, is her influence going to endure? An ascendancy built on economics may be overthrown by the same force. The nationalist party in Tibet, that welcomed the British when they were needed as advisors and allies against China, may some day become strong enough to manage affairs without detailed instructions from the British. The anti-British sentiment, now concentrated in the Panshen Lama (or Tashi Lama) and some of the big monasteries may grow.¹ The *status* of India may be changed to such an extent that Tibet will no longer be essential as a buffer state. Furthermore, if the dwindling population of Tibet should die out, who is going to replace it?² However uncertain future factors may be, it is certain that Great Britain will continue to enjoy her unparalleled prestige in Tibet for some decades to come.

¹ After his return to Lhasa in 1913, the Dalai, with the help of the young party and the British, has been consolidating his power at the expense of the lamas. Those who were not admitted into the young party, or those who conscientiously opposed its pro-British policy, and those lamas who were apprehensive of the curtailment of their power or customs by the Dalai because of his new reforms, were gathered around the Panshen Lama. Historically, the controversy between the Panshen and the Dalai is not new. The present one is, however, more significant in view of its political implications and the unsolved problems between Great Britain, China and Tibet. In order to cut the wire before the powder exploded, the Dalai fined the Panshen, in the capacity of a superior temporal head. The Panshen's treasury was drained to such an extent and his position so threatened that he was forced to flee under the pretext of collecting additional tributes from his Mongolian followers in order to pay the fines. This was the way he came to China in 1924, and has remained there ever since. He has been very courteously entertained, but China has not taken sides in Tibetan internal politics. Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-48.

² The Tibetan population has been estimated to be not more than 1,500,000. It has been on a steady decline on account of celibacy, polyandry, diseases and a high rate of infant mortality. *Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 24.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Annual Register, The*, (Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad) London.
- Bernstein, Herman, *Willy-Nicky Correspondence*, 1918, New York.
- Bell, Sir Charles, *Tibet*, 1924, London.
- Berlin, L., "England and Tibet," *Novii Vostok (New Orient, Revue d'Association Russe pour les Etudes Orientales)* 1922, vol. ii, Moscow.
- "Biography of Emperor Shuen," *Book of History*.
- Buchan, John, *Lord Minto*, 1924, London.
- Bushell, S. W., "The Early History of Tibet," *Royal Asiatic Society Journal*, vol. 12, 1880, London.
- Chen, C. W., *The Problem of Hsi Kang*, 1930, Shanghai.
- Chi Yin Tsi, *The Dependencies of the Imperial Dynasty*, 1884, Hongchow.
- Clark, Grover, *Tibet, China and Great Britain*, 1924, Peking.
- Cordier, Henri, *L'Expédition de Chine de 1860*, 1906, Paris.
Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales 1860-1900, 1901, Paris.
- Curzon, Lord George Nathaniel, *British Government in India*, 1925, London.
Leaves from a Viceroy's Note Book, 1926, London.
Frontier, a lecture at Oxford, 1907, London.
Russia in Central Asia, 2nd ed., 1889, London.
- Das, Taraknath, *British Expansion in Tibet*, 1927, Calcutta.
- Dennis, Alfred, L. P., *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, 1923, Berkeley.
- Dodwell, Lord H., "Minto as Viceroy," *National Review*, vol. 85, 1925, London.
- Eckardstein, H. von, *Diplomatische Enthüllungen Zum Ursprung Des Weltkrieges*, 1919, Berlin.
- Edgar, J. Huston, "The Tibetan and his Environment: an Interpretation," *Royal Asiatic Society Journal*, vol. 57, 1926, Shanghai.
- Fay, Sidney, B., *The Origins of the World War*, 1928, New York.
- Filchner, Wilhelm, *Sturm Uber Asien*, 1924, Berlin.
- Fischer, Louis, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, 1930, New York.
- Gerard, Auguste, *Ma Mission en Chine, 1893-1897*, 1918, Paris.
German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, selected and translated from *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, by E. T. S. Dugdale, 1928- , London. Cited as *G. D. D.*

- Gooch, George, Peabody, and Ward, Sir A. W., *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919, 1922-1923*, London.
- Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914*, edited by Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelsohn Bartholdy and Friedrich Thimme, 1922-1927, Berlin. Cited as *G. P.*
- Great Britain
Accounts and Papers (Parliamentary Papers) London.
 Cited as *A. & P.*
Parliamentary Debates, London. Cited as *Parl. D.*
British and Foreign State Papers, London. Cited as *B. F. S. P.*
British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, 1926-1929, London.
 Cited as *B. D. O. W.*
Tibet (One of the peace handbooks prepared by the British Foreign Office, Historical Section, vol. 12, no. 70) 1920, London.
- Hammann, Otto, *Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges*, 1919, Berlin.
- Harris, Dwight Norman, *Europe and the East*, 1926, New York.
- Hayashi, Count Tadasu, *Secret Memoirs*, edited by A. M. Pooley, 1915, New York.
- Holdich, Sir Thomas H., *Tibet the Mysterious*, 1906, New York.
- Hsiao, Yi San, *General History of the Ching Dynasty*, 1928, Shanghai.
- Hsieh, P., *Tibet's Diplomatic History*, 3rd ed., 1928, Shanghai.
- Hu, C. L., *A Historical Study of the Boundaries of Hsi Kang*, 1928, Shanghai.
- Iswolzky, Alexander, *The Memoirs of Alexander Iswolzky*, edited and translated by Charles Louis Seeger, 1920, London.
- Kawaguchi, Ekai, "Russia's Tibetan Policy," *Open Court*, vol. xxx, 1916.
- Koeppes. C. F., *Die Lamäische Hierarchie und Kirche*, 1859, Berlin.
- Kornilov, A. A., *Modern Russian History*, 1917, New York.
- Krausse, A. S., *The Far East*, 1900, London.
- Krause, F. E. A., *Geschichte Ostasiens*, 1925, Göttingen.
- Lü, S. M., *A History of China*, 3rd ed., 1925, Shanghai.
- MacMurray, John V. A., *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China*, 1919, Washington.
- Mayers, William Frederick, *The Chinese Government*, 3rd ed., 1896, Shanghai.
- Muir, Ramsay, *The Expansion of Europe*, 1917, Boston.
New York Times, New York.
- Nicolson, Harold George, *Portrait of a Diplomatist*, 1930, New York.

- Popov, A., "Russia and Tibet," *Novii Vostok*, 1927 and 1928, Moscow.
- Pribram, Alfred Franzis, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914*, 1920, Cambridge. This is the English translation of the original German edition, *Die Politischen Geheimverträge Osterreich-Ungarns, 1879-1914*, 1920, Vienna.
- Roberts, Lord, *Forty Years in India*, 1914, New York.
- Rockhill, W. W., "Tibet," *Royal Asiatic Society Journal*, vol. 23, 1891, London.
- Ronaldshay, Earl, "Notes on a Journey Across Asia," *Proceedings of the Central Asian Society*, 1904, London.
- Ta Ching Hwei Tian* (The Dynastic Institutes of the Ching Dynasty) 1899, Peking.
- Teichmen, Eric, *Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet*, 1922, London.
- Tomimas, Shutaro, *The Open-Door Policy and the Territorial Integrity of China*, 1919, New York.
- Tzybikov, G. T., *Buddhist Palomirk U Swiatyn Tibeta*, 1918. St. Petersburg.
- Ular, Alexander, "The Tibetan Puzzle," *Contemporary Review*, vol. 85, 1904, London.
- "The Solution of the Tibetan Problem," *Contemporary Review*, vol. 85, 1904, London.
- "England, Russia and Tibet," *Contemporary Review*, vol. 82, 1902, London.
- Waddell, Laurence Austine, *Buddhism in Tibet*, 1895, Shanghai.
- Wang, Chin Yu, *The Tibetan Question*, 1929, Shanghai.
- Wei, Yuan, *Shen Wu Chi* (The Record of the Early Military Conquests of the Ching Dynasty.) 1842, Kiangtu.
- Willoughby, M. E., "The Relation of Tibet to China," *Central Asian Society Journal*, vol. 11, 1924, London.
- Witte, Count Sergei Yulyevich, *Memoirs*, 1921, Garden City, New York.
- Younghusband, Sir Edward Francis, *India and Tibet*, 1910, London.

VITA

WEI KUO LEE was born in Nan Chung, Szechuan, China, on June 5, 1905. After graduating from the public schools in Chengtu, the capital of the province of Szechuan, he attended Tsing Hua College, Peking, China during the years 1920-1927. From 1927 to 1929, he studied in the university of California and received the degrees of B.A. and M.A. from the said institution in 1928 and 1929.

He was in attendance at Columbia University during the sessions 1929-1930 and 1930-1931, taking work with Professors Shotwell, Hyde, Chamberlain, Moon, Jessup and Langer. Since 1929 he has worked under the direction of Professor Moon. While in the United States of America he held the Tsing Hua scholarship.